SANAA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

S E C R E T SANAA 000356 NOFORN DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019 TAGS: ASEC PTER YM SUBJECT: SANAA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) - SPRING 2009 REF: STATE 13023 Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- POLITICAL VIOLENCE -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Demonstrations ¶A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American demonstrations? Yes. Various ethnic, religious, and professional groups are capable and have been allowed to stage demonstrations in the past. The Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) exercises tight control over the theme and expression of these events as much as possible. However, spontaneous protests and demonstrations have occurred without ROYG approval in the past, usually in response to domestic political issues. Demonstrations likely to be anti-American would be closely monitored and confined to areas unlikely to cause serious disruption to traffic or municipal operations. In the past, demonstrations have occasionally taken on anti-American themes but are rarely hostile. Groups carrying out anti-American demonstrations are usually comprised of student and various professional associations (lawyers, teachers, etc). The rebel al-Houthi group and its sympathizers harbor resentment toward the United States Government and they have the capability of carrying out anti-American protests. However, their cause is more focused against the ROYG. In addition, Non-Government Organizations (NGO) such as HOOD (National Organization for Defending Rights, Freedoms and Dignity) have organized protests in response to USG policy on Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees. These demonstrations have not specifically taken on a anti-American tone, but rather a push for the ROYG action against the USG detainment of Yemeni citizens in Guantanamo Bay. ¶B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the country in the past 12 months? Yes. In December 2008 demonstrations in support of Palestine took place throughout Sana'a. Although there was not specifically anti-American sentiment expressed, there was a call for a "boycott of America." ¶C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities? No. However, there have been several demonstrations held 2km from the diplomatic residential area (approximately 10km from the Embassy). Protests must be coordinated with the ROYG, who tries to ensure that protests are held in areas that will not be too disruptive. ¶D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? Protests, not specifically anti-American, generally range in size from 2000 to 5000 people. Often times children are bused in from nearby schools to increase the numbers. ¶E. Are these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by domestic issues? Although anti-American sentiment is usually subdued, protests have been related to U.S.-Israel relations (specifically Palestine issues),the continuing U.S. presence in Iraq/Afghanistan, and the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (the majority of the detainees being Yemeni nationals). ¶F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? Generally peaceful. Demonstrations must be coordinated with and approved by the ROYG. In the past, ROYG security forces have forcibly dispersed non-sanctioned, anti-ROYG, demonstrations in the southern city of Aden and other locations. In December 2008 the ROYG dispersed a large demonstration in Aden which turned violent and resulted in numerous arrests and injuries. ¶G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property or injuries to USG employees? No. ¶H. If violent, have any demonstrations ever penetrated our security perimeter line? No. The ROYG has an informal policy of not allowing protests past a point approximately 1km from the Embassy. ¶I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the country within the last 12 months? Yes. There have been several demonstrations and rallies against the ROYG since July 2007. These demonstrations are usually organized by opposition parties against government price hikes and other domestic issues. ¶J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities? No. ¶K. What is the average size of an anti-government demonstration? Most of the rallies averaged in the hundreds with some rallies reaching as high as 10,000, although there have not been reports of a demonstration of this size in approximately 8 months. ¶L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? Most demonstrations relating to domestic issues have been peaceful. However, several demonstrations have experienced some level of violence, often initiated by the ROYG against the protesters. Violent protests in Yemen have been the exception over the past 12 months. Most opposition party protests have remained peaceful. ¶M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property? No. ¶2. (S/NF) Macro Conflict Conditions ¶A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or intrastate conflict? Yes. Yemen is engaged in an intrastate conflict with Shia rebels loyal to Abdul Malik al-Houthi, also known as the Shabab Al-Mu,minin (Believing Youth),or even more recently as the Mujahedeen group, according to recent statements by the group's leader. This conflict began in mid-2004, and flared up again in the spring of 2005. In late December 2006, the conflict erupted again and has become more intense. There were a large number of violent clashes in Saa'da in Jan/Feb ¶2007. The conflict remained largely localized in the north until May 2008, when ROYG forces confronted al-Houthi rebels in Bani Hushaysh, an area approximately 12km from the Embassy. The conflict in this area lasted approximately the entire month of June of 2008, and into early July. On July 17 2008, the ROYG announced an end to the conflict in Saa'da, but it is difficult to predict if this will result in a lasting peace. Over the past several months there have been unconfirmed reports of sporadic gunfire between al-Houthi rebels and ROYG forces. Tribal groups in the Marib and Al-Jawf governorates have also posed a serious problem to the ROYG and Western interests. In addition to the rebel uprising to the north, the ROYG has had difficulty with other extremist groups. Al-Qaida was responsible for the July 2007 VBIED attack on an archeological site in Marib (50 miles east of Sana,a) which killed eight Spanish tourists and two Yemeni nationals (note: Marib was off-limits to official Americans at the time of the bombing and remains off-limits). Al-Qaida also claimed responsibility for the shooting deaths of at least two Belgian tourists in the Hadramaut region in January 2008, a string of mortar attacks on the Embassy compound and other Western interests in spring 2008, and the VBIED and suicide attack against the Embassy in September 2008. Although the ROYG has had some success against extremist elements, Al-Qaida continues to enjoy relative safe haven outside of Yemen's major metropolitan areas. ¶B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is limited to a specific region or a country-wide civil war? Clashes have remained largely limited to a specific region in the Saa'da governorate, approximately 100 miles north of Sana,a; however, the clashes in Bani Hushaysh have proven the conflict can spread. ¶C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic facilities located in this region? No. ¶D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American orientation? Yes. The Al-Houthi rebels are centered on opposing the ROYG, but are also anti-American and have criticized Sunni scholars for ordering people to obey "cruel rulers who cooperate with America." Last year, the leader of the al-Houthi group stated that their new slogan is "God the Greatest, Death to America and Israel, Victory for Islam and Muslims." The ROYG also faces intrastate challenges with Al-Qaida and other extremists. AQY has reportedly expanded to form Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). As Al-Qaida's capabilities grow they continue to threaten American and Western interests, to include diplomatic facilities. ¶3. (S/NF) Host Country Capabilities ¶A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained? No. Police forces continue to be poorly trained, underpaid and often corrupt. Traditional law enforcement forces in Yemen are responsible mainly for traffic and crowd control, as well as criminal investigations. USG assistance has enabled Yemeni security forces to develop counter-terrorism capabilities; however, law enforcement agencies face numerous challenges regarding planning, coordination and execution of complex counter-terrorism operations. Reliance on manpower is emphasized over the use of technology. Agencies have difficulty maintaining operational security and operating in a nighttime environment. Yemeni law enforcement agencies have shown an unwillingness to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement in investigating attacks against USG interests and in areas such as intelligence sharing and forensic investigations. The FBI-led investigation into the September 2008 US Embassy terrorist attack still lacks the cooperation needed from the host nation to push forward. Coordination for protection of U.S. Embassy personnel and properties is still lacking. The ROYG is slow to respond to requests for increased security and seldom coordinates removal of security assets. The United States has been successful in providing equipment and extensive training to the Central Security Forces-Counter Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU),a para-military unit of the Ministry of Interior. Diplomatic Security's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (DS/ATA) has also paid dividends by providing the training outlined below in section 3-B. ¶B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? Yes. Yemeni police and security forces have received DS/ATA training in the areas of counter-terrorism, bomb detection/disposal, fraudulent documents, major case management, and interdicting terrorist activities. A second bomb technician course involving the Presidential Guard (PG) unit was held in January of 2009. ATA funded Tactical Rappel, Counter-terrorism Strategies, and Soft Target Protection classes are scheduled for mid-2009. In addition, a counter-sniper course and counter-assault team (CAT) training is in the planning phases. U.S. agencies have also funded and trained elements of the Yemeni Coast Guard on interdiction of vessels. Yemeni military elements have also received USG funding and training for counter terrorism units. The LEGAT Office has sponsored courses focused on the police role in counter-terrorism investigations, specifically the development of basic crime scene and terrorism investigation skills. Additionally, the LEGAT office sponsors individual ROYG MOI personnel to attend the FBI National Academy, executive development courses, homicide investigation and English language training. In February 2009, the LEGAT office donated and provided training for Cross-match Portable Biometrics machines. ¶C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, widespread corruption inside their agencies? Yes. However, reports from U.S. agencies indicate that the Yemeni Counter Terrorism Unit, Presidential Guard and Coast Guard are largely void of corruption. ¶D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions? The intelligence services are moderately professional and fairly capable. The National Security Bureau (NSB) is a developing intelligence service that continues to establish itself as a moderately capable organization. The U.S. Embassy enjoys close ties with the Political Security Organization (PSO). Relations with the NSB fluctuate. Both organizations have been expanding in size and technological capabilities. The ROYG intelligence and security services have neutralized several terrorist cells, to include Al-Qaida cell leader Hamza Al-Qaiti in mid-August 2008. However, the ROYG judicial system has consistently released individuals who have been assessed as threat to U.S. interests in Yemen, at least in part due to a lack of effective counter-terrorism laws. ¶E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with U.S. Embassy requests for information and support? Yes, but not consistently. Intelligence services rarely volunteer information; yet, on some occasions the ROYG takes the initiative to inform the USG of CT developments. Liaison with host-nation intelligence services has improved and it appears that this trend will continue, but an open exchange of relevant information is lacking. ¶F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in recent years, have host country security services been able to score any major anti-terrorism successes? Yes. In August of 2008, the PSO raided a terrorist safe house located in the Hadramaut governorate of Yemen. The raid resulted in the disruption of planned attacks and the death of five known Al-Qaida operatives to include Hamza Al-Qaiti, an Al-Qaida cell leader and suspected mastermind of the spring 2008 attacks against the Embassy and other Western targets. In January 2009 the CTU conducted a raid in the city of Sana'a on a suspected AQ cell resulting in one arrest and two dead. This cell was suspected of planning attacks on ROYG and Western targets. ¶G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective security? Yes, but at times requests for additional security take days to transpire. However, after initial assistance has been provided, Host Nation security personnel often become complacent and additional security support may be reassigned without notice. ¶H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major airports in the country? Poor. ATA held four separate training modules for airport security personnel and airport officials since 1998, but this training was not institutionalized and has not been effectively implemented at airports. There have been numerous occurrences of x-ray screeners not watching their monitors constantly, and ineffective access control procedures. Some improvements have been made since August 2006, following a change in security control at the airport from the Political Security Organization (PSO) to the National Security Bureau (NSB),but these changes have brought problems of their own. Embassy staff are frequently harassed by NSB personnel wanting to search luggage and other items that arrive via diplomatic channels. There are still security issues at the airport, but new screening measures have been implemented for arrivals, new physical barriers have been erected, separating arrivals and departures, and security has controlled movement of civilians to restricted areas. ¶I. How effective are customs and immigration controls agencies? Ineffective. ROYG customs and immigration agencies are underpaid, poorly trained, and receptive to corruption. Customs agency procedures are still inconsistent and personnel are overzealous in searching U.S. Embassy shipments and unclassified diplomatic pouches. They routinely confiscate pieces of Embassy and personal technological equipment such as computers, satellite phones, printers, PDAs, and other electronic devices. ¶J. How effective are border patrol forces? Ineffective. Yemen shares mountain and desert borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman. Borders have rugged terrain which is porous and nearly impossible to secure effectively. Despite recent initiatives and USG support, it remains relatively easy to transit illegally into Yemen from Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia. The emerging Yemeni Coast Guard continues to show marked improvement in areas of vessel interdiction and patrols, but is severely under funded, and suffers from poor training and improper equipment which limits its effectiveness. Yemeni security forces remain ineffective at securing land crossings, and terrorist elements have crossed freely at ROYG-controlled crossings. -------------- INDIGENOUS TERRORISM -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Anti-American Terrorist Groups ¶A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in country? Yes. ¶B. If yes, how many? Two. Al-Qaida in Yemen (AQY) has taken responsibility for numerous attacks throughout Yemen to include the Embassy, Western installations and ROYG targets. AQY has reportedly expanded to form Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and has advised that Yemen is their base of operations. The Aden-based Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) is a known Al-Qaida sympathizer group. The Shabab Al-Mu'mineen (Believing Youth Group) located in Saa'da is anti-American but not classified as a terrorist group. ¶C. Have these groups carried out anti-American attacks within the last 12 months? Yes. ¶D. Were any of these lethal attacks? Yes. ¶E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities? Yes. On March 18, 2008 the Embassy compound was attacked by individuals using small anti-personnel mortar rounds. These rounds missed the Chancery, but struck the northwest wall of the compound in addition to a girls' school and host-nation security barracks located in this area. There were no deaths, but several injuries. On September 17, 2008, terrorists carried out a coordinated attack against the Embassy using suicide bombers and VBIEDs. This attack was deemed the worst terrorist incident in Yemen in over a decade. ¶F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military, or related targets? Yes. Al-Qaida members who escaped from a PSO prison in February 2006 also helped plan and conduct two suicide VBIED attacks on oil facilities in Yemen. The first, in September 2006, was an attack in Ash-Shahir on the southern coast, targeting an oil facility owned by Canadian Nexen, which also employs American staff. The second was in November of 2006 and involved an attack in Marib, targeting the Safer Oil facility (a Yemeni company which employs an international staff, including Americans). There are no U.S. military installations in Yemen. ¶G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific regions or do they operate country-wide? The attacks have been country-wide. ¶H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions? Yes. The March 18, 2008 mortar attack and September 17, 2008 attack were directed at the U.S. Embassy. ¶5. (S/NF) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups ¶A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not anti-American) in country? No. ¶B. If yes, how many? N/A ¶C. Have these groups carried out attacks in the capital or in areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located? N/A ¶D. Were these attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate? N/A ¶E. Have any Americans ever been killed or injured in these attacks? N/A -------------- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Transnational Terrorist Indicators ¶A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a presence in country? Yes. Al-Qaida, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP. There has been no local reporting in the last 12 months on PIJ or PFLP. Yemeni security forces neutralized an Egyptian national (Ahmed Basyouni Dwedar) with known ties to EIJ in a July 2007 raid in Sana,a. ¶B. How does the EAC assess this presence? Is it an operational cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda cell? Al-Qaida has sympathizers, support, and operational cells in Yemen. Prior to the September 2006 oil facility attacks there was reporting that indicated that their operational planning appeared to be non-existent. However, 2 of the 23 prisoners that escaped from a PSO prison in February 2006 were the bombers in these oil facility attacks. Since then, several other AQ prison escapees have been linked with the terrorist cell responsible for the July 2007 Marib bombings in addition to the mortar attacks that took place in spring ¶2008. Other groups may have links or may be cooperating with Al-Qaida, these other groups include several tribal groups in the outlying provinces. ¶C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? The Yemeni government is not sympathetic, but seems to lack the political will or ability to conduct a sustained engagement with AQ. The ROYG, however, officially supports Palestinian groups, including Hamas. ¶D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country that may have a relationship with any of the above groups? Yes. Possible suspect NGO groups include: -- Al-Haramain al-Sharifain Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Ihsan Association, Saudi Arabia -- World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia -- Dar al-Arqam Stationary for Printing and Publication, Saudi Arabia -- Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia -- Dubai Charitable Association, Saudi Arabia -- Abu-Baker Salem Al-Sa'ari Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Supreme Authority for Muslims of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia -- Tibah Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Saeed Qahtan Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- International Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia -- League of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia -- Charitable Association in Fujaira, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Bir Islamic Committee, Saudi Arabia -- Zahra Al-Khalidiah Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Salem Omar Ba'ashem and Omar Badahda, Saudi Arabia -- Mecca Association, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Emir al-Khairiyah Committee (Al Haramain),Saudi Arabia -- Islamic Union (Quebec),Saudi Arabia -- Hamoud al-Hayyawi Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Noor Charitable Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Bin Saynoon Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Bin Mahdi Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Bayelghoum Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Fittrah Foundation, UAE -- Al-Islah And Tawhid Social Association, UAE -- Kuwait Joint Committee for Relief of the Global Islamic Charitable Organization, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait -- United Arab Emirates Association, UAE -- Bayt al-Shariqa al-Khairi (Sharja Charitable House),UAE -- Omar Bin Yousuf, UAE -- Qatar Charitable Association, Qatari -- Islamic Relief, UK -- Dubai Charitable Association, UAE -- Al-Fikrah Center, UAE -- Al-Islah Association, Kuwait ¶E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country that are sympathetic to these groups? Yes. Most of the population is sympathetic to these groups. Public sympathy for pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli groups is widespread, as seen in the December 2008 demonstrations in support of the Palestinians. ¶F. How does the EAC assess the level, intent, and scope of hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Serbia, Syria, et al.) in country relative to potential anti-American terrorist acts? Foreign hostile intelligence services, (e.g. Russia, China, Syria, Egypt, and Iran) focus primarily on information gathering for their own countries' interests, and do not assist anti-American groups in country with terrorist activity. However, with the recent increase in tensions between the USG and Iran, this strategy of only information gathering could change to a more tactical strategy, resulting in possible terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities. ¶G. How does the EAC assess the availability of weapons and explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile terrorist elements? Yemen likely has among the highest number of small arms/light weapons per capita in the world, with easy access to many varieties of explosives. Weapons and explosives are easily attainable, and gun markets are well-stocked. Although the presence of weapons is smaller in scale in the larger cities, small arms remain prolific in tribal areas and smaller towns. The Al-Houthi rebellion has also indicated how easy it is to obtain light and heavy weapons in country. In addition, there have been reports of surface to air missiles in the hands of terrorist groups in Yemen. The ROYG has made several efforts at addressing gun control issues. On August 23, 2007, the Ministry of Interior announced new legislation to curb weapons possession in the capital city and outlying provincial capitals by establishing a gun ban in the capital cities. The gun ban seems to have limited effectiveness as numerous weapons still remain in citizens' possession, but are not openly carried. Police and other security forces often set-up check points throughout the city to search people and vehicles for weapons. SECHE