FROM YEMEN, SEPARATE ATTACKS ON SAUDI DOORSTEP

S E C R E T SANAA 002029 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM SUBJECT: FROM YEMEN, SEPARATE ATTACKS ON SAUDI DOORSTEP REF: A. RIYADH 1460 ¶B. RIYADH 1470 ¶C. SANAA 1541 Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Details are still emerging in two separate, deadly attacks which took place on November 3 close to the Yemen-Saudi border. In northern Sa'ada's Jabal al-Dukhan border region, one Saudi security officer was killed and 11 others wounded, allegedly by Houthi rebels. The second attack, which appears to be the work of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, involved the assassination of four Yemeni security officials returning through Yemen's Hadramout governorate from a meeting with Saudi officials on the border near al-Wadiya. Facts and theories continue to emerge in both attacks, which took place in remote areas away from the media and the watchful eyes of Sana'a, necessitating an ongoing investigation to identify the true culprits. END SUMMARY. HOUTHIS: FROM SA'ADA INTO SAUDI? -------------- ¶2. (S) Unidentified gunmen likely affiliated with the Houthi rebels killed one Saudi security official and injured 11 others on November 3 in northern Sa'ada's Jabal al-Dukhan border region (Ref A),as the ROYG purportedly gained ground in the area, local media reported. While Yemeni media reported that the attackers were Houthis, official Saudi media referred to the gunmen only as "armed attackers." In possibly related news, the Houthis announced late on November 3 that they had taken control of territory inside Saudi Arabia around Jabal al-Dukhan. (Note: The mountain of Jabal al-Dukhan itself is within Yemeni territory. However, the region of the same name stretches up to the Saudi border. Announcements of military advancements by either side are therefore difficult to pinpoint. End Note.) Post contacts said that the attack appears to be the work of the Houthis who were (1) recently pushed out of al-Malahit ) and potentially up against the Saudi border - by ROYG advances in the area, and (2) have used their media outlets to rail against Saudi involvement in the war in Sa'ada, including specific November 2 statements warning the Saudi regime to "assume a neutral position" or risk confrontation. ¶3. (S) While reports of military advances by either side are mixed and unreliable, it appears that the ROYG might have had some military successes in al-Malahit in early November, forcing the Houthis to retreat up to ) and possibly over ) the Saudi border. The ruling General People's Congress' (GPC) al-Muatamar.net reported on November 2 that the ROYG armed forces had taken control of Jabal al-Dukhan in al-Malahit district and pushed the Houthi rebels out of their positions in the area. NDI Deputy Country Director Murad Zafir told PolOff on November 4 that the Houthis had likely been "pushed up against" the Saudi border by ROYG military advances, and, unable to retreat into Sa'ada, attacked Saudi guards across the border. Demonstrating the ongoing volatility of the situation, Mohammed al-Qadhi, Yemen correspondent for al-Jazeera, told PolOff that his contacts in Sa'ada reported fighting was ongoing in the Jabal al-Dukhan area as of 15:00 local time on November 4. Recent Houthi media statements also point to the Houthis as the likeliest culprits. In Abdulmalik al-Houthi's November 2 statement, he accused the Saudis of allowing the Yemeni army to use a Saudi military base near Jabal al-Dukhan to launch attacks inside Yemen, which Houthi called a "flagrant aggression and serious interference by the Saudi regime." Nassir al-Rabiya, Yemen correspondent for Gulf News, told PolOff on November 4 that the attack on the Saudi security officials was "the Houthis carrying out their recent threat to strike back against the Saudis." As of close of business local time, the Houthis had yet to take credit for - or deny - the attack on the Saudi border guards. (Comment: The Houthis generally take credit quickly for attacks and military advances - including capturing or killing Yemeni military officials. Their silence on the attack on the Saudi officials could either indicate their lack of involvement or a strategic decision to avoid further rankling the Saudis. End Comment.) AN ALLEGED AQAP AMBUSH -------------- ¶4. (S) Also on November 3, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) elements reportedly ambushed and killed Wadi Hadramout Political Security Organization (PSO) Director Ahmed Bawazir, Hadramout Public Security Director Brigadier General Ali Salim al-Ameri, and local security officials Zayki Arafat Hubaish and Raimi Ali al-Kathiri in northwest Hadramout's Khashm al-Ein area of al-Abar district, according to local media reports. Gunmen fired on the security officials' vehicle as they returned from a meeting with Saudi officials on the border at al-Wadiya. Alawi bin Sumait, the Seyoun chief correspondent for independent Aden-based al-Ayyam newspaper who has extensive contacts in the area, told PolOff on November 4 that 12 attackers were involved in the ambush. According to local media reports, anonymous ROYG officials immediately attributed the attack to AQAP. (Note: If perpetrated by AQAP, this incident would represent the second AQAP operation in Hadramout governorate in 2009. The first took place on March 15, when a suicide bomber attacked a group of South Korean tourists in Shibam, killing five people and injuring four. End Note.) When reached on November 4, a shaken Hadramout Deputy Governor Omair Mubarak Omair refused to comment on what he called a "sensitive situation best left to the Ministry of Interior." (Note: As of close of business local time, AQAP had not taken credit for the attack. However, it is not uncommon for AQAP to take credit for an attack several days after the fact. End Note.) ¶5. (S) Although the ROYG has yet to make an official statement of blame and AQAP has not taken credit for the attack, post contacts in Sana'a and Hadramout agreed that AQAP was the most likely culprit. Al-Ayyam's Bin Sumait pointed to AQAP Emir Nasir al-Wahishi's 2009 statements in which he threatened to target ROYG security officials for their counter-terrorism operations. The assassinated officials, however, were not focused on targeting AQAP, Bin Sumait said. Zafir said that the officials were likely targeted for their symbolism - specifically Bawazir's PSO affiliation - rather than as individuals. Bin Sumait, who was in a meeting with local tribal leaders familiar with extremist activity in the area when reached on November 4, said the attack was "carefully planned, coordinated and executed." Journalist Rabiya said that the attack was likely retaliation for the ROYG's killing of local AQAP leaders in an operation in Wadi Hadramout in 2007. Contacts said that the operation was likely the work of a local AQAP cell; Zafir attributed it to AQAP's "third generation," which has "some strings attached to Wahishi, but acts independently." The hyper-religious climate in Hadramout, where the Salafi presence has grown tremendously in recent years, provides a friendly environment for AQAP to plan and conduct attacks (Ref C). Zafir said that ROYG security on the road through Hadramout to Saudi Arabia is poor, which enables AQAP to find "many hiding places" in the area. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (S) Facts and theories continue to emerge in the two attacks ) both of which took place in remote areas away from the media and watchful eyes of Sana'a ) which makes it difficult to definitively finger the culprits. While the cross-border attack north of Sa'ada appears to be the work of the Houthis, the mountainous border region provides a safe haven not only for the Houthi rebels but also for well-armed tribesmen, smugglers and AQAP, any of whom could theoretically have perpetrated the attack. The alleged AQAP attack in northwest Hadramout, however, is in line with the group's recent attempts to target Yemeni and Saudi security officials, such as the failed assassination attempt on Mohammed Bin Nayef in September. END COMMENT. SECHE