IRAN TO ANSWER IAEA PROPOSAL OCTOBER 29, WANTS "IMPORTANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000462 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019 TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PARM SUBJECT: IRAN TO ANSWER IAEA PROPOSAL OCTOBER 29, WANTS "IMPORTANT REVISIONS" ? REF: Dubai RPO 459 DUBAI 00000462 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, IRPO, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iran press reports that Iran's Supreme National Security Council is meeting October 28 to decide Iran's position on the draft IAEA fuel proposal, with the decision to be announced October 29. Iranian Majlis deputies and press continue to speak out against the IAEA draft proposal to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),with no prominent Iranian politician supporting the IAEA proposal as currently constituted. Iranian media has quoted 'informed officials' as saying that Iran will agree with the general framework of the draft IAEA proposal, it will seek "important revisions." The nature of the criticisms, largely from pragmatic conservatives, indicates that any "important revisions" could well focus on either Iran phasing the export of its own uranium (as opposed to releasing it all at once),and/or a lessening of the overall amount Iran ships out below the 1200 kilogram figure cited in the Iranian press. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Iran's Supreme National Security Council will decide Iran's position on the draft IAEA fuel proposal in an October 28 meeting, according to an October 28 ISNA article quoting Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi. Iran will then announce its answer to the IAEA proposal on October 29, according to Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Leadership Board member Mohammad Karami Rad. (Comment: other 'informed sources' in Iranian press have spoken of Iran announcing its decision 'by Friday.'). According to 'an informed official' quoted by Iran's Arabic language 'Al-Alam' news, while Iran will agree with the general framework of the draft IAEA proposal, it will seek "important revisions in it." ¶3. (U) Iranian Majlis members and press continue to speak out against the draft IAEA proposal for providing fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),with no prominent Iranian politician supporting the IAEA proposal as currently envisioned: - Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi has spoken out repeatedly against the IAEA proposal (reftel),telling press on October 27 that "in our viewpoint we should buy fuel but not send out our own fuel." He added that if ultimately it is decided to use Iran's own fuel, it would be better to send it "not all at once" but rather "piecemeal." - The Deputy Chair of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Esmail Kowsari told press on October 27 that he too favored a straight purchase of nuclear fuel as opposed to this IAEA 'fuel for fuel' deal. He added he thought it "quite likely" that the Majlis would reject such a 'fuel for fuel' deal (Comment: it is unclear whether the Majlis would have the opportunity to formally approve any TRR fuel deal). - in an article titled 'Al-Baradei Proposal to Humiliate Iran,' Majlis Energy Commission Spokesman Seyyed Emad Hosseini told pragmatic conservative website "Farda" (affiliated with Tehran Mayor Qalibaf),that the performance of the Iranian negotiating team in Vienna and Geneva was "very weak." The current IAEA proposal was a "humiliation" for Iran and potentially harmed Iran's national interests. Any decisions taken by the team that were contrary to the glory of the Iranian people in these negotiations "would not be accepted by the Iranian people." Parroting an earlier statement by Majlis Speaker Larijani, Hosseini said it likely the West was trying to deceive Iran and impose its will on it. - National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Majlis Representative Fatemeh Ilya in comments to the press October 28 referenced Western dishonesty over the last 30 years and the to lack of guarantees in this deal. She said TRR fuel must be provided without Iran having to send out any of its own enriched uranium: "Defending our national interests and strengthening our independence in all regards compels us to keep our fuel within Iran." DUBAI 00000462 002.2 OF 002 - National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Majlis Representative Hossein Ebrahimi told press on October 28 that if Iran has to provide its own fuel in order to get 20 percent enriched fuel, it should do so gradually, in stages. ¶4. (U) Public criticism of the IAEA proposal (often referred to as the 'US proposal') also continues to focus on the presumptively excessively high amount of Iranian enriched uranium being requested. An October 26 piece from the pragmatic conservative 'Ayandeh News' website referred to the 'deceptive US plan' to take 1,200 kilograms of Iran's 3.5 percent enriched uranium, saying though this amount was eight times more than what was needed by the TRR. It argued that to produce one kilogram of 20 percent enriched uranium needed by the TRR, Russia would need six kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched uranium from Iran are required. The TRR needs a total of approximately 23 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium to continue operations for the rest of its 15-year operational life. Hence, only 150 kg of 3.5 percent enriched uranium from Iran. But 'the US' is seeking approximately eight times this amount, i.e. 1,200 kg, which would be enough to run the TRR the next 130 years,' whereas it will not be operational for more than fifteen years. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: As noted reftel, it is unclear what, if any, correlation there is between the ongoing public debate surrounding the IAEA proposal and the Iran's internal deliberation process. Regardless it must be noted that this IEAE proposal as currently constituted has had no public champions within Iran over the last week, to include any member of Ahmadinejad's nuclear negotiating team. The nature of the criticisms by Iran's pragmatic conservatives indicate that any "important revisions" sought by Iran could well focus on either phasing the export of its own uranium (as opposed to releasing it all at once),and/or decreasing the overall amount Iran ships out below the 1200 kilogram figure cited in the press. END COMMENT. EYRE