Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SANAA1014
2009-05-31 11:12:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:
SALEH AND CRONIES DRAW FIRE FROM A BROADENING
VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHYN #1014 1511112 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 311112Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY SANAA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2021 INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0088 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SANAA 001014
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG
BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV YM
SUBJECT: SALEH AND CRONIES DRAW FIRE FROM A BROADENING
SWATH OF ROYG CRITICS
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
-------
S E C R E T SANAA 001014
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG
BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV YM
SUBJECT: SALEH AND CRONIES DRAW FIRE FROM A BROADENING
SWATH OF ROYG CRITICS
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) As political tension mounts in Yemen, a broadening
cross-section of EMBASSY interlocutors is blaming President
Saleh personally for the country’s woes. This increasing
distrust of Saleh bodes poorly for his ability to draw
effectively on the power base that traditionally has enabled
him to weather political crises. End Summary
Pointing the Finger at Saleh
--------------
2. (S) Against a backdrop of continuing unrest in Yemen’s
south, EMBASSY interlocutors, even those in the ruling party,
are increasingly placing blame for the southern unrest and
the nation’s other problems squarely on the doorstep of
President Saleh. Sheikh Mohamed Naji al-Shaif of the Bakil
confederation said to the Ambassador on May 26, "who caused
the southern call for independence? Saleh." Assistant
Secretary General of the opposition Islah Party told POL/E
Chief on May 19 that Saleh’s rule is responsible for the
unrest in the country. On May 18, Mohamed Abulahoum, a
member of the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) General
Committee, told POL/E Chief that Saleh is no longer capable
of bringing about needed reforms.
Nepotism, Ahmed Ali, and the Cult of Personality
-------------- ---
3. (S) The presence of close members of the President’s
family in senior leadership positions is a primary irritant
for the President’s detractors. GPC Parliamentarian Ali
al-Imrani complained to POL/E Chief on May 25, "His (Saleh’s)
sons and his nephews who are like his sons are running
everything. He has more children, what happens when they get
older? There will be no positions for anyone else." Shaif
told the Ambassador that if Saleh will not abdicate his
position then he should "say goodbye to (remove from power)
his corrupt generals and his family members."
4. (S) Of particular concern is presidential son Ahmed Ali
Abdullah Saleh, head of Yemen’s Special Operations Force and
Republican Guard. It is generally believed that Saleh is
grooming him to be the next president. Imrani told POL/E
Chief, "if there is to be any serious reform, Saleh must
first announce that his son will not replace him. We are not
a monarchy. I have no objection to Ahmed Ali winning the
presidency but he must not inherit it." Adeni businessmen
Adnan al-Kaff and Ahmed Shukri and Syrian businessman working
in Mukalla Nasser Musphi have all told representatives of
post’s force protection detachment that southerners will
never support Ahmed Ali as a president. Shaif told the
Ambassador that Saleh "must get rid of Ahmed Ali."
5. (C) Beyond pure nepotism, presidential critics complain
that Saleh has warped Yemen’s institutions to amass power to
himself. Imrani complained that the GPC "is not even a real
political party. It’s just a tool to do Saleh’s will." When
asked about the effectiveness of Yemen’s Parliament, Council
of Ministers and judiciary, Yassin Saeed Noman, Secretary
General of the opposition Yemeni Socialist Party, said, "they
have no power. They are chosen on the basis of loyalty, not
loyalty to the state or the homeland -- loyalty to one man
(Saleh). This makes them just tools of the President."
Comment
--------------
6. (C) It is unsurprising in a state dominated by a strong
leader that those unhappy with their situation blame that
individual. The increasingly open criticism of the president
and his inner circle in Yemen bodes poorly for the ability of
the Saleh regime to regain the people’s trust. This, in
turn, bodes poorly for the country’s ability to stabilize
itself in the near term. End Comment.
SECHE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG
BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV YM
SUBJECT: SALEH AND CRONIES DRAW FIRE FROM A BROADENING
SWATH OF ROYG CRITICS
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) As political tension mounts in Yemen, a broadening
cross-section of EMBASSY interlocutors is blaming President
Saleh personally for the country’s woes. This increasing
distrust of Saleh bodes poorly for his ability to draw
effectively on the power base that traditionally has enabled
him to weather political crises. End Summary
Pointing the Finger at Saleh
--------------
2. (S) Against a backdrop of continuing unrest in Yemen’s
south, EMBASSY interlocutors, even those in the ruling party,
are increasingly placing blame for the southern unrest and
the nation’s other problems squarely on the doorstep of
President Saleh. Sheikh Mohamed Naji al-Shaif of the Bakil
confederation said to the Ambassador on May 26, "who caused
the southern call for independence? Saleh." Assistant
Secretary General of the opposition Islah Party told POL/E
Chief on May 19 that Saleh’s rule is responsible for the
unrest in the country. On May 18, Mohamed Abulahoum, a
member of the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) General
Committee, told POL/E Chief that Saleh is no longer capable
of bringing about needed reforms.
Nepotism, Ahmed Ali, and the Cult of Personality
-------------- ---
3. (S) The presence of close members of the President’s
family in senior leadership positions is a primary irritant
for the President’s detractors. GPC Parliamentarian Ali
al-Imrani complained to POL/E Chief on May 25, "His (Saleh’s)
sons and his nephews who are like his sons are running
everything. He has more children, what happens when they get
older? There will be no positions for anyone else." Shaif
told the Ambassador that if Saleh will not abdicate his
position then he should "say goodbye to (remove from power)
his corrupt generals and his family members."
4. (S) Of particular concern is presidential son Ahmed Ali
Abdullah Saleh, head of Yemen’s Special Operations Force and
Republican Guard. It is generally believed that Saleh is
grooming him to be the next president. Imrani told POL/E
Chief, "if there is to be any serious reform, Saleh must
first announce that his son will not replace him. We are not
a monarchy. I have no objection to Ahmed Ali winning the
presidency but he must not inherit it." Adeni businessmen
Adnan al-Kaff and Ahmed Shukri and Syrian businessman working
in Mukalla Nasser Musphi have all told representatives of
post’s force protection detachment that southerners will
never support Ahmed Ali as a president. Shaif told the
Ambassador that Saleh "must get rid of Ahmed Ali."
5. (C) Beyond pure nepotism, presidential critics complain
that Saleh has warped Yemen’s institutions to amass power to
himself. Imrani complained that the GPC "is not even a real
political party. It’s just a tool to do Saleh’s will." When
asked about the effectiveness of Yemen’s Parliament, Council
of Ministers and judiciary, Yassin Saeed Noman, Secretary
General of the opposition Yemeni Socialist Party, said, "they
have no power. They are chosen on the basis of loyalty, not
loyalty to the state or the homeland -- loyalty to one man
(Saleh). This makes them just tools of the President."
Comment
--------------
6. (C) It is unsurprising in a state dominated by a strong
leader that those unhappy with their situation blame that
individual. The increasingly open criticism of the president
and his inner circle in Yemen bodes poorly for the ability of
the Saleh regime to regain the people’s trust. This, in
turn, bodes poorly for the country’s ability to stabilize
itself in the near term. End Comment.
SECHE