YEMENI MILITARY COMMANDER DESCRIBES AL-QAEDA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000334

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD
EMBASSY RIYADH FOR LISA CARLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS PTER ECON YM
SUBJECT: YEMENI MILITARY COMMANDER DESCRIBES AL-QAEDA
PRESENCE IN MARIB, CT NEEDS

REF: A. RIYADH 326

B. SANAA 83

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) During a February 18 meeting with Embassy officers, MG
Mohammed al-Maqdashi, Regional Commander of the Yemeni Armed
Forces Middle District, described al-Qaeda's (AQ) presence in
Marib as a diffuse, well-trained force of mostly Saudi
recruits. Despite ample funding from sources in neighboring
countries, especially Saudi Arabia, AQ's numbers in Marib
remain small, according to Maqdashi. He claimed that local
tribes increased their cooperation on CT matters with the
ROYG following President Saleh's February 3 visit to the
region. The command's stated CT needs include armored
vehicles, parachutes, grenades, night-vision goggles, flak
jackets, and sniper training. End Summary.

AQ IN MARIB: "NOT AS BIG AS YOU THINK"
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2. (S) MG Maqdashi told Emboffs on February 18 that
countering the AQ threat is the main mission of his command,
which covers the Marib, Jawf, and Shebwa governorates and
includes one battalion of Yemeni Special Operations Forces
(YSOF). Maqdashi described AQ's presence in central Yemen as
a nimble, diffuse, but relatively small force, under pressure
from the ROYG and local tribes. "AQ is not as big as you
think or as the press reports," Maqdashi said, declining to
estimate the precise number of fighters in the region.
Maqdashi stressed the difficulty of targeting operatives who
rarely congregate in one place for long and can "smell when
someone is coming." AQ's ranks in Yemen are mostly Saudi and
its funding and equipment come from Saudi Arabia and other
GCC countries, claimed Maqdashi.


3. (S) Maqdashi said that AQ forces in Yemen reportedly had
"advanced," Saudi-procured communications equipment (NFI),
Belgian FN and Russian magazine-loaded sniper rifles, and
Somali-origin SAM launchers left over from the 1994 civil
war, although he had not seen any of these items first-hand.
Marib offers AQ many benefits, according to Maqdashi: an
absence of vehicle registration, sparsely-populated desert
terrain, a ready supply of unregistered small arms, and
largely unguarded borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman. (Note:
Freedom from registering arms and vehicles is common
throughout Yemen. End Note.) Despite this seemingly ideal
operating environment, Maqdashi doubted that AQ maintains
fixed operating bases in Marib, based on his command's
inability to locate the rumored sites.

LOCAL TRIBES UNDER PRESSURE FROM ROYG
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4. (S) President Saleh's recent warning to tribal leaders
regarding AQ's presence in their regions put pressure on the
tribes to cooperate with the ROYG on CT matters, Maqdashi
said. (Note: Saleh told Marib tribesmen during a February 3
visit to Marib that they should voluntarily hand over AQ
operatives to the ROYG otherwise the military would go after
AQ without the tribes' permission, according to a press
report. End Note.) Maqdashi said that the military's
relations with the local tribes are "delicate" and that even
a single "incident" could ruin relations between the two. He
said that some tribes, chastened by Saleh's message, were
providing useful if not always actionable CT-related
information to his command. An "unprecedented" increase in
military checkpoints, land patrols, and air surveillance in
Marib had put both AQ and local tribes on the defensive,
Maqdashi said. One officer who had spent the past 16 years
on the base told the OMC chief that the Middle District
Command's dealings with the tribes had evolved from
encounters defined by brute force to cautious cooperation
based on shared interests. Maqdashi attributed the February
17 surrender of AQ leader Mohammed Oteik Oweid al-Aufi
al-Harbi (aka Muhammed al-Oufi) (REF A) to the President's

SANAA 00000334 002 OF 002


message and to the military's increased profile outside the
base.


5. (C) Maqdashi said that Marib's worsening unemployment,
partially caused by declining oil production (REF B),played
into AQ's hands by making tribal leaders more susceptible to
entreaties by AQ operatives flush with cash; it also made
youth recruitment easier in the absence of employment
alternatives. Maqdashi pleaded for additional USG
development projects in Marib and stressed that security and
development went hand-in-hand. Econoff pledged to relay this
request to USAID and described the myriad U.S.-funded
projects already underway in Marib, including a USAID-funded
vocational institute in Marib City and numerous USDA-funded
primary and secondary schools.

CT NEEDS IN MARIB
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6. (S/NF) Maqdashi said that the YSOF battalion under his
command needs sniper training, parachutes, flak jackets,
night-vision goggles, hand grenades, and armored vehicles.
The military's Middle District includes 14 battalions of
regular soldiers deployed across three governorates -- Marib,
Shabwah, and Jawf -- and the one YSOF battalion. The YSOF
battalion consists of 670 soldiers authorized, of which 450
are present at the base and approximately 240 are in
training, including a paratrooper unit. (Note: More detailed
information on the base will be reported separately through
DAO channels. End Note.) Maqdashi and Ministry of
Interior-appointed Governorate Security Director, BG Mohammad
al-Ghadra, complained to the OMC chief that previous Embassy
visits to Marib had yielded promises of ambulances and
clinics but no follow up. The OMC chief detailed the extent
of FMF-funded items given to YSOF in the past six months and
warned that future terrorist attacks against the Embassy
could impede official travel to Marib, making USG military
assistance coordination more difficult.

BIO NOTE
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7. (C) MG Mohammed Maqdashi, one of Yemen's five regional
military commanders, became Middle District Commander in
August 2008 and seemed engaged and energetic as he led
Emboffs on a lengthy tour of the Marib paratrooper training
site, the base's intelligence communications center, and YSOF
training facilities.

COMMENT
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8. (S) Post agrees with Maqdashi's description of al-Qaeda in
Marib as a numerically weak but potent force. Maqdashi's
characterization of AQ in Yemen as a Saudi rather than a
homegrown threat is typical of ROYG interlocutors who want to
shift the focus away from Yemen's own failings and blame
porous borders and foreign fighters instead. His optimistic
assessment of YSOF's CT record and the pressure on the tribes
resulting from Saleh's recent Marib visit is likely overblown
and may have been intended for the ears of the Yemeni
military intelligence official who sat in on all meetings.


9. (S) Comment continued. The commander's emphasis on the
need for job creation and educational opportunities, however,
was a refreshing perspective on security in Marib and a frank
admission that military pressure on AQ and political pressure
on the tribes are only part of the solution. Maqdashi and
his senior officers have high expectations for future USG CT
assistance and were correspondingly careful to balance their
description of progress thus far with the challenge of
countering AQ with the military's current resources. Despite
their frustrations with the results of previous Embassy
visits, the Marib command was clearly anxious to make a good
impression, meeting with Emboffs for over four hours and not
hesitating to provide specific information on the base's
current technical capabilities. End Comment.
SECHE