Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SANAA579
2009-04-05 12:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:
ROYG OPERATION GRABS 55 SUSPECTED EXTREMISTS
VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHYN #0579 0951235 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 051235Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY SANAA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1547
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000579
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER YM
SUBJECT: ROYG OPERATION GRABS 55 SUSPECTED EXTREMISTS
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000579
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER YM
SUBJECT: ROYG OPERATION GRABS 55 SUSPECTED EXTREMISTS
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On April 4, Major General Ali al-Ashwal briefed
EmbOff on the ten-day assault undertaken by the Yemeni Army
and security forces against extremist armed gangs, including
suspected terrorists in the town of Ja'ar in the governorate
of Abyan. (Note: Al-Qaeda has long been known to maintain a
strong presence in Ja'ar. End Note.) According to Ashwal,
the operation led to the arrest of 55 suspects, including
some members of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army. ROYG forces
suffered one death and two injuries. Staff Brigadier General
Mujahid Ghushain, the Yemeni Director of Military
Intelligence, noted that the last three arrestees were
captured on April 3 in the governorate of Shebwa after
fleeing the fighting in Abyan. Contrary to previous reports,
Ashwal said that no aircraft were used in the attack. He
noted that an armored brigade from Zinjibar in Abyan,
equipped with U.S. made M-60 A1 tanks and M-113 A2 Armored
Vehicles, was the key army force.
2. (C) President Saleh told the Ambassador on April 4 that
the targets of the operation were individuals who had
originally been jihadists, and then had come over to the
ROYG's side only to return to their jihadist ways. Ashwal
implied that the group had previously had an "agreement" with
ROYG authorities and had grossly violated it by attacking a
school, ambushing a government convoy, and establishing
checkpoints. These activities were seen as challenging ROYG
authority in an area with a limited number of ROYG troops.
Comment
--------------
3. (C) This operation demonstrates that the ROYG is most
likely to take effective, kinetic action when it can clearly
see that doing so is in its own interests. Post is seeking
information from the ROYG on the arrestees and their
affiliations.
SECHE
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER YM
SUBJECT: ROYG OPERATION GRABS 55 SUSPECTED EXTREMISTS
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On April 4, Major General Ali al-Ashwal briefed
EmbOff on the ten-day assault undertaken by the Yemeni Army
and security forces against extremist armed gangs, including
suspected terrorists in the town of Ja'ar in the governorate
of Abyan. (Note: Al-Qaeda has long been known to maintain a
strong presence in Ja'ar. End Note.) According to Ashwal,
the operation led to the arrest of 55 suspects, including
some members of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army. ROYG forces
suffered one death and two injuries. Staff Brigadier General
Mujahid Ghushain, the Yemeni Director of Military
Intelligence, noted that the last three arrestees were
captured on April 3 in the governorate of Shebwa after
fleeing the fighting in Abyan. Contrary to previous reports,
Ashwal said that no aircraft were used in the attack. He
noted that an armored brigade from Zinjibar in Abyan,
equipped with U.S. made M-60 A1 tanks and M-113 A2 Armored
Vehicles, was the key army force.
2. (C) President Saleh told the Ambassador on April 4 that
the targets of the operation were individuals who had
originally been jihadists, and then had come over to the
ROYG's side only to return to their jihadist ways. Ashwal
implied that the group had previously had an "agreement" with
ROYG authorities and had grossly violated it by attacking a
school, ambushing a government convoy, and establishing
checkpoints. These activities were seen as challenging ROYG
authority in an area with a limited number of ROYG troops.
Comment
--------------
3. (C) This operation demonstrates that the ROYG is most
likely to take effective, kinetic action when it can clearly
see that doing so is in its own interests. Post is seeking
information from the ROYG on the arrestees and their
affiliations.
SECHE