TRIBALIZED "POPULAR ARMY" AGAINST THE HOUTHIS WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 001847 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR SMOFFATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 TAGS: MCAP MOPS PGOV PHUM PREL PTER YM SUBJECT: TRIBALIZED "POPULAR ARMY" AGAINST THE HOUTHIS WILL EXACERBATE SA'ADA WAR REF: SANAA 1532 Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The ROYG is encouraging the formation of a "popular army" of tribesmen to supplement the regular army's fight against the Houthis in northern Yemen. The ROYG uses the "popular army" to harness tribal support for the war, increase its numbers and firepower in the region, and engage in illegitimate tactics. By allowing fighting tribesmen to loot and plunder, the ROYG would reward them for their loyalty to the government. While some tribes have contributed fighters to the ROYG's side, others support the Houthis, out of shared anti-government sentiments, appreciation for the Houthis' help in resolving tribal disputes, or outrage at the collateral damage caused by the ROYG's bombing of population centers. The tribalization of the war is particularly pronounced in Amran's Harf Sufyan, where Sufyan and Hashid tribes share a long border and a history of tensions. Most observers are alarmed by the ROYG's strategy of using tribal militias, fearing that it will only prolong and complicate the war. Despite this, President Saleh's personal determination to defeat the Houthis at all costs, and his desire to spread the blame for an increasingly unpopular war, is likely behind his drive to pursue this risky strategy. END SUMMARY. ROYG ENCOURAGES "POPULAR ARMY" TO FIGHT HOUTHIS -------------- -- ¶2. (SBU) The ROYG is encouraging the formation of a "popular army," also referred to as "popular resistance committees," to fight alongside the regular army against the Houthis in northern Yemen. The popular army is not a self-defense force; its members leave their villages to fight elsewhere, often far from their homes. Instead, it is a way for the ROYG to harness tribal support for the war in Sa'ada, increase its numbers and firepower in the region (since the fighters provide their own arms),and engage in illegitimate tactics against the Houthis and their sympathizers. By allowing these mobilized tribal militias to loot and plunder, the ROYG intends to reward them for their loyalty to the government. According to Ministry of Defense weekly 26 September, thousands have "flocked to join the popular resistance committees." They "voluntarily rushed in an unprecedented way with their weapons to the committees' headquarters..., determined to teach (the Houthis) lessons they will not forget." (Comment: While the numbers are likely exaggerated, the glowing praise for these committees is indicative of the government's support. End Comment.) According to 26 September, these volunteer fighters "will support the armed forces in their confrontations with these terrorist elements in order to reinstate security and stability in their villages." Schools often serve as "collecting areas" for mobilized tribal fighters. In one instance, as reported by Yemen Times Online, each volunteer fighter was given 20,000 Yemeni riyals (about $100 USD) and 100 bullets. They are not, however, registered as part of the regular army nor on its payroll. ¶3. (C) While the ROYG is actively enlisting Hashid-affiliated tribes on its behalf, other tribes have thrown their support behind the Houthis, for several reasons. First, they share similar anti-government sentiments, even if they do not share their ideology. Second, they support the Houthis out of anger at the destruction and loss of life caused by the ROYG's attacks on civilian population centers during this and previous rounds of fighting. For example, according to journalist Mohamed al-Qadhi of Abu Dhabi-based The National newspaper, in the village of al-Adi in Harf Sufyan district (Amran governorate),where the ROYG bombed an IDP camp and reportedly killed 87 civilians (reftel),some of the victims belonged to a tribe that had sent 50 tribesmen to fight with the army against the Houthis. The mobilized fighters' leader is dismayed that the government attacked its own supporters, said Qadhi. Bakil tribal leaders are outraged at the needless loss of life, as the victims were mostly women and children. Third, according to Sa'ada native Abdulmajid al-Fahd, Executive Director of local NGO Civic Democratic Foundation, Houthis help resolve conflicts between tribes and reduce the number of revenge killings in areas they control. By administering conflict resolution based on shari'a (Islamic) law, "what the Houthis did was bring peace between the tribes" in certain areas. He noted that President Saleh is known for doing the opposite )- creating divisions between tribes in order to stay in power. Fahd explained that the Sufyan tribe in Amran governorate, which had among the highest rates of revenge killings in Yemen, largely supports the Houthis because of their role in resolving disputes that typically led to such killings. When asked if Houthis recruit fighters by offering payment, Murad Zafir, Deputy Director of NDI, told PolOff on October 6 that young men join the Houthis because they will get food for themselves and their families, but the real reason people join is "because (their family's) blood was shed." There are also allegations that some criminals join the Houthis in order to take advantage of the spoils of war. ¶4. (C) Tribalization of the war is particularly pronounced in Harf Sufyan, where Sufyan and Hashid tribes share a long border and long-standing tensions owing to a major land dispute. After the war expanded to Harf Sufyan, Yemen Times Online reported in late August that more than 3,000 Hashid tribesmen were being mobilized to fight the Houthis there. (Note: Fahd told PolOff on September 27 that the number of mobilized Hashid fighters was only several hundred. End Note.) According to Ali Saif Hasan of the Political Development Forum, President Saleh promised Hashid tribal leader Hussein al-Ahmar that he would finance 3,000 tribesmen to fight in the popular army. Bakil tribal leader Mohammed Abulahoum told Pol/Econ Chief on September 30 that President Saleh was angry that only a few hundred Hashid fighters responded to the call. According to al-Arabiyah Television, these Hashid tribesmen fought alongside the Yemeni army. Their mobilization led to inter-tribal fighting when, according to independent News Yemen, the Khalikah School in Harf Sufyan, which was serving as an assembly point for volunteer Hashid fighters, came under artillery attack from the Sufyan tribe on August 29, killing seven and wounding 19. News Yemen reported that several other killings in the area were the result of Hashid members' settling scores with Sufyan members, in retaliation for the latter tribe's support for the Houthis. ROYG SPREADS THE BLAME AND TAKES THE GLOVES OFF -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Member of Parliament and ruling General People's Congress member Mohammed al-Qadhi (not the journalist by the same name from The National) told PolOffs on October 5 that President Saleh recruited Hashid tribal fighters in order to "spread the hate" for the war, so that he would not be the only one responsible for the suffering and destruction it would cause. With tribesmen involved in the fighting, Qadhi said, families of those killed in the conflict would focus their anger and blame on them, not the President. Other observers believe that the ROYG encouraged tribes to take its side in the war under the mistaken impression that it is the only way to defeat the Houthis. According to journalist Nasser al-Rabyee of Gulf News, President Saleh reportedly said that only the tribes are capable of ending the war in Sa'ada. Although the ROYG tried to enlist tribal support during the previous round of fighting, Rabyee told PolOff on August 31 that "this time, it's official" and that the popular army is evidence of the ROYG's more systematic approach. He said that the tribes' involvement in the war allows the ROYG to delegate war-fighting, thereby allowing its proxies to use more unsavory tactics against Houthis and their sympathizers. He recognized that this practice is "outside the law and the constitution, because the army should take responsibility (for the war)" and that tribalizing the war will "lead to chaos," but he pointed out that the ROYG tried to defeat the Houthis several times before and failed. "Now, the army will be (leading the fight),but the tribes will be able to do the types of things that the Houthis do," by which he means commit abuses against the civilian population. (Note: The ROYG accuses the Houthis of killing civilians and destroying their property, but these accusations have not been independently confirmed. According to the International Crisis Group, however, the Houthis are responsible for looting. End Note.) ¶6. (C) Most observers are alarmed by the government's strategy of using tribal militias, fearing that it will only prolong and complicate the war. Naseem al-Rehman, Chief of Communications and Advocacy for UNICEF, told PolOff on September 20 that the practice "blurs the lines between combatants and non-combatants." This "will be very dangerous for the country," he said, because it will turn the tribes against each other, leading to blood feuds and revenge killings. Parliamentarian Qadhi agreed, implying that triggering tribal blood feuds was in fact one reason why President Saleh recruited Hashid fighters in the first place. He wanted them to be the targets of the retaliation caused by the families of the victims of the war. Observers are also concerned about the looting and plundering that is likely to occur. NDI's Zafir described the popular army as a "looting force" that follows the army as it advances and explained that tribes historically have been rewarded with looting opportunities in return for their support during a conflict. These concerns are shared by Presidential Advisor for Sa'ada Affairs Mohammed Azzan, who told PolOff on August 16 that he fears massive looting of civilian properties will occur wherever the army makes gains against the Houthis. Fahd said that even if the war were to end soon, "there will be tribal conflict side-effects" that will ignite a chain reaction of revenge killings that will continue indefinitely. For that reason, some tribes are resisting the government's efforts to involve them in the war. For example, the Dumhamid, a Bakil-affiliated tribe, did not allow army troops to enter Harf Sufyan through its territory, for fear of provoking a conflict with neighboring tribes. Parliamentarian Qahdi noted that other Bakil-affiliated tribes blocked the army's advance through Amran governorate because they were angry that the ROYG was favoring the Hashid by recruiting fighting tribesmen only from it. He also warned that many of the tribes surrounding Sana'a are so fed up with the government that they would not think twice about supporting the Houthis if invited. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) The ROYG's effort to tribalize the war is a dangerous strategy that is unlikely to lead to victory against the Houthis, though it is likely to set off a series of deadly and destabilizing inter-tribal conflicts that could continue for years. Because many tribes are cognizant of that possibility, the ROYG has been only partially successful in tribalizing the war and numbers of tribal fighters announced in the official media are likely significantly exaggerated. While it is unclear as to why the ROYG continues to embrace this strategy despite its obvious flaws, President Saleh's determination to defeat the Houthis is probably driving him to adopt whatever measures he thinks will help him do so, regardless of the potential long-term damage. END COMMENT. SECHE