IRAN: CABINET VOTE'S AFTERMATH HIGHLIGHTS GOVERNMENT'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000377 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV IR SUBJECT: IRAN: CABINET VOTE'S AFTERMATH HIGHLIGHTS GOVERNMENT'S FACTIONALISM, WEAKNESS DUBAI 00000377 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ahmadinejad and Iran's media heralded the Majlis' vote confirming 18 of his 21 cabinet nominees as a boon for Iran's unity and national interests. However, the confusion surrounding Ahmadinejad's aborted second-round nominations for the Ministries of Education and Energy and the reports that Khamenei's intervention was required to prevent the rejection of several other nominees belies such claims. Both developments set off sniping among conservatives. Khamenei's intervention in the cabinet confirmation underscores Ahmadinejad's political weakness and as it was, even the Supreme Leader's intervention was insufficient to save all of his nominees. Rather than bolstering the government, as the IRIG maintains, the cabinet vote highlights both the dissension within ruling conservative circles and Khamenei and Ahmadinejad's diminished stature due to the June 12 presidential election and its aftermath. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The confusion surrounding Ahmadinejad's aborted nominations for the Ministries of Education and Energy highlights the dissension among conservatives that surfaced during the Majlis vote on Ahmadinejad's proposed cabinet. On September 3 the Majlis endorsed 18 of the President's 21 nominees, rejecting the proposed Ministers of Education, Energy, and Welfare. On September 8 Ahmadinejad recalled the nominations of Fatemeh Alia as Education Minister and Ali Zabihi as Energy Minister, only two days after disclosing their names. A deputy Majlis speaker was quoted in the Iranian press as attributing the turnabout to guidance from the Supreme Leader delivered during a meeting between Khamenei and the new cabinet. Others speculated that senior clerics had again opposed the nomination of a female. Additionally, BBC Farsi reported that the two nominations were met with immediate calls of "do do" in the Majlis, a Persian slight and a clear indication that some members of the Majlis were again disappointed with the President's cabinet offerings. Their displeasure may also account for the withdrawal of the nominations. ¶3. (C) However on September 8, Ahmadinejad's chief of staff and confidante Esfankiar Rahim Mashaei refuted these suggestions, telling press that Ahmadinejad still trusted the two nominees and that their withdrawal was due only to the Majlis recess. Mashaei denied hearing anything about clerical opposition to the nominations and asserted that the issue would pass once Ahmadinejad again submits the nominations. ¶4. (C) The back-and-forth over these two nominees adds to the post-confirmation sniping among conservatives. Shortly after the final cabinet confirmation vote, Majlis Deputy Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar told press that several more Ahmadinejad nominees would have been rejected had the Supreme Leader not intervened. According to Bahonar, the Supreme Leader advised the Majlis that if they had reservations about the nominees, the Majlis should still give them the benefit of the doubt, though he cautioned that Khamenei had not ordered the Majlis to approve the nominees. Other Majlis members reiterated that Khamenei had sent such guidance to the Majlis. ¶5. (C) Ahmadinejad's media adviser Ali Akbar Javanfekr responded that Bahonar was only trying to justify his efforts to block the nominations of eight nominees. (Note: Bahonar before the cabinet vote predicted that at least four or five nominees would be rejected.) Javanfekr did confirm that Khamenei had given a message to the Majlis, though he maintained it was only an admonishment to work more "tolerantly" with the Ahmadinejad government. ¶6. (C) Comment: Khamenei's willingness to go to bat for Ahmadinejad to prevent embarrassment and to maintain a fagade of unity in one sense suggests Khamenei remains supportive of the President. Their relationship has been the subject of much speculation since Ahmadinejad publicly defied Khamenei over his failed appointment of Mashaei as First Vice-President, setting off a storm of criticism from conservative quarters. Still, Khamenei had little choice but to intervene on behalf of Ahmadinejad's nominees. The defeat of several nominees would have been a blow to both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, exposing how DUBAI 00000377 002.2 OF 002 narrow Ahmadinejad's support even within the Iranian government has become. ¶7. (C) As it was, even the Supreme Leader's intervention was insufficient to save all of Ahmadinejad's nominees. Ahmadinejad in his two terms has had seven of his start of term ministerial nominees rejected, far more than any other president. Rather than bolstering the government, as the IRIG maintains, the cabinet vote highlights the dissension within the government and Khamenei and Ahmadinejad's diminished stature since the presidential election. End comment. EYRE