IRAN: GUARDIAN COUNCIL RETURNS SUBSIDY REFORM HOT POTATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000531 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019 TAGS: ECON IR PGOV SUBJECT: IRAN: GUARDIAN COUNCIL RETURNS SUBSIDY REFORM HOT POTATO BACK TO MAJLIS DUBAI 00000531 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DoS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d),(e) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 9 Iran's Guardian Council (GC) announced that it would not ratify President Ahmadinejad's targeted subsidies bill but instead return it to the Majlis for more work. The GC has not yet said why it rejected the bill, but did signal earlier in the week it would do so after Speaker Ali Larijani sent the bill forward with contradictory language as to who (executive or legislative branch) would control revenues derived from subsidy reform. Ahmadinejad had been strongly opposed to the Majlis submitting the bill to the GC until this issue was settled, but on December 2 Larijani sent the bill forward, hoping the GC would resolve the ambiguities in favor of the Majlis. The GC's decision to return the bill to the Majlis means the politically charged issue remains for the moment unresolved. This ongoing tussle between President Ahmadinejad and the Majlis over subsidy reform has now spilled over into deliberations over the upcoming year's annual budget and also the next Five Year Development Plan, both of which relate to the fiscal year starting in March of 2010. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) In a December 9 interview with state media outlet IRNA, GC Spokesman Abbas Ali Kadkhodai said the GC had studied the targeted subsidy bill and "it was found to have problems, so it will be sent back to Majlis." He said further details would be provided at a Saturday, December 12 news conference (NOTE: On December 7 Kadkhodai had signaled this rejection when he told press that after an initial look at the bill, the GC "already foresees problems." END NOTE.) SHOW ME THE MONEY -------------- ¶3. (C) Eliminating the current subsidies system is expected to garner USD 100 billion in savings, and the President and the Majlis are tussling now over who will ultimately control that money, with President Ahmadinejad insisting his government should receive it and have full control over how to distribute it to lower-income Iranians. ¶4. (C) While concurring with the President's strategy to eliminate subsidies and distribute cash, the Majlis disagreed with who should appropriate those funds. Specifically, Ahmadinejad took exception to Article 13 of the bill, which states, "The government is required to deposit all the resources obtained through the implementation of this law (eliminating subsidies) into a special account with the General Treasury called Directing Subsidies. One hundred percent of the funds deposited will be allocated in the framework of the annual budget laws...and the government is required to show the credits for each of the expenditures in the annual budget." THE BUILD-UP -------------- ¶5. (C) Tensions over control of the funds first spiked when President Ahmadinejad made an uninvited November 3 appearance at the Majlis after passage of Article 13. There, he made an unscheduled speech on the Majlis floor and admonished MPs for making changes to his original subsidy reform bill and demanded executive control. At the same time, he submitted a letter to Speaker Larijani withdrawing the bill. Both sides quickly scrambled to salvage a solution and on November 8 MPs voted to approve Article 16 of the bill giving the executive body full control of the savings derived from eliminating subsidies and also ratified the entire bill. Numerous MPs who voted against the final article commented on the contradictions between Article 13 and 16. Reformist daily Aftab-e Yazd reported December 3 that although Larijani initially balked at a government suggestion a special committee to work out a solution determining that it was "not possible to reconsider DUBAI 00000531 002.2 OF 002 ratification," a separate committee compromised of three government officials and three MPs was convened to determine how to resolve the contradiction. ¶6. (C) Tension flared again when Ahmadinejad made personal appearances at each of the joint committee's meetings chastising MPs for changing the original bill he submitted in 2008. According to official news agency Mehr, in a November 11 meeting Ahmadinejad said, "Iran will emerge as an economically prosperous nation in five years if the subsidy bill is implemented just as the administration has devised it." TIPPING POINT -------------- ¶7. (C) Larijani's decision not to accept a report by the joint-committee that a new regulatory agency (appointed by the President) be set up to implement the program may have set the stage for the GC's rejection of the bill. Concurring with the head of the Majlis Research Center Ahmad Tavakkoi, Larijani cited violations of parliamentary procedure as the reason no to accept the recommendation. As a result, he chose to keep the bill MPs originally ratified and forwarded it to the Guardian Council for final ratification. ¶8. (C) Larijani's decision occasioned a very strong Government response, with Ahmadinejad declaring that he was "recalling" the bill. Ahmadinejad's representative in the Majlis, a former Larijani aide, went further and targeted Larijani in an interview with conservative new agency Mehr saying, "the Speaker's Council delayed solving the problems of the Subsidies Bill for three weeks...it is not justifiable suddenly to refer the bill to the Guardian Council." ¶9. (C) In the one week interim since the subsidy reform bill was submitted to the GC, Ahmadinejad and his representatives have taken a harder public line on other matters related to public finance as a way to build pressure, stating repeatedly neither the draft for the upcoming 1389 annual budget (starting March 21, 2010) nor the next Five-Year Plan (also scheduled to start in March 2010) will be submitted to the Majlis until the subsidy reform bill is passed. On December 8, Ahmadinejad ratcheted up the pressure further, saying that the government demanded the fate of the subsidy reform bill be resolved in the coming week. ¶10. (C) COMMENT: It is unclear whether Ahmadinejad's pressure tactics will lead GC members and MPs to acquiesce to his demands. The GC decision to send the bill back to the Majlis seems to be in the government's favor, although without specific GC feedback about sought-after revisions, it is difficult to determine who 'won.' Additionally, how the Majlis and specifically Larijani will respond is not certain. Larijani's response to Ahmadinejad's refusal to submit a budget and Five-Year Development Plan has grown more bellicose in recent weeks, and he has made clear that he expects the Supreme Leader to resolve any conflicts. Additionally, the country's Audit Court recently announced plans to expand monitoring of 'illegal' government spending outside of the budget as well as continued efforts to investigate if the government misappropriated funds from the Oil Stabilization Fund in previous years. The move underscores the growing politicization of all matters related to public finance as well as the rising tide of discontent across the political elite with Ahmadinejad's actions in the economy, past and present. If the Supreme Leader's fails to wade in, it is possible that important public finance issues will remain unresolved. END COMMENT. EYREA