ALI NASSER MOHAMMED: YEMEN'S ONCE AND FUTURE

S E C R E T SANAA 002073

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER YM
SUBJECT: ALI NASSER MOHAMMED: YEMEN'S ONCE AND FUTURE
PRESIDENT?

REF: A. 1999 DAMASCUS 3076

B. 1990 STATE 360410

C. 1995 SANAA 223

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY. As the overall political situation in Yemen
continues to deteriorate and the secessionist Southern
Movement continues to gain strength, former People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) President Ali Nasser
Mohammed has emerged as the most-talked about ) if not the
most likely - candidate to lead an independent southern
Yemen. Known for his ability to recognize shifting political
fortunes and align himself with the group that has the upper
hand, Ali Nasser has been closely monitoring events in Yemen
and testing the political waters for a possible return in a
number of ways, including maintaining regular contact with
elements of President Saleh's domestic opposition; hiring
international consultants and local agents to work on his
behalf; using the media to increase his status and voice his
positions; and approaching foreign governments for support
and feedback. Many Yemenis believe that Ali Nasser offers
the high profile, foreign relations experience, personal
background and reform-mindedness needed to lead an
independent or federalized south. While Ali Nasser has
officially maintained a position of support for Yemeni unity,
his private comments and actions suggest that this position
is more politically expedient than genuine; many insiders
believe that his priority is to once again assume a
leadership role in Yemen - whether it is unified or not.
Despite the recent buzz and Nasser's personal ambitions,
however, the former president's checkered past ) from bloody
infighting in the PDRY to his involvement in the punishing
1994 civil war between North and South Yemen ) complicate
any attempt to return to a leadership position. END SUMMARY.

THE BUZZ ON ALI NASSER
--------------


2. (S) In the southern governorates of the former People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY),a protest movement that
began in 2007 with a group of disgruntled former army
officers has mushroomed, according to a range of southern
political observers, into a widespread secessionist movement
with an estimated 40,000 followers and increasing popular
support. In 2009, southerners - especially in restive
Dhale', Lahj and Abyan governorates - have staged public
demonstrations, several of which drew up to 100,000
participants, calling openly for the independence of South
Yemen and waving flags of the former PDRY. Southern
political observers estimate that a majority of southerners
now support secession and anti-ROYG sentiment runs even
higher.


3. (S) Against this backdrop, political observers have begun
to evaluate potential candidates to lead an independent or
federalized southern Yemen. The top names thrown around at
qat chews include former PDRY President Ali Nasser Muhammed,
former PDRY Vice President Ali Salim al-Beidh, former PDRY
Prime Minister Haydar Abubakr al-Attas, former jihadist
turned Southern Movement supporter Tariq al-Fadhli, and
activist Hassan Baum. Throughout the factionalized south,
Ali Nasser has increasingly emerged as the most widely
palatable candidate. Southern Movement leaders, including
General Mohammed Saleh Tammah, General Nasser al-Taweel, and
former Deputy Prime Minister Mohammed Haidra Masdous all told
PolOff that Ali Nasser, who still has a substantial following
among current and former military and civilian officials from
the south, would be the most likely candidate to lead a
potentially independent south Yemen.

TESTING THE POLITICAL WATERS
--------------


4. (S) Local political observers have long credited Ali
Nasser with a keen instinct for recognize shifting political
fortunes and aligning himself with the group that has the
upper hand. To that end, the former president has been
closely monitoring and assessing events in Yemen ) virtually
since his exile to Syria in 1990 ) in order to determine if
and when circumstances would permit him to stage a return.
With the confluence of not only the secessionist Southern
Movement, but also the rise of the Houthi rebels in the north
and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the tribal
governorates, the national mood might be receptive to the
idea of an anti-Saleh alternative. While publicly continuing
to support Yemeni unity, Ali Nasser has begun to more openly

criticize the increasingly unpopular Saleh regime and its
policies. Nasser told Dubai-based Khaleej Times in an
October 6 interview that inheritance of power ) from Saleh
to his son Ahmed Ali - is "bad for the country."


5. (S) Ali Nasser has employed a number of different means
to test the political waters, including maintaining regular
contact with elements of President Saleh's domestic
opposition; hiring international consultants and local agents
to work on his behalf; using the media to increase his status
and voice his positions; and approaching foreign governments
for support and feedback. Contacts agree that Ali Nasser
maintains extensive contacts with a range of President
Saleh's domestic opponents, from the above-board (the
opposition parties) to the more clandestine, such as AQAP.
According to Aden-based journalist Ayman Nasser, who has
extensive contacts in the Southern Movement, Ali Nasser
Mohammed maintains good connections with former rivals Beidh
and Attas as well as Fadhli. Sheikh Mohammed bin Naji
al-Shaif, a Bakil tribal leader who has openly expressed his
dissatisfaction with President Saleh, told the Ambassador in
May that he meets with Ali Nasser often. Renegade ruling
General People's Congress (GPC) official Mohammed Abulahoum,
a reform-minded former insider who meets often with elements
of the opposition, told PolOff in September that Ali Nasser
is "a very good guy. He has been my friend for a long time."
Abulahoum said that he met with Ali Nasser, "all of the
southern leaders," and other elements of the informal
domestic opposition in Cairo in August. He added that Ali
Nasser talks regularly with the opposition Joint Meeting
Parties (JMP).


6. (S) Formally and informally, Ali Nasser has created a
team of international consultants and local agents to work on
his behalf to create a friendly political climate for his
return to Yemeni politics as well as continually assess when
the time is right for this return. An American strategic
consultant visited Yemen in mid-October to explore the
feasibility of Ali Nasser returning to the country. The
consultant told the DCM that, based on his consultations in
the southern governorates, he believed a majority of
southerners now embrace the idea of an independent south
Yemen, but the time is still not right for Ali Nasser's
return. Ali Nasser also has the allegiance of prominent
Yemenis in the Southern Movement as well as the ROYG. One
example is Salman al-Mashdali, a wealthy businessman
originally from al-Bayda governorate, who lobbied PolOff to
get U.S. support for Ali Nasser's proposal for a four-year
federal system followed by a referendum on unity in the
southern governorates. Although not as public with their
support, the former PDRY president retains a cadre of allies
within the ROYG, to include Vice President Abdurabu Mansour
al-Hadi, who sources say remains loyal to him.


7. (S) In his public statements to date, Ali Nasser has
shrewdly hewed to a line of support for Yemen's unity and
stability. He told the Khaleej Times on October 6, "Yemen's
stability is the stability of countries and people of the
entire region." (Comment: As a smart political operator,
Nasser likely recognizes that unity is not only the
preoccupation of Sana'a, but also the official policy of the
U.S., Europe and the Gulf states. By maintaining a careful
separation between himself and openly secessionist leaders
like Beidh, Nasser preserves a relatively favorable position
with both the ROYG and international community. End
Comment.) Privately, however, contacts assert that the
former president's comments and actions indicate that the
lip-service he pays to Yemeni unity is a cover for his deeper
political ambitions, which involve a strong desire to return
to power - as part of a power-sharing agreement in a unified
Yemen; as chief executive of the southern governorates in a
federalized state; or, preferably, as leader of the
independent South Yemen he once ruled.


8. (S) According to insiders in Ali Nasser's camp as well as
local political observers, Nasser has continued to
periodically approach foreign governments with tailored
messages aimed at garnering their support. In June 1999,
when U.S. policy in Yemen focused on democracy-building, Ali
Nasser told Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Damascus that Yemen's
"government should be reformed, decentralized and
institutionalized with forceful steps taken to reduce the
influence of tribalism and the military in politics (Ref A)."
A more recent strategy to garner U.S. support has been for
Ali Nasser's Yemeni acolytes to convince PolOffs that an
independent southern Yemen would prove a more reliable
counter-terrorism partner. For example, Yemeni businessman

Mashdali, an Ali Nasser supporter, shared details regarding
an alleged extremist cell in Abyan governorate in an
introductory meeting with PolOff in mid-October. Southern
Movement sympathizers Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammed
Ali al-Shadadi, Abyan MP Salem Mansour al-Haydare and Shebwa
MP Ali Yaslim Bawda al-Himyari told PolOff in late October
about grassroots campaigns they had begun in their districts
to root out AQAP. This "CT approach" to winning
international support applies not only to the U.S., but also
to Arab states ) such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia ) worried
about Islamic extremism. Independent media reported that Ali
Nasser and Attas met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in
Cairo in early October.

THE PROS...
--------------


9. (S) As a former president and long-time leader of the
former PDRY, Ali Nasser bring a lot to the table. Many
Yemenis believe that he offers the high profile, foreign
relations experience, personal background and
reform-mindedness needed to lead an independent or
federalized south. First in exile in Sana'a and then in
Syria, Ali Nasser has maintained a relatively high profile
through his leadership of the Arab Center for Strategic
Studies, founded in 1995, which helps ensure access to
high-level Arab officials. Yemeni political observers say
that Ali Nasser still enjoys good relationships with most
Arab heads of state, especially in the Gulf countries, Syria
and Egypt. Many Arab leaders remember that under Ali
Nasser's leadership, the PDRY dropped its hard-line
confrontational policies towards its neighbors and adopted a
more moderate tone. In historical perspective, Ali Nasser is
viewed as a reformer who initiated economic policies opening
Yemen to the West. Although he remained supportive of
President Saleh's policies in the 1990s, he began to
criticize the president as the situation in the south
continued to deteriorate. In 2008 and 2009, Ali Nasser
positioned himself as an anti-Saleh voice for reform when he
began to use the media to call for major systemic changes.
His personal background is also appealing to many
southerners. Originally from Abyan's tribal heartland, Ali
Nasser understands the mentality of the vast majority of
southerners living outside of urbane Aden. He is also
remembered as a hero of the 1960s revolution against the
British, which affords him a special place of honor in
southern hearts and minds.

...AND THE CONS
--------------


10. (S) The former president's checkered past, however,
complicates any political return to Yemen. In January 1986,
then-President Ali Nasser Mohammed attempted to purge his
opponents in the former PDRY's politburo via assassination.
In the bloody fighting that ensued, Ali Nasser was defeated
and forced into exile in northern Yemen (Ref B). Even after
his exile from Yemen, Ali Nasser continued to go after
southern opponents. Although abroad at the time, Ali Nasser
played an inspirational role in the 1994 north-south civil
war via the "Ali Nasser Brigades," exiled southerners who
spearheaded Northern Yemen's attacks against the south. It
is unclear to what extent southerners remember Ali Nasser's
legacy of infighting, however. Post reporting dating back to
1995 assessed that Ali Nasser's (then five-year) absence from
Yemen had largely "clouded memories of his shortcomings as
the former head of the PDRY" (Ref C). The demographics of
the south are also in Ali Nasser's favor; the 75 percent of
southerners under the age of 25 do not know much about the
internecine conflicts of the 1980s and early 1990s.


11. (S) The fine line Ali Nasser has chosen to walk between
publicly supporting unity and winning support in the
increasingly secession-minded south will also complicate any
potential political future. In his media statements, Ali
Nasser has shrewdly chosen to back Yemeni unity. He has
publicly criticized Saleh's policies, however, and speaks
privately to confidantes and members of the opposition of his
desire to see an independent southern Yemen. Still, a public
perception that Ali Nasser is willing to work with the
current regime could taint him in the eyes of southerners and
other Yemenis frustrated with the current government. This
no doubt contributed to Ali Nasser's decision to decline
President Saleh's invitation in mid-2009 to return to Yemen
and assume the duties of either vice president or prime
minister. Even Mashdali, the pro-Ali Nasser businessman,
told PolOff in October, "Any southern politician who works

with this regime - his career will be done." Yemeni
Socialist Party (YSP) Aden Chief Ali Munasser told PolOff on
October 12, "If (Ali Nasser) adopts any settlement within the
framework of unity, he will lose the support of the south."
However, in order to retain the support of the international
community and the possibility of dialogue towards a federal
system ) Ali Nasser's current proposal for "saving" Yemeni
unity ) he cannot fully embrace the Southern Movement's
secessionist rhetoric.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (S) Insiders and political observers agree that Ali
Nasser seeks a return to power in his native land in whatever
form he can obtain it; the most likely option is devolved
central authority in either a power-sharing agreement between
the ruling party and opposition or a federalized state,
rather than a fully independent South Yemen. If Yemen moves
towards a federalized system split along north-south lines,
Ali Nasser is a front-runner to lead the south. His
relatively good standing with President Saleh ) especially
in comparison to turncoats such as Tariq al-Fadhli or
secessionists like Ali Salim al-Beidh ) and palatability to
Western and Arab audiences make him a likely compromise
candidate in a coalition or federalized government. Ali
Nasser's popularity among today's southern Yemenis, and his
ability to lead an increasingly fractured, tribalized and
radicalized south, remain major questions in assessing his
capability to lead. At a minimum, Ali Nasser must fight an
uphill battle in order to achieve the position of leadership
he so clearly desires. END COMMENT.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
--------------


13. (S) Former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)
President Ali Nasser Mohammed al-Hassani was born in Dathinah
(Abyan governorate) in 1938 or 1939. He led the National
Liberation Front - predecessor of the Yemeni Socialist Party
(YSP) ) against the British in the 1960s, and quickly
climbed the ranks in the newly independent South Yemen.
After holding various leadership positions including the
presidency, Ali Nasser ) as he prefers to be called ) tried
to eliminate political rivals in the politburo via
assassination in 1986. His faction was defeated in the
fighting that ensued, forcing Ali Nasser to flee north to
Sana'a. During his time in exile, he tried to organize
military and political opposition against Ali Salim
al-Beidh's PDRY regime, but left the country shortly before
the 1990 unity of North and South Yemen in a deal between
Saleh and Beidh. After settling in Damascus, where he
founded the Arab Center for Strategic Studies in 1995, Ali
Nasser briefly returned to Yemen in 1997. Under pressure
from President Saleh, however, he left again after a short
period of near-house arrest in Sana'a. Ali Nasser, thought
to be in good health, now splits his time between Damascus,
where he lives with his Syrian architect wife and five
children, and Cairo.
SECHE