IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KEY INDICATORS OF FRAUD

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NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KEY INDICATORS OF FRAUD

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S/NF) Iran analysts, both Iranian and foreign, have reacted
with incredulity to the results of the Iranian presidential
election and accused the IRIG of grossly rigging the election
and falsifying the resuls. The Iran Regional Presence Office's
review of Iran's recent presidential elections and the current
election indicate the accusations of fraud have merit. Key
points:



-- The numbers released by the Ministry of Interior - for all
four of the candidates - contravene known voting patterns in
Iran's recent history. Most significantly, accepting the
Ministry of Interior's numbers requires believing that a massive
new group of voters who did not support Ahmadinejad in 2005
voted in favor of him this time.



-- Media supportive of Ahmadinejad began indicating he had won
before polls closed and before counting was to have begun. Just
after 6pm in Iran, an article appeared on the Fars news website
in Farsi alleging that a candidate had won the election with
about 60% of the vote, nearly matching the final outcome.



-- There is strong evidence that the government had prepared
extensively for the post-election riots despite that past
elections have not provoked riots.



Where does Ahmadinejad's Majority Come From?




2. (S/NF) According to the Ministry of Interior (MOI),46.2
million of Iran's 70 million people were eligible to vote in the
election. Based on the numbers released publicly by the MOI on
June 13, turnout exceeded 85 percent nationwide, based on 38.95
million ballots cast. This is the highest participation level
recorded in a national election, topping the 80 percent turnout
in the 1997 presidential election. This level of voter
participation was anticipated by most Iran political analysts
and supported anecdotally through widespread foreign and
domestic media coverage of long lines at polling stations in
major urban centers throughout the day.




3. (S/NF) Khatami won the 1997 and 2001 elections in landslides,
taking 70 percent and 78 percent, respectively. He had broad
support across all demographics, but the large margins of
victory were primarily due to his ability to mobilize and sweep
the urban vote.




4. (S/NF) During the eight years of Khatami's administration,
urban voters grew disillusioned with the political system that
prevented Khatami from effectively implementing the reform
movement's platform and emerged as a largely silent majority
within Iran. Participation among this cadre dropped in the 2004
Majles election, the 2005 presidential election, and the 2008
Majles election. It is within this context that the
relatively-unknown Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, primarily
on the back of a strong rural turnout and a significant popular
backlash to his principal opponent. The 2007 Tehran City
Council election provides a snapshot of Ahmadinejad's urban
support, midway between the two presidential elections.
Ahmadinejad's allies in the election fared poorly in the 2007
Tehran City Council election, indicating that two years into his
tenure his urban support, at least in Tehran, remained low.




5. (S/NF) In the first round of the 2005 election, Ahmadinejad
gained 20 percent of the vote, roughly 5.6 million people.
This cohort should be considered his base of support at that
time. Ahmadinejad may have expanded his base in the intervening
4 years, and likely did, but the MOI numbers require that
Ahmadinejad's base roughly quadrupled. The MOI numbers show
that 85 percent of the country voted and that Ahmadinejad
received 63 percent of the vote, an outcome that requires
Ahmadinejad to have captured a significant share of the urban

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vote and the silent majority - the exact people who stayed home
in the past few elections rather than vote for Ahmadinejad or
his political allies.




6. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad does enjoy a loyal, committed base of
support. He has been in campaign mode since 2005 but has
focused his attention and the government's resources mainly on
the rural voters who brought him to office. He has also
recently been able to boost the salaries of many public sector
workers and pensioners. In the months leading up to the
election, however, there was a growing consensus among political
scientists, sociologists, and economists that despite the
handouts and salary increases, Ahmadinejad's support among the
poor and the working class in both urban and rural areas was
eroding rather than increasing. It is well-established that
attendance at Ahmadinejad public events is enhanced by cash
handouts, and supporters are often bussed to events to ensure
high turnout.




7. (S/NF) The election results released by the MOI contravene
voting patterns in Iran's recent history. In 2005,
Ahmadinejad's support in the 30 provinces ranged from a low of 6
percent to a high of 55 percent, reflecting a range of voting
preferences among Iran's diverse population. In this election,
Ahmadinejad's support ranged from a low of 45 percent to a high
of 77 percent, and he received under 50 percent in only two
provinces. Also, Karroubi gained 18 percent of the vote in 2005
and swept his home province of Lorestan. According to the MOI,
this year he captured less than 1 percent of the vote nationwide
and just 4 percent in Lorestan. Of the three "Azerbaijani"
provinces, Mousavi lost two to Ahmadinejad and barely won a
third; historically, even minor presidential candidates with an
Azerbaijani background win these provinces. It is worth noting
that Mousavi lost his home province, East Azerbaijan, despite
his candidacy's significant resonance amongst his fellow Azeri
Iranians. Ahmadinejad won East Azerbaijan, despite having
polled at only 15 percent there in 2005.



Government Oversight also Raises Suspicions




8. (S/NF) The process of counting and announcing results did not
follow the government's own rules. In past elections, the
government entities charged with administering and certifying
results have largely observed the protocol outlined in the
Election Law. The Ministry of Interior usually announces
provincial and municipal results real time, as they are counted,
following the close of the polls. Such results were only
announced three days later in this election. Khamenei, rather
than waiting for the Guardians Council to certify the election
before endorsing the result, approved of the results prior to
the MOI's announcement of the final results.




9. (S/NF) Media supportive of Ahmadinejad began indicating he
had won before polls closed and before counting was to have
begun. Just after 6pm in Iran, an article appeared on the Fars
news website in Farsi alleging that a candidate had won the
election with about 60 percent of the vote.




10. (S/NF) There is strong evidence that the government had
prepared extensively for the post-election riots, with the
pre-positioning of anti-riot units, the cuts in SMS service
before the election, and the denial of communication services to
reformist groups. However, past elections have not provoked
riots. The riots in protest of the announcement of election
results are occurring in all major cities, and across a variety
of neighborhoods within the cities. Protests have not been
limited to specific demographic groups.



Comment:




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11. (S/NF) The actual results of the election will likely never
be known. However, IRPO concludes that the allegations of
widespread fraud have merit.
ASGARD