IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - FEBRUARY 3,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000051 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/3/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI IR SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - FEBRUARY 3, 2009 REF: LONDON 127 DUBAI 00000051 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office - Dubai, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. [S/NF] Election Update - Rumors of Ahmadinejad's Delusions May Hurt His Chances, Khatami Poised to Enter, Velayati May Be Compromise Choice: Several of our Iran and Dubai based contacts have noted Ahmadinejad is facing a major reelection challenge, and that only the Supreme Leaders' active support keeps his reelection hopes on track. This support may waver for a number of reasons, however, and may end entirely. According to one well-connected Dubai-based source, a rumor is spreading that Ahmadinejad has been telling private audiences that he is the main pillar of the Islamic Republic, not the Supreme Leader. This source noted that, if this is true or the rumor takes root, the Supreme Leader may temper or suspend his support for Ahmadinejad. Former President Khatami, meanwhile, has reportedly decided to run in the elections, although he has made no formal announcement. While Khatami likely enjoys strong support from reformists, women and youth, according to a Dubai based Iranian businessman, regime insiders and some outsiders recall the Khatami period as a difficult and ultimately disappointing period which most are not eager to repeat. Speaking bluntly, one retired IRIG official noted that it ultimately came down to Khatami lacking any street-level cadres capable of battling the massive forces of the hardline Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs, the Basij, and other "pressure groups" that ruthlessly suppress dissent on behalf of regime hardliners. With both candidates flawed, multiple contacts tell us that consensus is building for former FM Ali Akbar Velayati to come forward as a compromise candidate. Velayati currently serves as the foreign policy advisor to the Supreme Leader, and is viewed as "relatively moderate" by reformists. Contacts described Velayati as "acceptable to all parties," "tractable," and less flatteringly - "lacking guts", a charge also at times leveled against Khatami. Comment: A Velayati presidency under these conditions may see the office of the Presidency diminish in importance, with the Supreme Leader's Office and or the security establishment absorbing key parts of the President's mandate. ¶2. [C/NF] US-Iran Exchanges Should Continue, But In Other Direction: A Dubai based Iranian businessman and educator related to Ayatollah Shahroudi, the head of Iran's judiciary, told IRPO Officer that despite the recent setbacks on exchanges, such engagement should continue. He made a point to affirm his continued support for cultural engagement, despite recent IRIG claims that such programs were merely part of a USG "velvet revolution" project, adding "we wouldn't be meeting if those claims were serious." He noted that Iranian circles opposed to better ties between Americans and Iranians have clamped down on cultural diplomatic engagement due to anxiety about possible impacts on their domestic political fortunes. This official's recommendation was to continue exchanges, but to focus on more exchanges from the US to Iran, which could help dispel doubts, empower advocates of cultural engagement inside Iran, and generate broad good will towards the US within Iran. Comment: We can expect at least some elements in Iran to counter our efforts at engagement just as some work to counter other US policies which Iran's leaders feel threaten their interests. If engagement is going to work, it will need to become more transparent and more bidirectional, and as we have suggested before, would greatly benefit from a non-governmental bilateral coordinating mechanism. ¶3. [S/NF] Alaei Brothers Reportedly "Well Treated": This same source noted that in discussions with Judiciary officials, they claimed that IVLP alumni Drs. Arash and Kamiar Alaei have been treated reasonably well during their imprisonment, have not been harshly interrogated or tortured, and have been allowed to receive family visits. This would not have been the case if the IRIG thought they were truly dangerous, he noted. He suggested this was a good sign, and speculated that they could be released well before their full sentences had been served. Note: This information appears to contradict statements from the brothers' mother. ¶4. [C/NF] Crackdown on Women's Rights Activists Just One Part of IRIG's Politicization of Social Issues: A long-time Iranian civil society activist described the various organizations that comprise the contemporary women's movement as 90% "charity-focused" and 10% "rights-focused." As the advocates of expanded rights for women have coalesced around the One Million DUBAI 00000051 002.2 OF 003 Signature Campaign in recent years, hardline authorities have grown increasingly wary of the "secular" nature of many of the activists, which they view as a potential threat to their rule and the stability of the system. But the activist explained that since the election of Ahmadinejad, the government has consistently pushed civil society organizations operating in many fields, not just women's rights, underground by politicizing their activities and their motives. She illustrated her point with a personal anecdote about a meditation and poetry class she attends in Tehran. Though no aspect of the class, the teacher, or the students is at all political in the conventional sense, they feel compelled to meet in secret and take measures to prevent the authorities from learning about the class. In her words, "now even reciting Hafez" is risky. Comment: As this example illustrates, the broad and continuing IRIG crackdown on civil society has spread public anxiety to many organized group activities - even one as innocuous as poetry/meditation groups. As many contacts have told us, the MOIS modus operandi is to monitor "suspicious" activity, but only act against civil society figures once they starting "organizing." For this reason, Iranians are particularly wary of organizing collectively - recalling demonstratively harsh regime actions of the past - even if their activities are wholly apolitical. ¶5. [C/NF] IRGC Journal Predicts Bleak Future for U.S.-Iran Relations: This week's edition of Sobh-e Sadeq, a weekly journal published by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, carries an editorial assessing that there are only three potential scenarios for bilateral relations under the Obama administration: 1) continuation of the status quo, 2) further deterioration of the relationship, and 3) a "false start" in which the United States will press for engagement as a tactical maneuver, but ultimately find itself unable to accept a fundamental shift in the relationship because its policy is dictated by "other interests" in the Middle East. The piece asserts that the U.S. needs improved relations with Iran, but that Iran has little to gain from rapprochement at this time. An IRPO contact who until several months ago worked closely with the IRIG observed that Iran's leadership feels emboldened after its "victories" in Gaza and Lebanon, and likely no longer feels that they face an imminent militarily threat from the U.S. or Israel. Comment: The IRGC is just one - albeit a powerful one - of many power centers that comprise the political landscape in Iran. While many hardline political figures, including President Ahmadinejad, have publicly questioned the sincerity of the new administration's commitment to engaging diplomatically, the IRGC appears to be trying to shape policy decisions in Iran to prevent engagement, a path they likely view as detrimental to their interests. ¶6. [C/NF] IRIB Anchor Dismisses Alleged Bias, Notes Economic Issues Attract Most Attention: An IRIB news anchor during a conversation with IRPO Officer dismissed reformers' complaints of official media bias. He instead insisted that during past elections, IRIB has been ordered to provide all candidates with equal coverage and treat them fairly. Aside from knowing the regime's red lines and abiding by them, he claimed no government interference in his work. He said the Supreme Leader's direct control over IRIB prevented interference from other government entities. The anchor also hosts a listener call-in show and said that his program elicits the most calls when it addresses economic issues, which now constitute about 40 percent of the show's broadcasts. Comment: The anchor's insistence of fair media treatment and no official interference is at odds with Iranian reformers' allegations of systematic bias against their candidates and the comments of a former Press TV employee, who alleged official monitoring (see reftel). Although the Supreme Leader's control of IRIB may shield it from other government entities, IRIB is still susceptible to influence from the Supreme Leader's office. ¶7. [U] Window on Iran is a classified, weekly product providing Washington policy community and Iran watcher highlights of key developments on Iran. It is produced by the Iran Regional Presence Office - Dubai. Please direct any questions/comments to: Kay McGowan (mcgowanka2@state.sgov.gov ) or Charlie Pennypacker (pennypacker@state.sgov.gov DUBAI 00000051 003.2 OF 003 ). ASGARD