IRAQ REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY REPONSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000941 SIPDIS FOR NEA/RA:JYAPHE AND NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ YM SUBJECT: IRAQ REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY REPONSE REF: STATE 48144 Classified By: DCM Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) (C) Post provides the following response to questions posed in reftel. --In what issue areas is the host government already engaging in bilateral and/or multilateral discussions on functional issues (water, energy security, refugees, border security, health, education, etc.) with other countries in the region, regional and international organizations, and NGOs and other private sector actors like foundations and philanthropic organizations? The ROYG has very little involvement in bilateral or multilateral discussions on functional issues. With very few exceptions, the ROYG's involvement in multilateral issues is intended either to accrue financial assistance or to manifest the country's and its leader's desire to be seen as a regional player. A prime example of this sort of participation is the ROYG's repeated attempts to act as a mediator between various Palestinian groups. The ROYG is a participant in the GCC's "A Malaria-Free Arabian Peninsula" program. The ROYG is also active in the anti-piracy contact group and seeks to host a regional anti-piracy center. Its desire to host the center probably reflects an attempt to garner financial benefit or increased status. --From the host country's perspective, which of these groups are working effectively to produce joint action to solve common problems, and which are largely talk shops that have not produced and are unlikely to produce concrete outcomes? Are there best practices in this area that could serve as a model for other taskforces- or lessons learned, both positive and negative - from previous experience that should inform the Department's thinking? The ROYG appears genuinely invested in the anti-malaria program. Beyond that, the ROYG does not appear to be overly interested in taking joint action or reaching concrete outcomes. --Where would the host government see gaps in the capacity of existing multilateral arrangements to agree on regional solutions to regional problems? Are there any specific functional issues for which the host government would support the formation of ad hoc multilateral task forces? Are there subjects where host country would serve as a natural leader? The ROYG feels it is a natural leader on the piracy issue based on its proximity to the Bab al-Mendeb. President Saleh appears to believe that his years of experience leading the country make him a natural leader in dealing with hot-button geopolitical issues like Palestine. In fact, Yemen's poverty and the ROYG's lack of control over much of its territory make it ill-suited to playing a leadership role on most issues. -- What other stakeholders - countries within and outside the region, including the U.S., and regional, international, and non-governmental organizations - would the host government want to include in these discussions? What kind of U.S. role would host country feel would be useful/acceptable in such fora? The ROYG has a strong desire to become a full member of the GCC and, for that reason, would seek GCC member participation in any such discussions. It equally would welcome a role for the Arab League and other mainstream Arab organizations. The ROYG would most likely welcome US participation in a non-leadership role, providing support. -- From the embassy's lens, are there any specific functional issues, such as water, the environment, health, or education, that might be ripe for an early harvest - i.e., good candidates for pilot projects to prove the value of new regional networks that would empower countries to reach multilateral solutions to functional, transnational problems? The anti-malaria program could be "ripe for an early harvest" if it were expanded to other countries outside of the Peninsula. -- What other sensitivities would the host government have in terms of membership (Iran, Israel, Iraq, etc.)? The ROYG would not welcome the participation of Israel. It might also be uncomfortable with the participation of Iran, but Iran would probably not be a barrier to Yemeni involvement. -- What functional issues or organizational arrangements would best encourage host governments to expand membership as comprehensively as possible (including Iran, Israel, Iraq, etc)? As noted above, financial support would be somewhat persuasive. Beyond that, if participants were to include Israel, President Saleh would probably require some sort of face-saving measure. This would most likely be accomplished through broad participation by other Arab countries. -- What would be an effective diplomatic engagement strategy for us to advance such a concept in the region, and in particular, with your host government? Local/regional branding is the most important strategy. Association with the USG would only increase resistance to any efforts associated with Iraq. SECHE