SA'ADA, MONTH FIVE: IS SALEH SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING

S E C R E T SANAA 002227 NOFORN SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF SA YM SUBJECT: SA'ADA, MONTH FIVE: IS SALEH SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING THE WAR? REF: A. SANAA 2176 ¶B. SANAA 2190 Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. A week after ceasefire negotiations between the ROYG and the Houthis broke down, bombing continues apace in war-torn Sa'ada governorate. President Saleh continues to send signs that he is still committed to a military end to the conflict and attempts at reaching a political solution to date have been less than serious. Meanwhile, the civilian death toll has mounted, with locals alleging that a single Saudi airstrike in Razah district on December 13 killed dozens of people. With Saudi Arabia's continuing involvement in the war and regional support for Yemen against the Houthis riding high during the Gulf Cooperation Council talks December 14-15, Saleh appears less likely than ever to accept anything but a full military defeat of the Houthi rebels. END SUMMARY. NEGOTIATIONS: ALL TALK? -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Despite earlier reports that President Saleh was seriously considering a political solution to the conflict, negotiations ) at a standstill since at least December 7 ) have been replaced by renewed military efforts to rout the Houthis (Ref A). In a cycle that has been repeated throughout the five-year course of the war in Sa'ada, any mediator whom Saleh perceives as "too close" to the Houthis ) from Presidential Advisor for Sa'ada Affairs Mohammed Azzan to former Minister of Local Administration Abdulkader al-Hillal ) is quickly discredited and pushed out of negotiations. An animated Saleh used the occasion of a December 9 meeting with D/D CIA Steve Kappes to criticize al-Haq party chairman and Houthi mediator Hassan Zayd and vowed to continue the war until the Houthis are beaten or accepted the ROYG's five-point ceasefire proposal, long the ROYG's stated condition for ending fighting (Ref B). ¶3. (S) On December 14, however, presidential advisor Dr. Abdulkarim al-Eryani told the Ambassador that he believed that in early December, Houthi leader Abdulkarim al-Houthi had personally signed off on the five-point proposal, which was then given to Saleh. (Note: Eryani said that he had not personally seen the proposal with Houthi's signature, but had been told about it. End Note.) In a December 16 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Rashad al-Alimi said that although the ROYG would theoretically accept a signed ceasefire agreement from the Houthis, "The problem with the Houthis is that what they say on the outside is completely different than what they are thinking on the inside. The Houthis will not really concede to a peace agreement while they believe they are strong. They are not yet ready to surrender because they are not weak enough." He indicated that the ROYG needed to keep hitting the Houthis militarily in order to bring them to a point where they would submit to a political settlement, which Alimi confirmed was the real endgoal. FULL STEAM AHEAD -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) With political talks on the back burner, the ROYG has once again turned its full attention to its military campaign in Sa'ada. In its attempt to put a permanent end to the rebellion, the ROYG has turned to regular ground forces, heavy air force bombardment, tribal militias, intelligence and even special forces trained for counterterrorism missions. President Saleh, addressing a group of "popular forces" in Dhamar City on December 15, praised both regular and irregular (tribal) recruits from Dhamar and Beidha governorates, and promised even the irregular troops that they would "have a place" in the official army camps after they completed their duties in Sa'ada, where they were soon to be sent. (Note: The ROYG has long relied on irregular tribal militias as proxy fighters in the war against the Houthis. End Note.) One platoon from the ROYG's elite Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) remains in Sa'ada City, trying to help the Ministry of Interior's Central Security Forces rid the governorate's capital of Houthi fighters (septel). Local media reported bloody street battles continuing in Sa'ada City as of December 15. The National Security Bureau's (NSB) Colonel Akram al-Qassmi told PolOff on December 14 that NSB's officers were working "long hours" in nearly round-the-clock operations to get better intelligence on the Houthis. ¶5. (S) Yemen's strategy appears to be focused on taking advantage of Saudi involvement to trap the rebels between Saudi and Yemeni forces, according to NGA imagery and analysis from mid-December. Although the Houthis are battered and war-weary after four months of nonstop fighting, they continue to register victories against Saudi and Yemeni forces. Local media reports, confirmed by sensitive reporting, indicate that dozens of Saudi soldiers have been captured by the Houthis, who then use their uniforms and weapons. While Deputy Prime Minister Alimi told the Ambassador that he hoped this could be "the beginning of the final stage" in the war against the Houthis and said that the rebels had "sacrificed a lot" in operations across the Saudi border and Sa'ada City, he acknowledged that the ROYG still had a ways to go before they could declare an end to the campaign. AMIDST MORE DEATHS, ACCUSATIONS FLY -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Civilian as well as military casualties continue to mount, according to local media reports, with a single airstrike in Razah district on December 13 allegedly taking as many as 70 lives and wounding up to 100 others. Houthi media outlet almenpar.net has blamed Saudi warplanes for the attack, which the ROYG quickly took credit for, denying Saudi involvement. Houthi and Iranian media reported that U.S. warplanes had directly bombed various regions of Sa'ada governorate in "over 28 air raids" in Razah on December 14 and 15, a story later picked up by local and pan-Arab media. (Note: This is the first time that the Houthis have alleged direct U.S. involvement in the war. Previous claims were limited to materiel and intelligence support to the ROYG and SAG. End Note.) On December 15, local media carried a Houthi statement alleging that 120 prisoners of war (NFI) were killed and 44 others injured in what they claimed were U.S. airstrikes on Houthi headquarters in northern Sa'ada. Al-Bayan and Reuters correspondent Mohammed al-Ghobari told PolOff on December 16 that the Houthis, feeling more desperate and crunched by Yemeni and Saudi forces, were making claims of U.S. involvement in the war to distract from their heavy losses in the first weeks of December. ¶7. (SBU) Massive displacement of the local population continues across Sa'ada, Amran, Hajja and al-Jawf governorates, escalated by the pace and scale of Saudi bombing in northern Sa'ada. The latest ROYG and UN estimates put the number of IDPs over 200,000 by January 2010, the highest to date in the five-year war. (Note: UNHCR estimated that 175,400 IDPS were spread across Amran, Hajja, Sana'a, Sa'ada, Jawf governorates and the Saudi border area as of November 22. Of those, 75,000 IDPs remained in embattled Sa'ada. End Note.) Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Abdulkarim al-Arhabi used a December 14 meeting with donors and the UN to beg donor countries to help the ROYG "cope with the humanitarian situation in Sa'ada." Security of and access to areas with IDP populations is still incredibly poor, Human Rights Watch's Gerry Simpson told PolOff on December 15. THE GULF'S GOT YEMEN'S BACK -------------- ¶8. (S) Yemen joined Saudi Arabia in using the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Kuwait on December 14-15 to drum up support for its war against the Houthis. According to Kuwaiti al-Watan newspaper, the GCC countries discussed the need to use the "GCC Peninsula Shield," a multinational quick-reaction force, against the Houthi rebels and similar threats. Islah Secretary General Abdulwahab al-Ansi told the Ambassador on December 15 that the ROYG was "playing the Houthi card and the Iranian card" with not only the U.S. but also the Gulf states, all of whom are concerned over Iranian expansionism. Ansi, who was involved in mediation efforts in Sa'ada dating back to 2004, questioned Saleh's seriousness about ending the war at a time of increased Gulf support for the ROYG. "Does he even want a solution in Sa'ada?" Mohammed Naji al-Shaif, a Bakil tribal confederation leader with close ties to Saleh, told EconOff on December 15 that direct Saudi involvement in the Houthi conflict had come as a tremendous relief to Saleh. With the Saudis involved and the conflict seemingly one of regional, not local concern, Saleh would seek to prolong, rather than shorten, the ROYG,s campaign in order to draw more Saudi military funding and deflect domestic political pressure, according to Shaif. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S) Despite earlier indications of Saleh's willingness to consider a political solution to the Houthi conflict, recent events suggest that the president, sensing a new wave of regional support and perhaps some Houthi blood in the water, has redoubled his commitment to a military rout of the rebels. Even with what was allegedly a signed ceasefire agreement from Abdulmalik al-Houthi accepting all of the ROYG's required concessions, Saleh chose not to call an end to hostilities, either out of mistrust of the Houthis, or a belief that they are starting to weaken. Instead, he and his regime have upped the anti-Iran rhetoric, sent more troops to the battlefield, sought to buy significant caches of new weaponry and embraced Saudi Arabia's ongoing involvement. Unfortunately for Saleh, facts on the ground appear to have changed very little as the entrenched insurgency continues to rage with Sa'ada's civilians caught in the crossfire. END COMMENT. SECHE