IRAN ELECTION AFTERMATH: OPPOSITION ATTACKS GOVERNMENT'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000273 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/2/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTION AFTERMATH: OPPOSITION ATTACKS GOVERNMENT'S LEGITIMACY DUBAI 00000273 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Guardians Council formally certified Ahmadinejad's landslide reelection on June 29, theoretically closing the door to any further challenges of the results. Nevertheless, the key opposition leadership figures categorically rejected the verdict and vowed publicly to fight on, outlining plans to form a commission to petition the judiciary to dismiss the results. Though Mousavi continues to exhort his supporters to demonstrate peacefully, he has not issued specific calls for mass civil disobedience that would challenge the state security forces' ability to maintain order. Rather, Mousavi and his allies appear to be focusing their efforts on attacking the legitimacy of a second Ahmadinejad government. This psychological warfare is likely intended to further isolate Ahmadinejad's government, both at home and abroad, while continuing to exacerbate fissures within the clerical and political elite. A spate of public criticism of the election and the government's conduct by clerical figures, coupled with signs that known adversaries of Ahmadinejad within the government have maintained their stature within the system, indicate that though the streets are quiet for now, the power struggle at the top is far from over. End summary. 2.(C) Since the initial announcement of Ahmadinejad's landslide win, which Supreme Leaders Khamenei quickly endorsed in a statement issued the day after the election, the government has maintained that all complaints regarding the election must be channeled through the Guardians Council (GC). With varying degrees of steadfastness, the three defeated candidates have rejected this process, arguing that the GC is not an impartial arbiter and can not credibly investigate complaints against the process. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have gone so far as to publicly accuse the GC of having played a role in the fraud. ¶3. (C) Nevertheless, the GC pressed on, giving the government an ongoing "legal process" to deflect criticism and buy time. On June 29, however, this process ended as the GC certification of essentially the same results first announced by state media the day after the June 12 election. According to Iran's Election �0A;Law, there are no other legal avenues available to the aggrieved candidates to pursue their complaints. ¶4. (C) The main opposition figures - Mousavi, Karroubi and former President Khatami - swiftly and categorically rejected the GC's verdict in near-simultaneous public statements deeming the election and the subsequent Ahmadinejad second term "illegitimate." In a statement issued July 1, Mousavi deemed the election illegitimate, detailed government improprieties before, during and after the election, and made sweeping demands of the state, including the release of political prisoners and the end of the repression of civil society. The typically soft-spoken Khatami accused the government of committing a "velvet revolution against the people," while the print edition of Karroubi's newspaper was shut down after he opened a condemnation of the election with a Koranic verse implying the death of the Islamic Republic. The three men have vowed to fight on and announced their intent to form a special committee to challenge the election in the judiciary. It is unclear, however, on what basis they can do or whether the judiciary would be any more open to hearing their complaints. (Note: Conservative media reported this week that Sadegh Larijani, brother of Majles speaker Ali Larijani, will soon replace Ayatollah Shahrudi as head of the judiciary.) ¶5. (C) Despite the fiery rhetoric and Mousavi's exhortations to his followers to continue to peacefully demonstrate, he has not issued a specific call for collective action on a scale that would disrupt everyday life in Iran. With limited ability to communicate or organize, and in the face of the state's ability to effectively suppress or pre-empt significant demonstrations, the key opposition figures appear to have little ability to mobilize the masses. Instead, they appear to be conducting psychological warfare against the government, specifically attacking the legitimacy of the next Ahmadinejad government, rather than fomenting mass civil disobedience. While this approach may not inspire the public, by continuing to issue statements he does keep the issue alive at a popular level. That said, Mousavi seems to have shied away from a head on DUBAI 00000273 002.2 OF 002 confrontation and his overarching aim is likely intended to exacerbate fissures within the governing elite and prevent the forces that have effectively vanquished the reformers from cementing their monopoly on political power. ¶6. (C) There has been much speculation about the machinations of Iran's clerical community in the aftermath of the election. The tainted election prompted reports that Assembly of Experts Speaker Rafsanjani was attempting to marshal support in that body to challenge Khamenei's primacy in the country. The ultimate results of Rafsanjani's efforts are unknown and his only public statement to date was a typically (and almost certainly intentionally) ambiguous statement. In recent days there has been a slight uptick in public reports of senior clerics expressing their frustration, albeit obliquely, with the election's aftermath. For example, Grand Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani, former secretary of the GC, said that "We should have acted in a way that these issues would not have come up. We should have moderated our positions and opinions. " And mid-ranking cleric (and son of a revered late Grand Ayatollah), Hojjat ol-Eslam Hadi Ghaffari, directly criticized Khamenei, a significant breach of Iran's red lines. Because the clergy are theoretically a pillar of the Islamic Republic, public dissent by respected clerical figures is more costly for the government than criticism emanating from secular political figures. However, the clerics were largely opposed to Ahmadinejad ahead of the election and their sentiments seem to have had little effect with Khamenei. ¶7. (C) Comment: Nearly three weeks after the election that sparked widespread popular unrest and exposed deep fissures within the ruling political and clerical elite, and between the government and the public, a political compromise that would satisfy the defeated candidates and their supporters remains improbable. Mousavi and his allies have seemingly lost the ability use public pressure to force the government to change course and instead are trying to sow doubt about the legitimacy of the government among the political and clerical elite. Their strategy risks further backlash from Khamenei and Ahmadinejad - elements within the government and conservative media continue to set the stage for Mousavi's defiance to be punished - and probably ensures that the highly polarized environment in Iran will continue. RICHARDSON