ALI NASSER MOHAMMED: YEMEN'S ONCE AND FUTURE

S E C R E T SANAA 002073 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER YM SUBJECT: ALI NASSER MOHAMMED: YEMEN'S ONCE AND FUTURE PRESIDENT? REF: A. 1999 DAMASCUS 3076 ¶B. 1990 STATE 360410 ¶C. 1995 SANAA 223 Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. As the overall political situation in Yemen continues to deteriorate and the secessionist Southern Movement continues to gain strength, former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) President Ali Nasser Mohammed has emerged as the most-talked about ) if not the most likely - candidate to lead an independent southern Yemen. Known for his ability to recognize shifting political fortunes and align himself with the group that has the upper hand, Ali Nasser has been closely monitoring events in Yemen and testing the political waters for a possible return in a number of ways, including maintaining regular contact with elements of President Saleh's domestic opposition; hiring international consultants and local agents to work on his behalf; using the media to increase his status and voice his positions; and approaching foreign governments for support and feedback. Many Yemenis believe that Ali Nasser offers the high profile, foreign relations experience, personal background and reform-mindedness needed to lead an independent or federalized south. While Ali Nasser has officially maintained a position of support for Yemeni unity, his private comments and actions suggest that this position is more politically expedient than genuine; many insiders believe that his priority is to once again assume a leadership role in Yemen - whether it is unified or not. Despite the recent buzz and Nasser's personal ambitions, however, the former president's checkered past ) from bloody infighting in the PDRY to his involvement in the punishing 1994 civil war between North and South Yemen ) complicate any attempt to return to a leadership position. END SUMMARY. THE BUZZ ON ALI NASSER -------------- ¶2. (S) In the southern governorates of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY),a protest movement that began in 2007 with a group of disgruntled former army officers has mushroomed, according to a range of southern political observers, into a widespread secessionist movement with an estimated 40,000 followers and increasing popular support. In 2009, southerners - especially in restive Dhale', Lahj and Abyan governorates - have staged public demonstrations, several of which drew up to 100,000 participants, calling openly for the independence of South Yemen and waving flags of the former PDRY. Southern political observers estimate that a majority of southerners now support secession and anti-ROYG sentiment runs even higher. ¶3. (S) Against this backdrop, political observers have begun to evaluate potential candidates to lead an independent or federalized southern Yemen. The top names thrown around at qat chews include former PDRY President Ali Nasser Muhammed, former PDRY Vice President Ali Salim al-Beidh, former PDRY Prime Minister Haydar Abubakr al-Attas, former jihadist turned Southern Movement supporter Tariq al-Fadhli, and activist Hassan Baum. Throughout the factionalized south, Ali Nasser has increasingly emerged as the most widely palatable candidate. Southern Movement leaders, including General Mohammed Saleh Tammah, General Nasser al-Taweel, and former Deputy Prime Minister Mohammed Haidra Masdous all told PolOff that Ali Nasser, who still has a substantial following among current and former military and civilian officials from the south, would be the most likely candidate to lead a potentially independent south Yemen. TESTING THE POLITICAL WATERS -------------- ¶4. (S) Local political observers have long credited Ali Nasser with a keen instinct for recognize shifting political fortunes and aligning himself with the group that has the upper hand. To that end, the former president has been closely monitoring and assessing events in Yemen ) virtually since his exile to Syria in 1990 ) in order to determine if and when circumstances would permit him to stage a return. With the confluence of not only the secessionist Southern Movement, but also the rise of the Houthi rebels in the north and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the tribal governorates, the national mood might be receptive to the idea of an anti-Saleh alternative. While publicly continuing to support Yemeni unity, Ali Nasser has begun to more openly criticize the increasingly unpopular Saleh regime and its policies. Nasser told Dubai-based Khaleej Times in an October 6 interview that inheritance of power ) from Saleh to his son Ahmed Ali - is "bad for the country." ¶5. (S) Ali Nasser has employed a number of different means to test the political waters, including maintaining regular contact with elements of President Saleh's domestic opposition; hiring international consultants and local agents to work on his behalf; using the media to increase his status and voice his positions; and approaching foreign governments for support and feedback. Contacts agree that Ali Nasser maintains extensive contacts with a range of President Saleh's domestic opponents, from the above-board (the opposition parties) to the more clandestine, such as AQAP. According to Aden-based journalist Ayman Nasser, who has extensive contacts in the Southern Movement, Ali Nasser Mohammed maintains good connections with former rivals Beidh and Attas as well as Fadhli. Sheikh Mohammed bin Naji al-Shaif, a Bakil tribal leader who has openly expressed his dissatisfaction with President Saleh, told the Ambassador in May that he meets with Ali Nasser often. Renegade ruling General People's Congress (GPC) official Mohammed Abulahoum, a reform-minded former insider who meets often with elements of the opposition, told PolOff in September that Ali Nasser is "a very good guy. He has been my friend for a long time." Abulahoum said that he met with Ali Nasser, "all of the southern leaders," and other elements of the informal domestic opposition in Cairo in August. He added that Ali Nasser talks regularly with the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). ¶6. (S) Formally and informally, Ali Nasser has created a team of international consultants and local agents to work on his behalf to create a friendly political climate for his return to Yemeni politics as well as continually assess when the time is right for this return. An American strategic consultant visited Yemen in mid-October to explore the feasibility of Ali Nasser returning to the country. The consultant told the DCM that, based on his consultations in the southern governorates, he believed a majority of southerners now embrace the idea of an independent south Yemen, but the time is still not right for Ali Nasser's return. Ali Nasser also has the allegiance of prominent Yemenis in the Southern Movement as well as the ROYG. ONE example is Salman al-Mashdali, a wealthy businessman originally from al-Bayda governorate, who lobbied PolOff to get U.S. support for Ali Nasser's proposal for a four-year federal system followed by a referendum on unity in the southern governorates. Although not as public with their support, the former PDRY president retains a cadre of allies within the ROYG, to include Vice President Abdurabu Mansour al-Hadi, who sources say remains loyal to him. ¶7. (S) In his public statements to date, Ali Nasser has shrewdly hewed to a line of support for Yemen's unity and stability. He told the Khaleej Times on October 6, "Yemen's stability is the stability of countries and people of the entire region." (Comment: As a smart political operator, Nasser likely recognizes that unity is not only the preoccupation of Sana'a, but also the official policy of the U.S., Europe and the Gulf states. By maintaining a careful separation between himself and openly secessionist leaders like Beidh, Nasser preserves a relatively favorable position with both the ROYG and international community. End Comment.) Privately, however, contacts assert that the former president's comments and actions indicate that the lip-service he pays to Yemeni unity is a cover for his deeper political ambitions, which involve a strong desire to return to power - as part of a power-sharing agreement in a unified Yemen; as chief executive of the southern governorates in a federalized state; or, preferably, as leader of the independent South Yemen he once ruled. ¶8. (S) According to insiders in Ali Nasser's camp as well as local political observers, Nasser has continued to periodically approach foreign governments with tailored messages aimed at garnering their support. In June 1999, when U.S. policy in Yemen focused on democracy-building, Ali Nasser told Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Damascus that Yemen's "government should be reformed, decentralized and institutionalized with forceful steps taken to reduce the influence of tribalism and the military in politics (Ref A)." A more recent strategy to garner U.S. support has been for Ali Nasser's Yemeni acolytes to convince PolOffs that an independent southern Yemen would prove a more reliable counter-terrorism partner. For example, Yemeni businessman Mashdali, an Ali Nasser supporter, shared details regarding an alleged extremist cell in Abyan governorate in an introductory meeting with PolOff in mid-October. Southern Movement sympathizers Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammed Ali al-Shadadi, Abyan MP Salem Mansour al-Haydare and Shebwa MP Ali Yaslim Bawda al-Himyari told PolOff in late October about grassroots campaigns they had begun in their districts to root out AQAP. This "CT approach" to winning international support applies not only to the U.S., but also to Arab states ) such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia ) worried about Islamic extremism. Independent media reported that Ali Nasser and Attas met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo in early October. THE PROS... -------------- ¶9. (S) As a former president and long-time leader of the former PDRY, Ali Nasser bring a lot to the table. Many Yemenis believe that he offers the high profile, foreign relations experience, personal background and reform-mindedness needed to lead an independent or federalized south. First in exile in Sana'a and then in Syria, Ali Nasser has maintained a relatively high profile through his leadership of the Arab Center for Strategic Studies, founded in 1995, which helps ensure access to high-level Arab officials. Yemeni political observers say that Ali Nasser still enjoys good relationships with most Arab heads of state, especially in the Gulf countries, Syria and Egypt. Many Arab leaders remember that under Ali Nasser's leadership, the PDRY dropped its hard-line confrontational policies towards its neighbors and adopted a more moderate tone. In historical perspective, Ali Nasser is viewed as a reformer who initiated economic policies opening Yemen to the West. Although he remained supportive of President Saleh's policies in the 1990s, he began to criticize the president as the situation in the south continued to deteriorate. In 2008 and 2009, Ali Nasser positioned himself as an anti-Saleh voice for reform when he began to use the media to call for major systemic changes. His personal background is also appealing to many southerners. Originally from Abyan's tribal heartland, Ali Nasser understands the mentality of the vast majority of southerners living outside of urbane Aden. He is also remembered as a hero of the 1960s revolution against the British, which affords him a special place of honor in southern hearts and minds. ...AND THE CONS -------------- ¶10. (S) The former president's checkered past, however, complicates any political return to Yemen. In January 1986, then-President Ali Nasser Mohammed attempted to purge his opponents in the former PDRY's politburo via assassination. In the bloody fighting that ensued, Ali Nasser was defeated and forced into exile in northern Yemen (Ref B). Even after his exile from Yemen, Ali Nasser continued to go after southern opponents. Although abroad at the time, Ali Nasser played an inspirational role in the 1994 north-south civil war via the "Ali Nasser Brigades," exiled southerners who spearheaded Northern Yemen's attacks against the south. It is unclear to what extent southerners remember Ali Nasser's legacy of infighting, however. Post reporting dating back to 1995 assessed that Ali Nasser's (then five-year) absence from Yemen had largely "clouded memories of his shortcomings as the former head of the PDRY" (Ref C). The demographics of the south are also in Ali Nasser's favor; the 75 percent of southerners under the age of 25 do not know much about the internecine conflicts of the 1980s and early 1990s. ¶11. (S) The fine line Ali Nasser has chosen to walk between publicly supporting unity and winning support in the increasingly secession-minded south will also complicate any potential political future. In his media statements, Ali Nasser has shrewdly chosen to back Yemeni unity. He has publicly criticized Saleh's policies, however, and speaks privately to confidantes and members of the opposition of his desire to see an independent southern Yemen. Still, a public perception that Ali Nasser is willing to work with the current regime could taint him in the eyes of southerners and other Yemenis frustrated with the current government. This no doubt contributed to Ali Nasser's decision to decline President Saleh's invitation in mid-2009 to return to Yemen and assume the duties of either vice president or prime minister. Even Mashdali, the pro-Ali Nasser businessman, told PolOff in October, "Any southern politician who works with this regime - his career will be done." Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) Aden Chief Ali Munasser told PolOff on October 12, "If (Ali Nasser) adopts any settlement within the framework of unity, he will lose the support of the south." However, in order to retain the support of the international community and the possibility of dialogue towards a federal system ) Ali Nasser's current proposal for "saving" Yemeni unity ) he cannot fully embrace the Southern Movement's secessionist rhetoric. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (S) Insiders and political observers agree that Ali Nasser seeks a return to power in his native land in whatever form he can obtain it; the most likely option is devolved central authority in either a power-sharing agreement between the ruling party and opposition or a federalized state, rather than a fully independent South Yemen. If Yemen moves towards a federalized system split along north-south lines, Ali Nasser is a front-runner to lead the south. His relatively good standing with President Saleh ) especially in comparison to turncoats such as Tariq al-Fadhli or secessionists like Ali Salim al-Beidh ) and palatability to Western and Arab audiences make him a likely compromise candidate in a coalition or federalized government. Ali Nasser's popularity among today's southern Yemenis, and his ability to lead an increasingly fractured, tribalized and radicalized south, remain major questions in assessing his capability to lead. At a minimum, Ali Nasser must fight an uphill battle in order to achieve the position of leadership he so clearly desires. END COMMENT. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION -------------- ¶13. (S) Former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) President Ali Nasser Mohammed al-Hassani was born in Dathinah (Abyan governorate) in 1938 or 1939. He led the National Liberation Front - predecessor of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) ) against the British in the 1960s, and quickly climbed the ranks in the newly independent South Yemen. After holding various leadership positions including the presidency, Ali Nasser ) as he prefers to be called ) tried to eliminate political rivals in the politburo via assassination in 1986. His faction was defeated in the fighting that ensued, forcing Ali Nasser to flee north to Sana'a. During his time in exile, he tried to organize military and political opposition against Ali Salim al-Beidh's PDRY regime, but left the country shortly before the 1990 unity of North and South Yemen in a deal between Saleh and Beidh. After settling in Damascus, where he founded the Arab Center for Strategic Studies in 1995, Ali Nasser briefly returned to Yemen in 1997. Under pressure from President Saleh, however, he left again after a short period of near-house arrest in Sana'a. Ali Nasser, thought to be in good health, now splits his time between Damascus, where he lives with his Syrian architect wife and five children, and Cairo. SECHE