IRAN'S QODS DAY ENDS IN A DRAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000386 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM IR SUBJECT: IRAN'S QODS DAY ENDS IN A DRAW REF: RPO DUBAI 384 DUBAI 00000386 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Tens of thousands of opposition supporters marched in Iran's Qods Day celebrations on September 18, defying government threats that anti-government protesters would be dealt with severely. Despite the warnings and significant efforts by the state to prevent large-scale anti-government gatherings, demonstrators marched freely through major urban centers across Iran. Notably, the response of the security forces was muted compared to earlier demonstrations: widespread clashes were not reported, and relatively few people seem to have been arrested. Additionally, the key leadership figures associated with the "Green Path" opposition - Mousavi, Karrubi, and Khatami - took to the streets briefly, ending speculation they would be denied freedom of movement by the government. Expediency Council head Ayatollah Rafsanjani, who had been removed from his post as Qods Day prayer leader by the government in an attempt to control the day's message (reftel), was also seen in the streets, with unconfirmed reports he was marching with protesters. In the on-going political struggle, Qods Day is best characterized as a draw rather than a defining moment for either side: the opposition demonstrated its resilience by bringing significant numbers to the street, but the government declined to raise the temperature by taking provocative steps such as brutally suppressing demonstrators or arresting opposition leaders. END SUMMARY. IRIG Ensures Official Qods Day Events Uninterrupted ¶2. (C) Qods Day's official events went as planned with Ahmadinejad delivering a fiery pre-sermon speech alongside speeches by Islamic Movement of Palestine leader Ramezan Abdullah and hardline cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami. Ahmadinejad tried to rally support for Palestine by labeling the Holocaust a lie and a pretext for the founding of Israel, and by blaming Europe for the start of anti-Semitism, as well as claiming the "Zionists" manipulated Western governments. The event was well orchestrated by the IRIG; state television showed Ahmadinejad delivering his speech before thousands of his supporters and there were no signs of the opposition protests taking place throughout Iran. There are reports that the government bussed in its supporters from throughout the country and also used busses to block access to the Friday prayer grounds, preventing the opposition from disrupting the day's officially sanctioned speeches. ¶3. (C) Predictably, Iran's security forces were out in large numbers; but, despite the IRGC's repeated warnings to the opposition against demonstrating on Qods Day, the security forces largely refrained from direct clashes with the protesters. Opposition marches took place in several cities after months of a severe crackdown that prevented even small groups from assembling. Video and photos purportedly taken during Qods Day rallies show the security forces standing by as protests continue. The confrontations that did occur were relatively minor in comparison with the clashes immediately following the election. The Commander of the Law Enforcement forces in Tehran said some "trouble-makers" were arrested; otherwise, reformist websites have reported some clashes later in the day, the use of tear gas to disperse some crowds, and the arrest of some wearing green in Mashad. We have not seen reports of protesters injured or killed. Opposition Leaders in the Streets ¶4. (C) Mousavi, Karrubi, and Khatami each briefly participated in marches in Tehran, debunking widespread rumors in the days leading up to September 18 that they had been placed under virtual house arrest. Photographers documented government supporters jostling former President Khatami while he was marching, knocking off his turban before his security team was able to lead him away. There are similar reports that Mousavi and Karrubi were also forced by thugs to leave marches prematurely. Reformist media carried reports that the harassment of the three was coordinated. (NOTE: This physical intimidation is not a new tactic. Karrubi's turban was knocked off by pro-government thugs in a similar incident in July, and Khatami was also roughed up at a campaign event earlier in the DUBAI 00000386 002.2 OF 002 year before he withdrew from the presidential race. END NOTE) ¶5. (C) Protests occurred in many cities; media and reformist websites have reported protests in Tehran, Mashad, Rasht, Tabriz, Shiraz, Esfahan, Bushehr, Kerman, Ahvaz, and, Yazd. The scale of the protests is unclear. BBC Farsi reported tens of thousands of protesters in Tehran and other cities while others suggest the number of protesters was higher. However, the government strictly enforced its ban on press coverage of protests, leaving the true level of participation subject to speculation based on anecdotal information. Reformist and other websites have also reported that protesters were closer enough to Ahmadinejad during a post-speech interview that shouts of "Resign!" were heard in the background, and that the IRIB was forced to broadcast an evening soccer match in black and white because of the large number green-wearing spectators. There are also reports, however, that the number of government supporters outnumbered the opposition, likely reflecting the government's oft-used tactic of bussing in supporters. The reports collectively indicate that although there protests were widespread, the protests immediately after the elections were much larger than the crowds that turned out on Qods Day. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: The opposition successfully demonstrated that popular anger over the disputed presidential election has not diminished despite its brutal suppression of earlier protests and well-publicized horrific treatment of detainees. Yet government restraint on Qods Day should not be seen as a strategic shift away from suppression toward compromise; rather, the IRIG likely calculated that tolerating muted displays of dissent on the streets was preferable to provoking a new round of international criticism over violence against protesters in advance of President Ahmadinejad's imminent trip to New York and the October 1 negotiations with the P5+1 powers. The government now though is likely to re-assert its control of Iran's streets to prevent the opposition from staging additional protests. In addition, with no significant public holidays in the near future to co-opt, the opposition will have to find a new way to express popular discontent. In the near term, we believe that the government will continue to carefully weigh its options to neutralize the "Green Path" opposition's key leaders in seeking to restore domestic political stability. END COMMENT. RICHARDSON