IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S MAJLIS SUPPORT LIMITED

C O N F I D E N T I A L RPO DUBAI 000435 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV IR SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S MAJLIS SUPPORT LIMITED CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Two early October incidents illustrate both the continuing gulf between the Majlis and President Ahmadinejad and Ahmadinejad's failure to garner support among the Majlis' Principlist faction, the conservatives who dominate the legislature. On October 6 an Ahmadinejad ally failed in his bid to displace Majlis Speaker Larijani as head of the Majlis' Principlist faction, handily losing the vote among Majlis conservatives. The remainder of the faction's leadership, all of whom have been vocal critics of the President, was also re-elected. Separately, at least 190 Majlis deputies, as well as most of the Majlis leadership, did not show up for an October 8 consultation meeting with Ahmadinejad. The meeting had been intended to increase coordination between the government and the Majlis. Taken together, the events indicate that Ahmadinejad's relationship with the Majlis and his support therein remains weak. END SUMMARY. Ahmadinejad's Majlis Support Limited ¶2. (C) Two early October incidents demonstrate the continuing gulf between the Majlis and the Ahmadinejad government, and Ahmadinejad's lack of support even among the Majlis' conservative majority. On October 6 the Majlis' Principlist faction held elections for its internal leadership, pitting Ahmadinejad's allies in the Majlis against incumbent and Majlis speaker Ali Larijani. In the lead-up to the vote Ahmadinejad's allies made several complaints regarding Larijani's conservative credentials. To cite but one example, Mashhad MP Javad Karimi Qoddusi complained that Larijani had worked on behalf of Mir Hossein Mousavi's presidential campaign and was an opponent of Ahmadinejad. He said Larijani had disobeyed the Supreme Leader's instructions by appointing committees to investigate aspects of the post-election unrest. Another Ahmadinejad supporter suggested the Principlist faction would change its internal bylaws to prevent the same person from being both Majlis speaker and leader of the faction. (COMMENT: The dispute between Larijani and Ahmadinejad is longstanding and Ahmadinejad's allies have repeatedly attempted to diminish Larijani's influence and role in the Majlis, to no avail. END COMMENT.) ¶3. (C) Larijani's primary challenger for the position was Morteza Aqa-Tehrani, an MP from Tehran and one of Ahmadinejad's loyal Majlis supporters. The vote among the factions' central committee was not close. Larijani was re-elected with 24 votes; Aqa-Tehrani received seven votes. Additionally, the faction's deputy positions went to Mohammad Reza Bahonar and Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Hassan Abutorabifard, both of whom are vociferous Ahmadinejad critics. In a likely attempt to spin the embarrassing defeat, an Ahmadinejad ally said afterwards that the vote would not create a fissure within the Principlist faction but warned 'if the activity of Principlist faction continues as it had the past, remaining part of the faction would not be useful.' ¶4. (C) Separately, reformist and opposition media reported that on October 8 the majority of Majlis deputies did not attend a consultation meeting with Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad had proposed the meetings following his re-election as a means to improve coordination with the Majlis. The meeting started an hour late due to the absence of 190-220 of the 290 deputies. (NOTE: Different publications reported different numbers of attendees. END NOTE.) Majlis speaker Larijani, the vice speakers, and other notable conservative members of parliament were also absent. ¶5. (C) Comment: Ahmadinejad's relationships with the Majlis and conservatives within the Majlis majority remain poor, as they were for the duration of Ahmadinejad's first term. Although it is unclear how the gulf between Ahmadinejad and the Majlis will affect the president's legislative priorities, the tension at least is indicative of the continuing animosity toward Ahmadinejad among Iran's elite, to include much of his own political 'Principlist' faction. EYRE