C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000462

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PARM
SUBJECT: IRAN TO ANSWER IAEA PROPOSAL OCTOBER 29, WANTS "IMPORTANT
REVISIONS" ?

REF: Dubai RPO 459

DUBAI 00000462 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, IRPO, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Iran press reports that Iran's Supreme
National Security Council is meeting October 28 to decide Iran's
position on the draft IAEA fuel proposal, with the decision to
be announced October 29. Iranian Majlis deputies and press
continue to speak out against the IAEA draft proposal to provide
fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), with no prominent
Iranian politician supporting the IAEA proposal as currently
constituted. Iranian media has quoted 'informed officials' as
saying that Iran will agree with the general framework of the
draft IAEA proposal, it will seek "important revisions." The
nature of the criticisms, largely from pragmatic conservatives,
indicates that any "important revisions" could well focus on
either Iran phasing the export of its own uranium (as opposed to
releasing it all at once), and/or a lessening of the overall
amount Iran ships out below the 1200 kilogram figure cited in
the Iranian press. END SUMMARY.




2. (U) Iran's Supreme National Security Council will decide
Iran's position on the draft IAEA fuel proposal in an October 28
meeting, according to an October 28 ISNA article quoting Majlis
National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Chairman
Alaeddin Boroujerdi. Iran will then announce its answer to the
IAEA proposal on October 29, according to Majlis National
Security and Foreign Policy Commission Leadership Board member
Mohammad Karami Rad. (Comment: other 'informed sources' in
Iranian press have spoken of Iran announcing its decision 'by
Friday.'). According to 'an informed official' quoted by Iran's
Arabic language 'Al-Alam' news, while Iran will agree with the
general framework of the draft IAEA proposal, it will seek
"important revisions in it."




3. (U) Iranian Majlis members and press continue to speak out
against the draft IAEA proposal for providing fuel to the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR), with no prominent Iranian politician
supporting the IAEA proposal as currently envisioned:



-

Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission
Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi has spoken out repeatedly against
the IAEA proposal (reftel), telling press on October 27 that "in
our viewpoint we should buy fuel but not send out our own fuel."
He added that if ultimately it is decided to use Iran's own
fuel, it would be better to send it "not all at once" but rather
"piecemeal."



- The Deputy Chair of the National Security and Foreign Policy
Commission Esmail Kowsari told press on October 27 that he too
favored a straight purchase of nuclear fuel as opposed to this
IAEA 'fuel for fuel' deal. He added he thought it "quite
likely" that the Majlis would reject such a 'fuel for fuel' deal
(Comment: it is unclear whether the Majlis would have the
opportunity to formally approve any TRR fuel deal).



- in an article titled 'Al-Baradei Proposal to Humiliate Iran,'
Majlis Energy Commission Spokesman Seyyed Emad Hosseini told
pragmatic conservative website "Farda" (affiliated with Tehran
Mayor Qalibaf), that the performance of the Iranian negotiating
team in Vienna and Geneva was "very weak." The current IAEA
proposal was a "humiliation" for Iran and potentially harmed
Iran's national interests. Any decisions taken by the team that
were contrary to the glory of the Iranian people in these
negotiations "would not be accepted by the Iranian people."
Parroting an earlier statement by Majlis Speaker Larijani,
Hosseini said it likely the West was trying to deceive Iran and
impose its will on it.



- National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Majlis
Representative Fatemeh Ilya in comments to the press October 28
referenced Western dishonesty over the last 30 years and the to
lack of guarantees in this deal. She said TRR fuel must be
provided without Iran having to send out any of its own enriched
uranium: "Defending our national interests and strengthening our
independence in all regards compels us to keep our fuel within
Iran."



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- National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Majlis
Representative Hossein Ebrahimi told press on October 28 that if
Iran has to provide its own fuel in order to get 20 percent
enriched fuel, it should do so gradually, in stages.




4. (U) Public criticism of the IAEA proposal (often referred to
as the 'US proposal') also continues to focus on the
presumptively excessively high amount of Iranian enriched
uranium being requested. An October 26 piece from the pragmatic
conservative 'Ayandeh News' website referred to the 'deceptive
US plan' to take 1,200 kilograms of Iran's 3.5 percent enriched
uranium, saying though this amount was eight times more than
what was needed by the TRR. It argued that to produce one
kilogram of 20 percent enriched uranium needed by the TRR,
Russia would need six kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched uranium
from Iran are required. The TRR needs a total of approximately
23 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium to continue operations for
the rest of its 15-year operational life. Hence, only 150 kg
of 3.5 percent enriched uranium from Iran. But 'the US' is
seeking approximately eight times this amount, i.e. 1,200 kg,
which would be enough to run the TRR the next 130 years,'
whereas it will not be operational for more than fifteen years.




5. (C) COMMENT: As noted reftel, it is unclear what, if any,
correlation there is between the ongoing public debate
surrounding the IAEA proposal and the Iran's internal
deliberation process. Regardless it must be noted that this
IEAE proposal as currently constituted has had no public
champions within Iran over the last week, to include any member
of Ahmadinejad's nuclear negotiating team. The nature of the
criticisms by Iran's pragmatic conservatives indicate that any
"important revisions" sought by Iran could well focus on either
phasing the export of its own uranium (as opposed to releasing
it all at once), and/or decreasing the overall amount Iran ships
out below the 1200 kilogram figure cited in the press. END
COMMENT.
EYRE