NORTHERN TRIBAL LEADER THROWS LOT IN WITH

S E C R E T SANAA 001007 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV YM SUBJECT: NORTHERN TRIBAL LEADER THROWS LOT IN WITH SECESSIONISTS Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Sheikh Mohamed Naji al-Shaif told the Ambassador on May 26 that he has met repeatedly with southern leader Ali Nasser Mohamed and had committed to give financial support to another prominent dissident. He further claimed that if Yemen's southern governorates secede, the northern governorate of al-Jawf, his tribal stronghold, will follow suit. Shaif appears to be positioning himself for a post-Saleh era. End Summary. Throwing in his Lot with Secessionists -------------- ¶2. (S) Sheikh Mohamed Naji al-Shaif, eldest son of the Paramount Sheikh of the Bakil confederation (Yemen's largest tribal confederation),told the Ambassador on May 26 that he has met frequently with former President of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) Ali Nasser Mohamed. (Note: Mohamed has been cited by some, including some in the Southern Movement, as a likely leader of an independent South Yemen, although he has thus far refused to publicly endorse secession. End Note.) Shaif told the Ambassador that he had just returned from several meetings with Mohamed in Dubai, which also included former Prime Minister of Yemen (after unity) Haider al-Attas. Unlike Mohamed, who Shaif feels would like to cut a deal with the current regime, Attas is seeking to "break the connection" between the southern governorates and the central government in Sana'a. (Note: Shaif said that Attas prefers the phrase "breaking the connection" to the more commonly used "secession." End Note.) ¶3. (S) Shaif told the Ambassador that Attas asked him what "the northern position" was on unity and he responded that the north supported unity as long as it was for all the people of Yemen. Attas then asked if Shaif would be willing to provide him financial support to "break the connection" between Yemen's north and south and he agreed to do so. (Note: Shaif did not disclose the amount of this financial support. End Note.) Shaif went to some pains to assert that his willingness to support the secessionists comes from his feeling that President Saleh has betrayed the country for his own personal gain. This is a feeling expressed by increasing numbers of embassy interlocutors (Septel to follow). ¶4. (S) Shaif told the Ambassador that if the southern governorates secede from Yemen, the northern governorate of al-Jawf (seat of the Bakil confederation) will secede as well, opening "a second front" against President Saleh. Shaif told the Ambassador that secession was not the only danger faced by the ROYG. "If there is no secession, there will at least be war," he said. Views on "Exiled Leaders" -------------- ¶5. (S) In spite of his willingness to meet and work with Mohamed and Attas, Shaif does not feel that any of the southerners living outside of Yemen would ever lead an independent South Yemen. "Mohamed, Attas and (former PDRY Vice President and briefly, in 1994, President of the breakaway Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) Ali Salem) al-Beidh want to benefit from southern independence, but they will never lead." He said that these men (including Beidh, who has proclaimed himself leader of the Southern Movement) provide rallying points for unhappy Southerners, "but the actual decisions are made in Dhale," a particularly restive southern governorate. Probing for Support -------------- ¶6. (S) The Ambassador stressed repeatedly the USG position that an immediate and effective ROYG response to the problems of its people is essential if Yemen's unity is to be preserved, which, he noted, is long-standing U.S. policy. The Ambassador asked if Shaif truly believed that the southern governorates could become a viable, independent state. Appearing to be fishing for an endorsement, Shaif replied, "it could, if it gets a green light from countries like the US and Saudi Arabia." After reiterating US support for a unified Yemen, the Ambassador noted that the ROYG had recently inaugurated a bewildering array of development programs for the south and an ambitious plan to consider devolving some power to the local level. He asked Shaif if these steps might be enough to appease the south. "It would take a miracle," responded Shaif. Background on Mohamed Naji al-Shaif and the Bakil Confederation -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) While Mohamed Naji al-Shaif is not himself the Paramount Sheikh of the Bakil confederation, he has for some time been performing the functions of that role in his father's name. While the Bakil are the largest tribal confederation, they have been historically less powerful than the smaller Hashid confederation. (Note: President Saleh and his family are Hashid. End Note.) Nonetheless, the Bakil confederation controls large areas in al-Jawf as well as parts of Amran, Marib and Sa'ada, and could be a considerable thorn in Saleh's side, particularly if he is faced with open rebellion in the south. Comment -------------- ¶8. (S) Shaif has in the past made extravagent claims and offers to the embassy. (In March he offered to use his tribal forces to assassinate "dangerous terrorist elements in al-Jawf.") In this meeting, however, he appeared both lucid and credible. It is reasonable to assume that his family, which has amassed considerable wealth, has benefitted from the regime's largess. In the byzantine world of Yemeni politics, it is even imaginable that Shaif's approach to the Ambassador had an ulterior motive or was an attempt by Saleh (acting through Shaif) to test USG commitment to Yemeni unity. In post's view, however, for Shaif to admit to material and moral support for the secessionists indicates that he truly believes that the Saleh regime will not respond effectively to this crisis and, therefore, may not survive the challenge of southern independence, and is trying to position himself for the post-Saleh era. End Comment. SECHE