S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000095

NOFORN
SIPDIS

SIPDIS, NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/24/2019
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL SNAR KDEM IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - FEBRUARY
24, 2009

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

1. [S/NF] Russia Reportedly Provides Iran Missile Technology for
ICBM: An Iranian businessman with strong links to
government/security circles through his status as former IRGC
commander in Khuzestan and former senior official for the
Bonyad-e Shahid told IRPO on February 22 that the Russians
provided Iranian defense minister Najjar a "kit" for evaluation
and construction of a missile with a 7,000 mile range during his
visit last week to Moscow. [Note: The two Russian missiles
with this range are the SS-25 Sickle and the SS-27 Topol, both
three-stage single warhead missiles designed at the Moscow
Institute of Thermal Technology and entering into service in
1988 and 1998 respectively. Both can be deployed on mobile
launchers.] IRPO Officer asked contact why he thought the
Russians would provide Iran with such a dramatically
destabilizing technology. He replied that "clearly, the
Russians are looking to the US to provide them some major
concessions" - purportedly to halt further diplomatic and
security support for Iran. Comment: Najjar reportedly wanted to
finalize the deal for S-300 air defense missiles during the
visit, and this other technology may be a consolation. IRPO is
unable to confirm the accuracy of this contact's claims, but is
compelled to report this disturbing allegation.




2. [S/NF] IRPO Contact Reports on Meeting with Khatami: A
well-established IRPO contact with direct access to the
reformist camp (both Khatami and Karroubi) provided a detailed
readout of his meeting last week with former President Khatami.
Highlights follow:



What Supreme Leader Khamenei Told Khatami: During the widely
reported meeting between the SL and former president Khatami in
late January, the SL told Khatami that in his opinion, Khat

ami
should not run for President because it would not be good for
the country. If Khatami chose to run and was elected, however,
as directed in the Constitution, the Supreme Leader would work
with him.



Mousavi To Join Race to Bolster Reformist Chances: Former PM Mir
Hossein Mousavi will formally declare his candidacy; in large
part to deflect some hardline pressure off former president
Khatami, but also to back him up should Khatami withdraw (either
voluntarily or otherwise) from the race. If Khatami survives
the vetting process, then Mousavi will step aside in support of
the former president.



Office of First Vice President Will Gain Increased Powers,
Candidates Will Reportedly Run on President-VP Tickets: Khatami
reportedly divulged IRIG plans for a change to the office of the
First Vice President under the next government. Under this
plan, the office will enjoy increased powers, more in line with
the role of a Prime Minister or the US Vice President. Khatami
has selected Moussavi as his first VP, and Karroubi has selected
former Tehran Mayor Karbashchi in this capacity. These duos
will reportedly run on two-man tickets as in US elections. It
is not clear if AN will run on a ticket with Dr. Parviz Davoudi,
his first VP.



Khatami Requests USG Help to Arrange Meeting with Swiss
Ambassador to Iran: To help offset IRIB's broad support for AN's
candidacy, and after the IRIG blocked his two main campaign
websites, Khatami is seeking outlets to raise his media profile
in advance of the election. Along these lines, he has asked if
Department can facilitate a meeting between Khatami and Swiss
Ambassador to Tehran, Livia Agosti. Such a meeting would allow
Khatami to highlight his international appeal (a key AN
weakness) and Khatami welcomed media coverage of the meeting by
domestic and foreign media. Should such a meeting be possible,
IRPO contact has asked that he be entrusted to deliver this
message to Khatami.

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3. [S/NF] Drug Interdiction Cooperation on Afghanistan as
Counternarcotics - Not Political - Breakthrough: In discussions
with Drug Enforcement Agency reps at ConGen Dubai, IRPO has
learned that many narcotics investigations could be greatly
enhanced by coordinating information sharing with Iranian
counter-drug police. DEA maintains many active leads that
currently end in Iran - with even minimal coordination these
leads could lead to major progress in USG efforts to fight
narcotrafficking in the region. Comment: Such an initiative
would boost CT indirectly and help stabilize Afghanistan, by
curtailing a key source of revenue for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Beyond any bilateral political issues involved, US-Iran
counternarcotics cooperation, or more accurately, incorporating
Iran into regional CN programs, would likely greatly increase
their effectiveness.




4. [C] Iran's Disaffected Youth So Far Tuned Out of Election:
An Iranian journalist told us that the majority of Iranian youth
are not likely to be politically active during the upcoming
presidential campaign. Many are resigned to the fact that
Khatami's candidacy, nor much else, is likely to change the
current system. Most believe that Supreme Leader Khamenei will
choose the next president, and therefore Iran's youth - a
generation beset with unemployment, increasing repression, and
isolation - have become apathetic and disaffected. He estimated
about 10 to 20 percent of Iran's students are members of the
Basij, but only a small percentage of them are ideologically
driven. For others, Basij membership is a way to improve
chances of gaining university admission or advancement. He also
said that at the other extreme, the hopelessness that many young
people feel is leading to dramatic increases in drug addiction
and other wanton behavior. Comment: Although many pin their
hopes on youthful activists to spearhead a reformist campaign,
if the majority of those under 25 have consigned themselves to
the status quo, then the reformists have already lost a key
constituency.




5. [S/NF] Reformist journalists, bloggers under pressure: The
journalist, who is coming to the U.S. to work on a U.S.-based,
Iranian news website, told us that the closure of Kargozaran and
Hamshahri's evening edition and the arrests or interrogations of
various bloggers by the IRIG has had a chilling effect among
reformist newspapers. Most reform-oriented publications lack
the political connections to protect themselves. The paper
Etemad-e Melli is operating only because current presidential
candidate and the paper's publisher Mehdi Karroubi, had the
clout to resist the IRIG, he said. As a case in point, our
25-year-old interlocutor has chosen not to return to Iran while
waiting to receive his U.S. visa, for fear he would not be
allowed to leave the country again. Comment: The IRIG's tactics
of arrest, intimidation and indirect threats, including the
recent creation of a special prosecutor to deal with Internet
and text message "character assassination," have had the desired
effect in restraining many otherwise critical voices as a
prelude to election campaigns beginning in earnest.




6. [S/NF] Speculation on Reasons Denying Visas for the U.S.
Women's Badminton Team: Two IRPO contacts offered their
assessments of the IRIG's decision not to issue visas to the
U.S. women's badminton team earlier this month. An Iranian LES
at USINT in Tehran, who was in Dubai to pick up his visa, told
us that the Department's announcement of the trip and subsequent
international press coverage had "politicized" the trip in the
eyes of some senior Iranian officials, who saw it as a direct
challenge from the U.S. that required a tough response. He
recommended that future sports diplomacy programs be handled
discretely, without publicity. Another contact told us that he
believed that some Iranian officials had worried that the trip,
already receiving positive coverage, would become a PR
nightmare for Islamic Republic. Coverage of U.S. athletes being

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embraced by Iranian crowds, as U.S. wrestlers had been, on the
thirtieth anniversary of the Islamic Revolution was not the
image the IRIG wanted to convey. Comment: Both of these
explanations likely factored into the decision not to issue the
visas. What is clear, however, is that the decision was made at
high levels in the IRIG after a preliminary decision to issue
the visas had been made.




7. [S/NF] Powerful Support for US-Iran Exchanges: The Iranian
employee of USINT told us separately that in querying various
contacts in and out of the IRIG about possible future travel of
American exchange visitors to Iran, he had heard from Yasser
Rafsanjani, the youngest son of Expediency Council Chair Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, that Islamic Azad University was
willing to host these exchanges and to provide the necessary
political cover for them. Comment: This information
corroborates a separate source's information that Rafsanjani and
Islamic Azad were receptive to the idea of working with USG and
IRPO on various exchange and outreach programs.




8. [U] Window on Iran is a classified, weekly product providing
Washington policy community and Iran watchers highlights of key
developments on Iran. It is produced by the Iran Regional
Presence Office - Dubai. Please direct any questions/comments
to Kay McGowan (mcgowanka2@state.sgov.gov
) or Charlie Pennypacker
(pennypacker@state.sgov.gov
).
ASGARD