PORT SECURITY WOES MAKE GULF OF ADEN "OPEN SEA"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001598

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND OES/MSN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHSA EWWT MCAP PREL MASS YM
SUBJECT: PORT SECURITY WOES MAKE GULF OF ADEN "OPEN SEA"
FOR PIRATES & SMUGGLERS

REF: SANAA 1484

SANAA 00001598 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. The Gulf of Aden is an "open sea" for
pirates and smugglers, the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG),Aden Port
Authority, and independent journalists told PolOffs on an
August 8 visit to Aden. The YCG's deep water patrolling
capabilities are almost non-existent and the Port Authority's
ability to detect aberrations in vessels' cargo and movements
is linked to inconsistent radar and voluntary inspection.
Reliable vetting procedures and a shift from hardware-focused
aid to training are necessary commitments for the ROYG's
counter-piracy forces if they hope to fend off pirate attacks
and re-establish Aden as a premier port city. END SUMMARY.

CORRUPTION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT
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2. (C) The Yemen Coast Guard (YCG) claims to have minimized
smuggling in the small region stretching westward from Aden
to Khawr 'Umayrah, but Colonel Lotf A.H. Baraty, the
commander of the YCG in Aden, declared the area from Bab
al-Mandeb to Mukha on the Red Sea "open sea and safe for
smugglers and pirates." Part of the problem is that the YCG
does not control the Mukha harbor; there are several other
security forces there, meaning additional opportunities for
corruption. Baraty alluded to some corruption within the YCG
and attributed it to a lack of adequate vetting of
fishermen's sons, soldiers from coastal areas, and unemployed
men from the mountains when they were recruited into the
force. "We don,t know who among them were untrustworthy."
Baraty indicated that he suspects pirate ships may be
receiving tip-offs from sailors onboard YCG ships via
satellite phone and from informants on shore regarding patrol
routes. Furthermore, Ayman Nasser, editor of independent
Aden-based newspaper al-Tariq, confirmed that the YCG has
been threatened by powerful individuals within Yemen, warning
them not to patrol certain areas of coastline lest their
sailors be killed. In addition, Nasser said that ROYG
military and tribal figures have been known to procure
weapons illegally and are "the most likely suppliers to the
pirates because their security clearances give them easy
access to the ports." The resulting lack of security renders
Yemen a perfect transit point for illicit arms and drugs (see
septel),leaving security officials like Baraty with "no
sense of how much is seeping through the open coast."

PORT SECURITY AND INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES
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3. (C) Founded in 2002, and beginning operations as late as
2003, the young YCG falls short in accomplishing its daunting
task of patrolling and securing Yemen's 1900 kilometers of
coastline. Dividing its territory into three districts, the
Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea, Baraty
indicated that the YCG has yet to establish a real presence
in the Arabian Sea. At its inception, the YCG was forced to
recruit men from mountain villages to supplement its ranks of
sailors and officers wooed away from the Yemeni Navy (YNAV),
resulting in a significant skills disparity within the YCG
and between the YCG and the sea-savvy pirates. Furthermore,
simmering resentment from the YNAV, whose ranks of talented
and English-speaking officers were depleted by the YCG,
remains an impediment to counter-piracy cooperation. The
YCG's stubborn refusal to share its mandate to secure the
coastlines with the YNAV was made evident in Baraty's
classification of the YNAV as an "impediment" to port
security, insisting on the YCG's "need to kick everybody out
of Mukha" in order to secure the harbor. (Comment. This
unsolicited comment from the commander of the YCG in Aden
underscores the infighting that continues to undermine
counter-piracy coordination in the Gulf of Aden. Instead of
focusing on cooperation, the YCG expends more energy on
ousting other ROYG security and naval forces from the mission
field. See reftel for greater detail. End Comment.)


4. (C) The YCG's long patrolling missions have been reduced
in number and randomized by budget cuts. Though they attempt
to maintain a weekly long patrolling mission, the YCG has
been forced to focus more on close harbor patrolling. Of the

SANAA 00001598 002.2 OF 002


YCG's 30 vessels dedicated to Aden, only three are capable of
sustained deep water patrolling. At $2200/tank of gas, the
high price of fuel combined with budget cuts have rendered
even minimal patrolling difficult as the YCG often lacks the
funds to fuel its ships. Mohamed A. Mubarak bin Aifan, the
Chairman of the Aden Port Authority, pointed to the Auto
Identification of Ships (AIS) system as the cornerstone of
current interdiction capabilities. Based on satellite
technology, the AIS can identify a ship more than 100 miles
before it reaches Aden and then inform the authorities of a
ship's cargo and direction. When questioned about its
limitations, Aifan admitted that the AIS works only on ships
which have complied with protocols to install and maintain a
black-box type of tracking device onboard. The Maritime
Affairs Authority (MAA) can detain a vessel not complying
with AIS, but only if it stops at the port and permits
inspection of the vessel. According to Aifan, AIS can serve
as a "complement, but not a replacement" of the more advanced
radar technology VTS which the YCG is attempting to
establish. VTS radar is a far more reliable system currently
used in the U.S. which can measure the electronic signature
of a vessel and determine if the ship deviates from a
pre-described course, thus enabling proactive interdiction of
passing vessels.

PIRACY PUTS THE SQUEEZE ON PORT TRAFFIC
--------------


5. (C) Since the recent upswing in piracy in the last year,
the Aden Port Authority has seen a 40 percent drop in
containers, which represents more than half of port revenues.
Aifan suspects the drop would have been higher had it not
been for the fact that in November 2008, Yemen entered into a
joint venture to develop the port via international port
management company Dubai Ports World. It was a &good
opportunity to develop the container business, but the
problem of piracy let us down. The effect of piracy could
have been more adverse if we hadn,t had the agreement with
Dubai,8 Aifan said. Unfortunately, Aden is still losing
volume to nearby Djibouti and ships are migrating even
further afield to Cape Town. The drop in oil prices and the
spike in insurance rates for ships transiting the Gulf of
Aden have rendered the longer Cape Town route an attractive
option. Oil tankers en route to Europe have been
circumventing the Gulf of Aden, even if it means an extra
two-to-three months of transit time.

COMMENT
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6. (C) The YCG, YNAV, and other ROYG security forces engaged
in counter-piracy must focus on elevating their standards of
training so that all personnel are sufficiently equipped to
engage the highly-adept pirates on the high seas. A
short-sighted focus on securing new boats, aircraft, and
other equipment without the proper maintenance and navigation
know-how or spare parts has dominated YCG-donor country
interaction. Furthermore, insistence on reliable vetting
procedures and investigation of potential corruption within
the ranks of the YCG, YNAV, and port police are essential
first steps in establishing an effective, credible
counter-piracy force. Should the ROYG fail to address these
systemic problems within their counter-piracy forces, Aden
will continue to lose port volume to neighboring hubs,
further crippling the local economy and encouraging
lucrative, illicit trade. END COMMENT.
SECHE