IRAN: IN CABINET AHMADINEJAD CHOOSES LOYALTY AND IDEOLOGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000348 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SUBJECT: IRAN: IN CABINET AHMADINEJAD CHOOSES LOYALTY AND IDEOLOGY OVER EXPERIENCE DUBAI 00000348 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Ahmadinejad's nominees for his second-term cabinet showcase his preference for loyalty over expertise, as most clearly have longstanding ties to the President. Although most of the 21 these nominees generally lack significant experience for their respective ministries, Ahmadinejad seems to have positioned several nominees for their current promotion by installing them as deputy ministers over the past few years in their designated fields. Also noteworthy are the IRGC ties of nominees for the key Defense, Intelligence, and Interior Ministries. These 'power ministry' nominations probably reflect the increasing role of the IRGC in internal security, however, media depictions of a cabinet slate 'dominated' by the IRGC overstates the case, as most of the 21 nominees do not have such ties. The Majlis is now reviewing the nominees and has complained many nominees lack experience and more generally that Ahmadinejad failed to consult with the Majlis prior to announcing his nominations. A few nominees probably will not be approved, although the Majlis could well feel pressure from Supreme Leader Khamenei to avoid embarrassing Ahmadinejad (and weakening the executive branch) at a time when Iran feels under severe international scrutiny. Votes on the nominees are scheduled to begin next week. END SUMMARY. Cabinet Nominees Loyal to Ahmadinejad ¶2. (C) In two live television interviews Ahmadinejad introduced his cabinet selections and the criteria for their selection. In addition to promoting their putative professional qualifications, Ahmadinejad made clear that their support for his agenda was a key component for the nominees' selection. Toward this end, many Iran observers have noted that all former cabinet members who objected to his thwarted promotion of ally Rahim Esfandiar Mashaie to First Vice President were not retained. In their place, Ahmadinejad has nominated mostly individuals to which he has longstanding ties. Some have ties to Ahmadinejad from his time as Tehran Mayor, were appointed by Ahmadinejad as Governor Generals or deputy ministers, have vocally supported the President over the past few years, and/or have assisted in his election campaigns. ¶3. (C) Although some nominees do have an IRGC background, they do not dominate the proposed slate. Defense Ministry nominee Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi has served in a variety of IRGC roles, most notably in the Qods Force, and Intelligence Minister nominee Heydar Moslehi and Interior Ministry nominee Mostafa Mohammad Najjar share an IRGC pedigree. These are critical ministries and the nominations probably do reflect the increasing role of the IRGC in internal security. However, most of the other nominees have not had prominent positions with the IRGC or Basij. As such, media analysis characterizing the proposed cabinet as indicative of an 'IRGC takeover' probably overstates the case - rather, the nominees' ideologically affinity with and loyalty to Ahmadinejad and not their ties the IRGC or Basij appear to be a more important factor in their selections. In contrast to an increase in IRGC affiliation, Ahmadinejad nominated the minimum number of clerics possible: one (NOTE: Iran's law requires that the Intelligence Minister be a cleric. This low number of clerics could well reflect Ahmadinejad's disregard for the clerical class as a whole.) ¶4. (C) Knowledgeable observers inside and outside Iran have also faulted Ahmadinejad for his nominees' dearth of relevant experience. In particular, the nominee for the Oil Ministry Seyyed Masud Mirkazemi has been singled out. Mirkazemi is the current Commerce Minister, has strong ties to the IRGC and involvement in defense and logistics planning, but has no apparent background in the oil industry. Other nominees seem similarly ill-suited to their positions, though Ahmadinejad perhaps has tried to undercut such arguments by naming several deputy ministers to head the organization they now serve. The proposed Ministers of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, and Communications and Information Technology fall into this category but have only limited experience. Although five of the nominees are incumbents, only one, Foreign Affairs Minister Mottaki was an original member of Ahmadinejad's 2005 cabinet. The others were installed between 2006 and 2008, often with minimal prior experience. DUBAI 00000348 002.2 OF 002 Reactions to the Nominees ¶5. (C) Ahead of Ahmadinejad's announcement of the nominees, Majlis members complained about the President's lack of coordination, and seemed eager to voice their frustration by immediately criticizing several of the picks. A Majlis Deputy Speaker even predicted that "at least four or five" of the nominees would not be approved. The prediction makes sense given that in 2005 four of Ahmadinejad's picks were rejected by the Majlis and a few of his ministers were subsequently impeached during their tenures (Comment: Prior to Ahmadinejad it was it was rare for cabinet nominees to fail to win Majlis approval at the start of a Presidential term). At the same time, an IRPO contact with former Majlis experience cautioned against taking the current Majlis grumblings over the nominees too seriously, suggesting that the Majlis decisions on the nominees are typically made at the last minute as a result of behind-the-scenes horsetrading. Also, several previous Ahmadinejad nominees initially criticized for lack of executive or managerial experience have ultimately prevailed, eventually earning the Majlis' vote of confidence. ¶6. (C) Other Majlis members, taking their cue from some senior clerics, have questioned Ahmadinejad's nomination of three women as ministers of Education, Health, and Welfare. A member of the Majlis clerical faction said that two Grand Ayatollahs had concerns regarding the suitability of females to serve as ministers. Additionally, some Friday Prayer leaders last week attacked Ahmadinejad for his selection of the women. The relevant experience of the women has also been questioned, and as such, Majlis votes against the three may reflect concerns about their lack of experience as much as concerns about their gender. ¶7. (C) The international reaction to Brigadier General Vahidi's nomination to the Defense Ministry-due to the Interpol arrest warrant for his role in the bombings in Argentina in 1994-will probably have little consequence. A Majlis deputy remarked that the international outcry only made Vahidi's confirmation all the more likely. It is quite possible that the nominee for the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology could also have trouble traveling abroad. In a March 2008 interview, nominee Kamran Daneshju said he had been barred from entering the European Union due to his deportation from the UK while a student during the Salman Rushdie affair. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Although several of the nominees will be thoroughly roughed up in the process and a few even possibly rejected, the Majlis will also feel pressure from certain quarters to approve the nominees and, in the case of the key ministries, the nominees are probably pre-approved by Khamenei. An August 23 lead editorial in the IRGC official "Sobhe Sadegh" weekly newspaper, for instance, suggested that the Majlis err on the side of goodwill when deliberating on the nominees in order to avoid 'playing into the enemy's hands.' Quite likely Supreme Leader Khamenei, in the wake of the popular unrest and dissension among the elite, prefers that these hearings not become a platform to vent Majlis frustration with Ahmadinejad. END COMMENT. EYRE