IRAN RESPONDS (ADQRSELY) TO IAEA BOG RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000514 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PARM SUBJECT: IRAN RESPONDS (ADQRSELY) TO IAEA BOG RESOLUTION DUBAI 00000514 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, IRPO, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Initial IRIG reaction to the November 27 IAEA Board of Governors' resolution came from its IAEA representative Ali Asghar Soltanieh, who expressed 'deep concern and disappointment,' and from the Iranian Majlis, whose members threatened to 'review' Iran's NPT membership. Subsequently, on November 29 the Iranian Majlis voted to have the Ahmadinejad administration submit a plan to minimalize Iran's IAEA cooperation. On that same day the Iranian Cabinet approved a plan for the construction of ten 'Natanz-size' enrichment facilities throughout Iran in hardened sites, and also said it would 'examine' the issue of Iran itself enriching fuel to the 20 percent level needed by the Tehran Research Reactor. As of yet no senior Iranian official has seriously bruited the idea of NPT withdrawal as a consequence of this vote, and indeed Iranian officials have taken pains to state that Iran will remain an NPT member and continue to 'live up to its commitments.' Despite this stab at projecting moderation, by its reactions an unrepentant Iran seems to be 'doubling up' in the wake of the IAEA vote by suggesting the possibility of even more destabilizing actions if the West does not seek an accommodation on the nuclear issue. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) The November 27 IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) Resolution, viewed universally as a strong rebuke to Iran, engendered uniform expressions of official displeasure from the Islamic Republic. The most laconic was Expediency Council President Rafsanjani, who on November 29 termed the BOG vote 'unjust' and called for Iran's 'active diplomacy' in international fora to prevent these types of actions against Iran. SOLTANIEH: MINIMAL COOPERATION ¶3. (U) In November 27 press comments before the BOG vote, IRIG IAEA Representative Soltanieh warned that an anti-Iran resolution would 'hurt the current constructive atmosphere,' have 'long-term consequences,' and 'cause Iran to lower its cooperation with the IAEA to the bare minimum required by its existing commitments.' His post-vote comments spoke of 'deep concern and disappointment' and said the resolution both 'jeopardizes the current conducive environment' and 'poses serious doubt.. about the good will of other parties.' [NOTE: His more extensive November 28 prepared comments to the IAEA BOG served mainly to summarize and repeat Iran's talking points on suspension of enrichment, Code 3.1, the Additional Protocol; 'Alleged Studies, the Fordo Installation, and the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),concluding with a call for the IAEA to immediately desist with the 'enervating and bothersome' political discussions about Iran's peaceful nuclear program]. In press remarks to a German news service reported on November 29 by the hardline conservative 'Kayhan' newspaper, Soltanieh said Iran would in all likelihood limit its cooperation with the IAEA to the legal minimum and 'would not implement even one word' of this IAEA resolution. Soltanieh termed this 'the minimal response' Iran could take in reaction to the BOG resolution. MFA: STILL REMAIN WITHIN NPT ¶4. (U) On November 27 MFA Spokesman Mehmanparast denounced the IAEA vote, calling it a 'fruitless.. superficial and ceremonial gesture' with the goal of putting pressure on Iran. He added that if Iran's basic rights as an NPT signatory are not guaranteed based on the IAEA Safeguards, we will see no reason to implement extra commitments vis a vis the IAEA." He did add that Iran would continue to be an IAEA member. MAJLIS: MINIMAL COOPERATION ¶5. (U) As is often the case in Iranian foreign policy, the Majlis fulfilled its 'bad cop' role, with various Majlis DUBAI 00000514 002.2 OF 003 National Security Committee members threatening to bar IAEA inspectors and/or to withdraw Iran from the NPT. At the start of the November 29 session, Speaker Ali Larijani said the BOG resolution proved that America and the West didn't intend to seek a solution through diplomacy, but instead were seeking to use 'political trickery.' He warned the US and other P5+1 countries not to do anything that causes Iran to 'pursue another path and seriously limit its cooperation with the IAEA.' In subsequent November 30 comments, Larijani said that Iran wants to pursue nuclear matters within the IAEA supervisory framework, which implies commitment to a strategy of diplomacy. However, 'if others pursue political trickery, Iran would also definitely change its methods.' In a November 29 statement read by Majlis Leadership Committee member Hassan Qaffuri-Fard and reportedly signed by over 200 representQves, the Majlis condemned the BOG vote and requested the Ahmadinejad administration, `in light of the hostile behavior of the P5+1 countries, to quickly submit to the Majlis National Security Committee a program and plan to decrease the level of Iran's IAEA cooperation, which the Committee will then present to the Majlis as a whole.' CABINET: WE'LL SHOW YOU: 10 MORE SITES ¶6. (U) On November 29 the Iranian cabinet, chaired by President Ahmadinejad, charged the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to plan and propose ten new `Natanz-size' enrichment facilities within the next two months. More specifically, within the next two months the AEOI is to start work on creating enrichment facilities at five sites already designated throughout Iran, and to suggest suitable locations for five more enrichment facilities. According to Ahmadinejad, given that the current (Fourth) Five-Year Development Plan, the country must produce fuel to produce the 20,000 MW of electricity from Iran's power stations, and creating 10 'Natanz-size' enrichment facilities will be an important step in this regard. He added that Iran would need to produce 250 to 300 tons of fuel, which would call for newer centrifuges with higher speeds. Ahmadinejad also said that Wednesday's cabinet meeting would discuss the question of whether Iran should itself produce the 20 percent fuel needed by the TRR. [NOTE: President Ahmadinejad is scheduled to address the Iranian nation in a TV address November 30, speaking on domestic and international issues]. ¶7. (U) In press comments after the cabinet meeting, AEOI head Ali Akbar Salehi said that the Cabinet's decision to build ten new enrichment sites and to examine the issue of enriching fuel to 20 percent was a "firm response to the unacceptable action of the 5+1" in the IAEA BOG meeting. He repeated that Iran would `remain committed to its international obligations.' Salehi also said: - that based on orders from the President the AEOI had already determined five new sites, and 'fortunately, preparations have already been made' for these sites; - henceforth, enrichment facilities would not be in the open but would be built in mountains, in such a manner as to be safe from attack; - Iran's Fifth Five Year Development Plans (scheduled to begin in March 2010) calls for contracts to be concluded for up to 5,000 MW of atomic power, and for each 1,000 MW of power one Natanz-size enrichment facility is needed; - Iran didn't intend to build this many sites but Western behavior caused the Administration to take today's actions. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: The essence of Iran'Qesponse to the BOG Resolution is three-fold: to put forward the possibility of 1) DUBAI 00000514 003.2 OF 003 reduced IEAE cooperation; 2) building more enrichment facilities; 3) enriching its own fuel to levels necessary for the TRR, i.e. approximately 20 percent (NOTE: President Ahmadinejad's public reference to the need for newer model centrifuges might be a fourth such response). Certainly at first glance reduced Iranian IAEA cooperation seems a more realistic and likely response than the other two options, especially Iran's announcement, seemingly borne of pique, that it will build ten new major enrichment sites in response to the IAEA vote (NOTE: Iran might be using this IEAE vote to broach the idea of 'ten new enrichment facilities,' so that it can subsequently include any newly discovered facilities as part of these ten). It also must be noted that as of yet no senior Iranian official has seriously bruited the idea of NPT withdrawal as a consequence of this vote, and indeed Iranian officials have taken pains to state that Iran will remain an NPT member and continue to 'live up to its commitments.' Despite this stab at projecting moderation, by its reactions an unrepentant Iran seems to be 'doubling up' in the wake of the IAEA vote by suggesting the possibility of even more destabilizing actions if the West does not seek an accommodation on the nuclear issue. END COMMENT. EYRE