KHATAMI'S IN - BUT CAN HE WIN?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000071 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL ECON IR SUBJECT: KHATAMI'S IN - BUT CAN HE WIN? DUBAI 00000071 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office - Dubai, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Though Khatami's decision to run for president gives reformist factions in Iran a cohesive leader with undeniable brand recognition, the former president faces a vastly different political landscape than in 1997, when he rode a tidal wave of popular support to victory. After two terms in office, during which time he was unable to implement most of the political reforms promised, his luster has faded. Khatami's ability to win, should the race effectively come down to a two-person contest between himself and Ahmadinejad, will depend greatly on his ability to convince enough voters to participate in a system they disdain in return for small improvements in economic management, personal liberties, and a less confrontational public face to present to the world. Khatami will also face an increased likelihood of voter manipulation as the two institutions charged with administering the election are in the hands of conservatives. Many key factors that will shape the outcome of the race, not the least of which is the final candidate list, remain undefined. Nevertheless, Khatami's entry will force factions across Iran's political spectrum to re-assess their electoral strategy in preparation for the June 12 contest. End summary. Khatami Enters the Fray ¶2. (C) Former two-term president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami ended months of public equivocation February 8 with the formal announcement of his intent to stand in Iran's June 12 presidential election. Khatami had come under strong pressure to run in recent months from fellow reformers, who view him as their best chance to regain the presidency from the conservative establishment, which consolidated its grip on Iran's various power centers through wins aQthe local level in 2003, the Majles takeover in 2004, and finally Ahmadinejad' election in ¶2005. ¶3. (C) Khatami's improbable first victory in 1997, in which he defied conventional wisdom by roundly defeating the right's candidate Ahmed Nateq Nuri with some 70% of the vote, was so unexpected that according to one prominent analyst, it is difficult to articulate the sense of `national euphoria' the event engendered. And despite a widespread sense that Khatami had been unable to translate his landslide victory into meaningful political reform, voters overwhelmingly supported a second term for him in 2001. ¶4. (C) After eight years in office, Khatami, and the reformers by extension, left the presidency discredited, having failed to deliver promised political reform at home and with their attempts to soften Iran's foreign policy undermined by spoilers within the security establishment and rebuffed in no uncertain terms by the United States. Conservatives capitalized on the reformers' disarray and the electorate's growing quiescence by disqualifying over 3,000 reformist candidates for the 2004 parliamentary election, thus engineering a conservative takeover of the Majles. The extent of the reformers' disorganization, as well as the profound sense of disappointment among their core constituent groups, helped pave the way for the Ahmadinejad's election in 2005. Why 2009 is not 1997 ¶5. (C) Khatami's unexpected victory in 1997 can be attributed to two main factors: overwhelming support among the populace for both the reformist agenda generally and his candidacy specifically, and the conservative establishment's failure to understand the extent to which Khatami's candidacy would resonate with the public. Both elements were critical to the reformers' ability to overcome the fact that virtually every key pillar of political and financial power had lined up in support of Nateq Nuri, creating the pervasive sense that he was ?destined? to win the presidency. ¶6. (C) The landslide nature of Khatami's electoral victories was DUBAI 00000071 002.2 OF 003 perhaps the most important check against fraud. According to one analyst, though truckloads of fakes ballots were apprehended, there were simply not enough fakes to overcome the greater number of legitimate votes cast for Khatami. Support for the reformers among bureaucrats overseeing the administration of the election from the Ministry of Interior also helped to ensure that the election was not stolen from Khatami. ¶7. (C) In 2009, Khatami faces a radically altered landscape. The highly personalized enthusiasm that many supporters once felt for Khatami and the reformist agenda has substantially eroded. Khatami's ability to attract support on the scale of that which led to his landslide victories in 1997 and 2001 is doubtful. Voters of the so-called `Khatami Generation' - university students who turned out in droves for him - now express regret over having legitimized the system by participating in the elections. One Iranian businesswomen in her 30s recently recounted how as a university student she cajoled her four siblings into campaigning and voting for Khatami in 1997 despite her parents' admonishment not to `sully' her identity card by acquiring the government stamp proving she voted. `Now,? she observed bitterly, `I hate Khatami worse than Ahmadinejad and all the mullahs because he made me believe in a lie.' ¶8. (C) Although other IRPO contacts have not evinced the same visceral reaction, few of Khatami's past supporters that we have spoken with seem willing to vote for him again. Two Iranian businessmen and a businesswoman in their 30s who recalled celebrating Khatami's 1997 victory at spontaneous parties now describe themselves and their cohort as indifferent. None were inclined to vote in the June election, although the businesswoman said she would be more likely to support former Foreign Minister and possible candidate Ali Akbar Velayati over Khatami because as Khamenei's `right hand,' Velayati would accomplish more as president, including improving ties with the US. An interior designer who voted for Khatami in 1997 said he had note voted since and had little interest in even discussing the election. He said he now just `lived his life' without worrying about the country's political machinations. ¶9. (C) In addition to the pervasive sense of disappointment among one-time Khatami enthusiasts, many members of the political elite point with alarm to the increased potential for fraud this election. Unlike previous elections, this year the two institutions charged with overseeing and administering the electoral process - the Guardian Council and the Ministry of Interior - are both firmly in the hands of hardliners. According to domestic press reports, a reformist MP from Abadan recently called attention to the `suspicious' and abrupt manner with which the central government has been appointing new provincial and district level governors ahead of the election. A Tehran-based consulting firm noted these officials will play key roles in administering the election. Moreover, in early February the reformist newspaper Etemad-e Melli reported that numerous experienced staff members from the Interior Ministry's elections office were recently fired, and were expected to be replaced by people closely connected to the current administration. ¶10. (C) Though some reformers have begun sounding the alarm about the potential for fraud, as yet there is little indication they have a clear strategy to mitigate voter manipulation. In November, the now-banned reformist paper Kargozaran called on the reformist leadership to begin recruiting and training `tens of thousands' of observers to monitor polling stations. IRPO contacts with ties to the Khatami camp have also quietly suggested the reformers would benefit from the presence of international observers, although publicly making such a request could trigger accusations from the right that the reformers are colluding with the West. Comment DUBAI 00000071 003.2 OF 003 ¶11. (C) Many key variables that will shape the outcome of the race are as yet undetermined, including the final list of candidates, which will not be issued until the Guardian Council completes the candidate vetting process in late May. Recent elections, to include both Khatami's first victory in 1997 and Ahmadinejad's 2005 win, have taken pundits by surprise. Yet Khatami's decision to enter the race, albeit reluctantly, likely presages a more vigorous contest than would have been anticipated if the race were limited to candidates from the various conservative and hardline factions. ¶12. (C) A long-time Khatami supporter observed that while the former president is unlikely to recapture the same mandate he once enjoyed, he can win. According to his logic, which is shared by other IRPO contacts, many voters will choose the small changes the reformers can credibly promise -- better economic management, increased personal freedoms, and a more palatable public face for Iran to present to the world - over the prospect of a second Ahmadinejad term. This conforms to the message we hear repeatedly from Iranians: in 2009, pedestrian concerns about the economy, pollution, and traffic appear to trump larger ideological considerations. ASGARD