IRAQ REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY REPONSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000941

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/RA:JYAPHE AND NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ YM
SUBJECT: IRAQ REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY REPONSE

REF: STATE 48144

Classified By: DCM Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

(C) Post provides the following response to questions posed
in reftel.

--In what issue areas is the host government already
engaging in bilateral and/or multilateral discussions on
functional issues (water, energy security, refugees,
border security, health, education, etc.) with other
countries in the region, regional and international
organizations, and NGOs and other private sector actors
like foundations and philanthropic organizations?

The ROYG has very little involvement in bilateral or
multilateral discussions on functional issues. With very few
exceptions, the ROYG's involvement in multilateral issues is
intended either to accrue financial assistance or to manifest
the country's and its leader's desire to be seen as a
regional player. A prime example of this sort of
participation is the ROYG's repeated attempts to act as a
mediator between various Palestinian groups.

The ROYG is a participant in the GCC's "A Malaria-Free
Arabian Peninsula" program.

The ROYG is also active in the anti-piracy contact group and
seeks to host a regional anti-piracy center. Its desire to
host the center probably reflects an attempt to garner
financial benefit or increased status.

--From the host country's perspective, which of these
groups are working effectively to produce joint action to
solve common problems, and which are largely talk shops
that have not produced and are unlikely to produce
concrete outcomes? Are there best practices in this area
that could serve as a model for other taskforces- or
lessons learned, both positive and negative - from
previous experience that should inform the Department's
thinking?

The ROYG appears genuinely invested in the anti-malaria
program. Beyond that, the ROYG does not appear to be overly
interested in taking joint action or reaching concrete
outcomes.

--Where would the host government see gaps in the capacity
of existing multilateral arrangements to agree on regional
solutions to regional problems? Are there any specific
functional issues for which the host government would
support the formation of ad hoc multilateral task forces?
Are there subjects where host country would serve as a
natural leader?

The ROYG feels it is a natural leader on the piracy issue
based on its proximity to the Bab al-Mendeb. President Saleh
appears to believe that his years of experience leading the
country make him a natural leader in dealing with hot-button
geopolitical issues like Palestine. In fact, Yemen's poverty
and the ROYG's lack of control over much of its territory
make it ill-suited to playing a leadership role on most
issues.

-- What other stakeholders - countries within and outside
the region, including the U.S., and regional,
international, and non-governmental organizations - would
the host government want to include in these discussions?
What kind of U.S. role would host country feel would be
useful/acceptable in such fora?

The ROYG has a strong desire to become a full member of the
GCC and, for that reason, would seek GCC member participation
in any such discussions. It equally would welcome a role for
the Arab League and other mainstream Arab organizations. The
ROYG would most likely welcome US participation in a
non-leadership role, providing support.

-- From the embassy's lens, are there any specific
functional issues, such as water, the environment, health,
or education, that might be ripe for an early harvest -
i.e., good candidates for pilot projects to prove the
value of new regional networks that would empower
countries to reach multilateral solutions to functional,
transnational problems?

The anti-malaria program could be "ripe for an early harvest"
if it were expanded to other countries outside of the
Peninsula.

-- What other sensitivities would the host government have
in terms of membership (Iran, Israel, Iraq, etc.)?

The ROYG would not welcome the participation of Israel. It
might also be uncomfortable with the participation of Iran,
but Iran would probably not be a barrier to Yemeni
involvement.

-- What functional issues or organizational arrangements
would best encourage host governments to expand membership
as comprehensively as possible (including Iran, Israel,
Iraq, etc)?

As noted above, financial support would be somewhat
persuasive. Beyond that, if participants were to include
Israel, President Saleh would probably require some sort of
face-saving measure. This would most likely be accomplished
through broad participation by other Arab countries.

-- What would be an effective diplomatic engagement
strategy for us to advance such a concept in the region,
and in particular, with your host government?

Local/regional branding is the most important strategy.
Association with the USG would only increase resistance to
any efforts associated with Iraq.
SECHE