IRAN ELECTION SCENESETTER: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RPO DUBAI 000217 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IR SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTION SCENESETTER: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIST ANNOUNCED, OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN PERIOD UNDERWAY DUBAI 00000217 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) 1.(C) Summary: The Guardians Council-approved list of four candidates eligible to stand in Iran's June 12 presidential election included no surprises. President Ahmadinejad remains the man to beat, but is the object of persistent and withering criticism from his three rivals, particularly for his poor stewardship of the economy and for exacerbating Iran's international isolation. Mir Hossein Mousavi, the 1980s prime minister whose candidacy is fueled in great part by former president Khatami's endorsement, is viewed as Ahmadinejad's strongest rival. However, the outspoken former Majles Speaker Mehdi Karrubi showed well in the 2005 election and has drawn the support of many well-known reformers. The fourth candidate, former Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohsen Reza'i, is not expected to win a substantial number of votes, but his participation exposes rifts within the conservative elite and gives other prominent principlists cover to not publicly support Ahmadinejad. ¶2. (C) Summary (cont.): If all four candidates stay in the race, they are likely to split the vote sufficiently to require a second round of voting on June 19. A two-man race -- in which only one opponent would benefit from the likely substantial anti-Ahmadinejad vote -- could leave the incumbent vulnerable. Though vote manipulation will likely favor Ahmadinejad and he is presumed to be the preferred candidate of Supreme Leader Khamenei, Iran's leadership places great importance on the appearance of electoral propriety; it is unlikely Ahmadinejad would be able to steal the election outright, nor that Khamenei would be able to deliver the election to him. Candidate Announcement Brings Some Clarity to Iranian Election -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Guardians Council (GC) certified the candidacies of the election's four leading figures: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, former Majles Speaker Mehdi Karrubi, and former IRGC Commander and current Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Reza'i. None of the other 471 people who registered to contest the election met the GC's interpretation of the constitution's eligibility definition. ¶4. (C) The challengers for the presidency have roundly criticized Ahmadinejad for the confrontational spin he has put on Iranian foreign policy and especially for his mismanagement of the economy. However, on the matters of greatest concern to the USG, namely the nuclear issue and engagement with the USG, the contenders differ only marginally from Ahmadinejad. Mousavi, Karrubi, and Reza'i all reject out of hand an enrichment suspension and applaud the achievements of Iran's nuclear scientists. Their general support for the status quo is both an acknowledgment of popular sentiment -- advocating suspension is not tenable under current conditions -- as well as the Supreme Leader's recognized primacy regarding the nuclear issue. All the candidates have similarly fallen in line behind Khamenei regarding engagement with the USG; each has voiced some variation of the Supreme Leader's Nowruz address wherein he said rhetorical change is not enough, they want to see US conduct towards Iran change. Moussavi, Karrubi and Reza'i have, however, noted the importance of ending Iran's international isolation and have suggested a more realist and less ideological tilt to their likely foreign policy in their comments. ¶5. (C) Even on the economy, where high inflation and rising unemployment have made Ahmadinejad an easy target, his opponents have largely asserted that they favor better or more efficient management. None of the challengers has outlined an economic agenda for structural reform of the state-dominated economy; rather, they have tried to highlight Ahmadinejad's erratic approach to economic policy and personnel decisions and the perception that he has squandered Iran's oil windfall of recent years. Mousavi, deriding the President's failure to deliver on his 2005 campaign promises, observed that "social justice does not mean the equal distribution of poverty" in one such attack. Yet despite being a focal point of the candidates' rhetoric, the election does not portend the dramatic changes needed to DUBAI 00000217 002.2 OF 004 improve Iran's economy. ¶6. (C) Where the challengers do differ with Ahmadinejad is their tone and in this regard, they have taken steps to distance themselves from Ahmadinejad's rhetoric. Mousavi has spoken of initiating a policy of "ditente" with the rest of the world; Karrubi criticized Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust and called the President's inflammatory remarks a favor to Israel; even Reza'i, a conservative and former IRGC commander, said Iran under Ahmadinejad is heading toward an "abyss " and should "neither pursue passivity or adventurism." All three men seek to be regarded as a competent manager capable of repairing the damage incurred during Ahmadinejad's tenure. The Candidates -------------- ¶7. (C) President Ahmadinejad remains the candidate to beat: he has an incumbent's advantages of media coverage and control of Iran's coffers, and support from key institutions charged with overseeing the election. Still, his re-election is not a foregone conclusion and two questions define his electoral prospects: his standing with Supreme Leader Khamenei and his reservoir of support in the provinces. Despite Khamenei's public assurances that he has only "one vote," many still worry that he will tilt the system in favor of Ahmadinejad. Khamenei raised such fears in a recent speech when his description of his ideal candidate sounded similar to Ahmadinejad. However, the description was generic enough to match other candidates as well. ¶8. (C) Ahmadinejad's support base includes radical hardliners who approve of the president's defiance of the international community, and the urban and rural poor, who identify with Ahmadinejad's piety and simple lifestyle. With the hardline vote relatively assured, the president is depending on getting the same provincial support he received in 2005 to win. In the last election, Ahmadinejad's promises of "social justice" were a key to his victory. He repeatedly returned to such themes during his provincial trips, making grand promises of economic development everywhere he went. However, many of his promises remain unfulfilled and the economy has faltered, leaving his degree of support in the provinces an unknown. ¶9. (C) Former Prime Minister Mousavi has emerged as the leading challenger to Ahmadinejad. Out of politics since the 1980s, Mousavi says he is returning to the fray because "things are not going well in this country." He is counting on a coalition of the youth and those that fondly remember his stewardship during the Iran-Iraq war. While on the one hand championing human rights, the rule of law, and disbanding the "Morals Police," he has adopted the color green for his campaign to highlight his religious pedigree (Note: The title "Mir" is a rarely used term synonymous with "Seyyed," designating a descendant of the prophet) and is running on a promise to return Iran to the "pure values" of the Islamic Revolution. Trying to bridge the difference, Mousavi maintains he is running as an independent; that said, nearly all of the leading reformist organizations back him. ¶10. (C) According to our contacts, however, Mousavi is not a charismatic campaigner. His challenge -- shared by all in the anti-Ahmadinejad camp -- will be to draw out the urban vote. In recent national elections, voter participation in the provinces has outpaced turnout in urban areas, where the president is least popular. Without a strong turnout, Mousavi will be hard pressed to overcome Ahmadinejad's inherent advantages. Mousavi, though initially reluctant to be lumped in with Khatami as a reformer, eventually yielded to Khatami's star power and the two have been campaigning together and Khatami is shown prominently on Mousavi's campaign posters. DUBAI 00000217 003.2 OF 004 ¶11. (C) Regime stalwart and 2005 presidential candidate Mehdi Karrubi returns to the fray determined to avenge his bitter, and perhaps fraud-tainted, defeat four years ago. When the polls closed Karrubi stood in second place in the vote and in position to join Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani in a runoff only to wake up the next day to find himself in third place, behind Ahmadinejad and out of the runoff. But despite his strong showing in the first round in 2005, Karrubi now is viewed mostly as a foil to the other candidates, but whether he draws more votes from Ahmadinejad or Mousavi is unclear. Karrubi is an economic populist, promising cash payments and oil shares to Iran's population, putting him in direct competition for voters who support Ahmadinejad's populism. He also champions human rights and the rights of Iran's ethnic minorities (Note: Karrubi is from the Lur ethnic minority),issues that Mousavi is trying to make his own. Perhaps tellingly, reformers have repeatedly requested Karrubi to withdraw in favor of Mousavi, a request he repeatedly denies. ¶12. (C) Former IRGC Commander and Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Reza'i was the last of the four to announce his bid and only did so after months of publicly trying to find a candidate to head a so-called unity government. When no one else emerged, he announced his own candidacy. Reza'i, a conservative, is banned from international travel because of an Interpol red notice stemming from his allegedly involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in Argentina. As in 2005, when he withdrew two days before the election, Reza'i has little chance of winning the election; his candidacy though highlights the disdain of many in the principlist factions for President Ahmadinejad. There is speculation that various conservatives and rivals to Ahmadinejad are assisting Mousavi's campaign. Reza'i's presence has allowed other prominent principlists to avoid endorsing a candidate because two conservatives are in the field. What to Look For -------------- ¶13. (C) The government's announcement of the official candidates signals the start of the election's official campaign period. The campaign period runs until June 10, just ahead of the June 12 election. Although the candidates have effectively been campaigning for months, the designated period will carry much more official media coverage. The state-run media has announced six debates between the candidates as well as individual Q&A sessions. The candidates themselves have promised press conferences; Ahmadinejad, for example, will be holding separate press conferences for domestic and international press later this month to officially launch his re-election bid. ¶14. (C) The media environment to date and in the run up to the election is a point of contention among the candidates. Ahmadinejad's opponents have complained about bias in the state-run media, accusing Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) of exaggerating Ahmadinejad's accomplishments and providing extensive coverage to his provincial trips. However, The IRIB is under Supreme Leader Khamenei's control and its chief asserts the IRIB is impartial. Perhaps to illustrate that point, the IRIB recently cancelled an interview with Ahmadinejad and did not cover a provincial speech. The president's backers have also complained that IRIB managers favor Mousavi. Still, Ahmadinejad, as president, will probably command a greater share of the coverage during the month-long official campaign period -- a significant advantage because most Iranians, particularly rural populations, still receive their news from IRIB. The candidates are embracing new media venues to attract voters, such as Facebook, but only a small segment of the population is savvy enough to use such technology and it is unlikely to overcome Ahmadinejad's traditional media advantage. Potential for Fraud -------------- DUBAI 00000217 004.2 OF 004 ¶15. (C) There are also allegations that Ahmadinejad will benefit from fraud in the election. Iranian elections are not free and fair; but beyond the Guardian Council's vetting -- this year 471 candidates were rejected -- the nature of electoral malfeasance and its significance is hard to gauge. Fears of fraud have increased this year because the GC and the Ministry of Interior, which oversee and carry out the election, are both aligned with Ahmadinejad. Guardians Council Secretary Janati recently made pointed comments supporting Ahmadinejad's re-election and Interior Minister Mahsuli, the president's campaign manager in 2005, was appointed to his post last fall. ¶16. (C) The GC certifies the results of the election and invalidates district votes they deem irregular. As such, the GC can throw out or alter results in particular districts. Karrubi and his campaign spokesman in 2005 accused the GC of this sort of tampering in particular districts. The Ministry of Interior, for its part, has control over the ballot boxes, giving rise to concerns for their protection/sanctity. All the candidates are allowed to station observers at each voting station, but the candidates likely do not have the staff to send representatives to all the polling booths. ¶17. (C) The losing candidates in 2005 also complained about the mobilization of the Basij, the IRGC's militia, on behalf of Ahmadinejad. Basij members are thought to constitute much of Ahmadinejad's base and are expected to support the President again. ¶18. (C) The election will in all likelihood see some degree of fraud and many such accusations. Still, the IRIG and Khamenei look to Iranian elections to validate the legitimacy of the regime. In the run up to the election Khamenei and his minions will repeatedly exhort Iranians to the polls in order to showcase the strength of the regime and "neutralize the enemies' plots." They do not want the who should also provide a check, if only a small one, against widespread fraud. election to be seen as a farce, which likely limits their willingness to overtly meddle. And although the IRIG does not permit the presence of foreign election observers, Iran has accredited nearly 200 foreign journalists Comment: -------------- ¶19. (C) Iranian foreign policy and nuclear program are, to a large extent, dictated by Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council as a function of Iran's perceived national interests. However, the president can affect foreign policy by force of his "bully pulpit," as we have seen both for the positive (Khatami) and the negative (Ahmadinejad). The election does not portend dramatic changes in Iranian policies of greatest concern to the U.S., but a new tone and new face for Iran, if Ahmadinejad is defeated, will strengthen the voices inside the country who favor pragmatism over confrontation. ASGARD