FROM YEMEN, SEPARATE ATTACKS ON SAUDI DOORSTEP

S E C R E T SANAA 002029

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: FROM YEMEN, SEPARATE ATTACKS ON SAUDI DOORSTEP

REF: A. RIYADH 1460

B. RIYADH 1470

C. SANAA 1541

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY. Details are still emerging in two separate,
deadly attacks which took place on November 3 close to the
Yemen-Saudi border. In northern Sa'ada's Jabal al-Dukhan
border region, one Saudi security officer was killed and 11
others wounded, allegedly by Houthi rebels. The second
attack, which appears to be the work of al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, involved the assassination of four Yemeni
security officials returning through Yemen's Hadramout
governorate from a meeting with Saudi officials on the border
near al-Wadiya. Facts and theories continue to emerge in
both attacks, which took place in remote areas away from the
media and the watchful eyes of Sana'a, necessitating an
ongoing investigation to identify the true culprits. END
SUMMARY.

HOUTHIS: FROM SA'ADA INTO SAUDI?
--------------


2. (S) Unidentified gunmen likely affiliated with the Houthi
rebels killed one Saudi security official and injured 11
others on November 3 in northern Sa'ada's Jabal al-Dukhan
border region (Ref A),as the ROYG purportedly gained ground
in the area, local media reported. While Yemeni media
reported that the attackers were Houthis, official Saudi
media referred to the gunmen only as "armed attackers." In
possibly related news, the Houthis announced late on November
3 that they had taken control of territory inside Saudi
Arabia around Jabal al-Dukhan. (Note: The mountain of Jabal
al-Dukhan itself is within Yemeni territory. However, the
region of the same name stretches up to the Saudi border.
Announcements of military advancements by either side are
therefore difficult to pinpoint. End Note.) Post contacts
said that the attack appears to be the work of the Houthis
who were (1) recently pushed out of al-Malahit ) and
potentially up against the Saudi border - by ROYG advances in
the area, and (2) have used their media outlets to rail
against Saudi involvement in the war in Sa'ada, including
specific November 2 statements warning the Saudi regime to
"assume a neutral position" or risk confrontation.


3. (S) While reports of military advances by either side are
mixed and unreliable, it appears that the ROYG might have had
some military successes in al-Malahit in early November,
forcing the Houthis to retreat up to ) and possibly over )
the Saudi border. The ruling General People's Congress'
(GPC) al-Muatamar.net reported on November 2 that the ROYG
armed forces had taken control of Jabal al-Dukhan in
al-Malahit district and pushed the Houthi rebels out of their
positions in the area. NDI Deputy Country Director Murad
Zafir told PolOff on November 4 that the Houthis had likely
been "pushed up against" the Saudi border by ROYG military
advances, and, unable to retreat into Sa'ada, attacked Saudi
guards across the border. Demonstrating the ongoing
volatility of the situation, Mohammed al-Qadhi, Yemen
correspondent for al-Jazeera, told PolOff that his contacts
in Sa'ada reported fighting was ongoing in the Jabal
al-Dukhan area as of 15:00 local time on November 4. Recent
Houthi media statements also point to the Houthis as the
likeliest culprits. In Abdulmalik al-Houthi's November 2
statement, he accused the Saudis of allowing the Yemeni army
to use a Saudi military base near Jabal al-Dukhan to launch
attacks inside Yemen, which Houthi called a "flagrant
aggression and serious interference by the Saudi regime."
Nassir al-Rabiya, Yemen correspondent for Gulf News, told
PolOff on November 4 that the attack on the Saudi security
officials was "the Houthis carrying out their recent threat
to strike back against the Saudis." As of close of business
local time, the Houthis had yet to take credit for - or deny
- the attack on the Saudi border guards. (Comment: The
Houthis generally take credit quickly for attacks and
military advances - including capturing or killing Yemeni
military officials. Their silence on the attack on the Saudi
officials could either indicate their lack of involvement or
a strategic decision to avoid further rankling the Saudis.
End Comment.)

AN ALLEGED AQAP AMBUSH
--------------


4. (S) Also on November 3, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) elements reportedly ambushed and killed Wadi Hadramout
Political Security Organization (PSO) Director Ahmed Bawazir,
Hadramout Public Security Director Brigadier General Ali
Salim al-Ameri, and local security officials Zayki Arafat
Hubaish and Raimi Ali al-Kathiri in northwest Hadramout's
Khashm al-Ein area of al-Abar district, according to local
media reports. Gunmen fired on the security officials'
vehicle as they returned from a meeting with Saudi officials
on the border at al-Wadiya. Alawi bin Sumait, the Seyoun
chief correspondent for independent Aden-based al-Ayyam
newspaper who has extensive contacts in the area, told PolOff
on November 4 that 12 attackers were involved in the ambush.
According to local media reports, anonymous ROYG officials
immediately attributed the attack to AQAP. (Note: If
perpetrated by AQAP, this incident would represent the second
AQAP operation in Hadramout governorate in 2009. The first
took place on March 15, when a suicide bomber attacked a
group of South Korean tourists in Shibam, killing five people
and injuring four. End Note.) When reached on November 4, a
shaken Hadramout Deputy Governor Omair Mubarak Omair refused
to comment on what he called a "sensitive situation best left
to the Ministry of Interior." (Note: As of close of business
local time, AQAP had not taken credit for the attack.
However, it is not uncommon for AQAP to take credit for an
attack several days after the fact. End Note.)


5. (S) Although the ROYG has yet to make an official
statement of blame and AQAP has not taken credit for the
attack, post contacts in Sana'a and Hadramout agreed that
AQAP was the most likely culprit. Al-Ayyam's Bin Sumait
pointed to AQAP Emir Nasir al-Wahishi's 2009 statements in
which he threatened to target ROYG security officials for
their counter-terrorism operations. The assassinated
officials, however, were not focused on targeting AQAP, Bin
Sumait said. Zafir said that the officials were likely
targeted for their symbolism - specifically Bawazir's PSO
affiliation - rather than as individuals. Bin Sumait, who
was in a meeting with local tribal leaders familiar with
extremist activity in the area when reached on November 4,
said the attack was "carefully planned, coordinated and
executed." Journalist Rabiya said that the attack was likely
retaliation for the ROYG's killing of local AQAP leaders in
an operation in Wadi Hadramout in 2007. Contacts said that
the operation was likely the work of a local AQAP cell; Zafir
attributed it to AQAP's "third generation," which has "some
strings attached to Wahishi, but acts independently." The
hyper-religious climate in Hadramout, where the Salafi
presence has grown tremendously in recent years, provides a
friendly environment for AQAP to plan and conduct attacks
(Ref C). Zafir said that ROYG security on the road through
Hadramout to Saudi Arabia is poor, which enables AQAP to find
"many hiding places" in the area.

COMMENT
--------------


6. (S) Facts and theories continue to emerge in the two
attacks ) both of which took place in remote areas away from
the media and watchful eyes of Sana'a ) which makes it
difficult to definitively finger the culprits. While the
cross-border attack north of Sa'ada appears to be the work of
the Houthis, the mountainous border region provides a safe
haven not only for the Houthi rebels but also for well-armed
tribesmen, smugglers and AQAP, any of whom could
theoretically have perpetrated the attack. The alleged AQAP
attack in northwest Hadramout, however, is in line with the
group's recent attempts to target Yemeni and Saudi security
officials, such as the failed assassination attempt on
Mohammed Bin Nayef in September. END COMMENT.
SECHE