IRAN: CONSERVATIVE IN-FIGHTING ALIVE AND WELL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000513 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM IR SUBJECT: IRAN: CONSERVATIVE IN-FIGHTING ALIVE AND WELL DUBAI 00000513 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Three months into President Ahmadinejad's second term, the dominant ruling faction in Iran (''Osulgarayan,' aka 'Principlist') remains divided by competition for power and resources. At its core are personal rivalries and the settling of political scores but there are also broader philosophical differences over domestic and foreign policy. Fallout from the infighting between the two Principlist main camps -- political allies of Ahmadinejad versus the so-called "pragmatic conservatives" primarily associated with Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani -- includes the likely scuttling of the Tehran Research Reactor deal, unprecedented attempts by the government to shut down conservative newspapers associated with Larijani and Qalibaf, a move by Ahmadinejad to wrest control of Tehran's metro from the Tehran Municipality, and a bruising battle in the Majlis over the implementation of Ahmadinejad's subsidy reform plan. Larijani's recent public defense of Expediency Council chair Ayatollah Rafsanjani also suggests the pragmatic conservatives remain willing and able to counter Ahmadinejad's attempts to consolidate political power. It is likely that both Principlist factions will seek support both from Supreme Leader Khamenei, and, perhaps more importantly, from the IRGC. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Iran's dominant political faction, the conservative 'Principlists' ('Osulgarayan') came into being in the latter years of the Khatami administration as a reaction to the reformist 'Second of Khordad' Movement,' which it saw as a threat to the founding principles of the Islamic Revolution. It swept into power starting with the 2003 Council elections, the 2004 Majlis elections and finally the 2005 Presidential elctions. However, like most Iranian political movements, success encouraged its fissiparous tendencies, and now it has two major factions, one clustered around President Ahmadinejad and the other led by Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, Tehran Mayor Qalibaf and Expediency Council Chairman Mohsen Rezai, all of who ran against Ahmadinejad in the 2005 Presidential election. ¶3. (C) The IAEA-sponsored proposal to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor is the most high-profile victim of the deep divisions among Iran's ruling conservatives. Deputy Majlis Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar, a close Larijani ally, launched an immediate public attack on the deal on October 18. Actors from across Iran's political spectrum soon followed suit, expanding on Bahonar's condemnation of the potential breakthrough with the West, terming it as a trick to deprive Iran of its LEU. ¶4. (C) On November 11, Ahmadinejad took an apparent swipe at Qalibaf by proclaiming his administration's intent to take over control of Tehran's metro system from the Tehran Municipality. Expansion of the metro system, seen as key to alleviating Tehran's legendary traffic snarls, is both politically sensitive and involves control of a construction budget worth more than six billion dollars, according to press reports. Qalibaf quickly returned fire, attributing the metro expansion delays to the failure of Ahmadinejad's administration to deliver promised funding, with Ahmadinejad Majlis critics quickly pushing through a proposal to fund the project from Iran's foreign exchange reserves. An IRPO contact who used to work for Qalibaf noted that the rivalry between Ahmadinejad, who preceded Qalibaf as Tehran mayor, dates back to at least 2005 when the little-known Ahmadinejad defeated Qalibaf in the presidential election. ¶5. (C) In another thinly-veiled attack by Ahmadinejad against his main rivals, on November 23 the government's Press Supervisory Board banned Tehran Municipality's newspaper Hamshahri, purportedly for publishing a tourist advertisement for a Baha'i temple in India. The move followed reports from the editors of Khabar, a pro-Larijani paper, that it would suspend its operations due to unspecified government-origin "political pressures." Though virtually all of Iran's reformist publications have been closed down or heavily censured, the unprecedented attack on Iran's largest conservative newspaper caused an immediate backlash, with one Tehran City Council members publicly citing examples of pro-Ahmadinejad publications that had published the same ad. Due to intervention by the Judiciary branch, the paper resumed publication November 24 after just one day's suspension. DUBAI 00000513 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) The protracted debate of how to implement the subsidy reform plan and control of the anticipated USD 30 billion annual savings provides additional insight into intra-Principlist skirmishing. Though it appears Ahmadinejad will get his signature plan through the Majlis, the pragmatic conservatives, who dominate the Majlis Principlist faction, have successfully altered the timeline for implementation and blunted Ahmadinejad's attempt to give his government unchecked access to the savings. The legislative skirmishes became so heated that at one point Ahmadinejad threatened to withdraw the bill completely rather than accept Majlis modifications to the plan. ¶7. (C) In an increasingly rare public defense of Ahmadinejad's top target Ayatollah Rafsanjani, Larijani lauded the Expediency Council head during November 23 remarks at an awards ceremony, terming him a "pillar of the system." Rafsanjani and his family have been under increasing pressure in recent months, mostly from Ahmadinejad allies. Hardline conservatives have been calling for Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi to stand trial and criticizing Rafsanjani directly. Larijani called such criticism unwarranted and noted Ayatollah Khomeini's deep support for Rafsanjani. (COMMENT: Although during the speech Larijani praised both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, his support for Ahmadinejad was more perfunctory, and Iranian media seized upon his comments regarding Rafsanjani, suggesting an ongoing tactical alliance between Rafsanjani and Larijani. END COMMENT.) ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Despite having effectively driven reformists from Iran's political playing field since the presidential election, tensions among the remaining conservative political elites remain high. The robustness of the "pragmatic conservative" camp within the Principlist faction indicates that Ahmadinejad has made little progress consolidating his power vis-`-vis his many enemies within the conservative camp. Likewise, however, lingering fallout from Ahmadinejad's "victory" at the polls has not tempered his willing to attack perceived rivals. It is likely that both Principlist factions will seek support both from Supreme Leader Khamenei, and, perhaps more importantly, from the IRGC. END COMMENT. EYRE