IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: AN INSIDER ASSESSES THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000174 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL IR SUBJECT: IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: AN INSIDER ASSESSES THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY DUBAI 00000174 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: A prominent political scientist from Tehran assesses that moderate presidential contender Mir Hossein Mousavi has - at least in theory - the constituency to win, but that his ability to defeat the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the June 12 election will depend largely on his ability to get out the vote. He described a complicated relationship between President Khatami, whom he sees regularly, and Mousavi, who seems not yet to have decided how to manage the considerable assets and potential drawbacks associated with using Khatami's star power on the campaign trail. The political scientist also pointed to a "softening" of Supreme Leader Khamenei's once-overt support for Ahmadinejad as the reformers and moderates' greatest achievement so far in the run-up to the poll. He said that most reformers now believe that Khamenei is "comfortable" with the prospect of a Mousavi presidency, and that although he might personally prefer another Ahmadinejad victory, he is now less likely to "push the system hard" in favor of Ahmadinejad. End summary. ¶2. (S/NF) Dr. Hadi Semati (please protect),a prominent political scientist affiliated with the University of Tehran and the Center for Strategic Research, the Expediency Council's think tank, and with extensive experience on US policy circles, shared his views on the current state of play in Iran's upcoming presidential election. IRPO Officers met with Semati on April 15 for a wide-ranging discussion of domestic Iranian issues and US-Iran relations. Mousavi Keeping His Distance from Khatami ¶3. (S/NF) Dr. Semati met alone with former President Khatami soon after he ended his presidential candidacy mid-March in favor of former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. According to Dr. Semati, Khatami's publicly stated rationale for the decision to end his campaign should be taken at face value. Khatami emphasized that he truly believed Mousavi could more effectively govern in the current political climate, and he did not want the moderate vote to be diluted by competing candidates. He added though that Khatami expressed irritation with Mousavi's decision to announce his own candidacy just two weeks after Khatami formally entered the race. According to Semati, Khatami told Mousavi directly that he preferred that Mousavi run and would not enter the race if he intended to stand. Khatami told Semati that Mousavi's response at the time was that he would decide in May. In Khatami's opinion, a May announcement would have been much too late in the cycle, prompting him to go ahead and enter the race on his own. Semati observed that despite Khatami's unhappiness over the sequencing of events, he was ultimately relieved to be able to withdraw with a "clear conscience." ¶4. (S/NF) Dr. Semati observed that Mousavi now faces a dilemma regarding how to best make use of Khatami's endorsement and support. As yet, Mousavi has not asked Khatami directly to actively campaign on his behalf. And according to Semati, although Mousavi needs Khatami's overt help to garner name recognition, particularly among the youth, Mousavi has not yet come to that conclusion himself. Semati opined that Mousavi appears to believe he can win by himself and that aligning himself too overtly with Khatami would undermine his ability to capture conservative votes. In Semati's view, this is a risky course because while he believes Mousavi has, "in theory," the constituency to win the election, the outcome of the election will depend entirely on voter participation. If Mousavi can mobilize to deliver high voter turnout, he will win; conversely, if participation is low, Ahmadinejad will likely prevail. ¶5. (S/NF) Dr. Semati said that despite the fact that Mousavi has not directly appealed to Khatami for help, many of the former president's key lieutenants are actively, but quietly, engaging on behalf of Mousavi's candidacy. According to Semati, more than 80,000 volunteers nation-wide were enlisted over the past year in anticipation of a Khatami candidacy in response to Ahmadinejad's capacity to effectively mobilize the Basij - a lesson the moderates "learned the hard way" in 2005. Though DUBAI 00000174 002.2 OF 003 there will be no formal announcement, Semati said this organization is being "activated" for Mousavi as most leading reformers see him as their best hope to unseat Ahmadinejad. Semati also noted that whereas presidential candidate Karroubi has some big names backing him - most notably, former Tehran Mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi, and former Khatami-era cabinet members Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Abbas Abdi, Ataollah Mohajerani, and Mohammad Ali Najafi - Mousavi is starting to pull in the main moderate political organizations, such as Kargozaran and the Association of Combatant Clerics. That these organizations are lining up behind Mousavi is important, although Semati noted that Karroubi's constellation of famous reformist faces from the Khatami era is "potentially problematic" for Mousavi. The Karroubi Factor ¶6. (S/NF) Dr. Semati assessed that Karroubi would likely draw as many, if not more, votes away from Ahmadinejad as from Mousavi because his principal appeal to voters will be his populist economic proposal to distribute Iran's oil wealth to the people via a still-undefined plan to somehow issue shares directly to the citizenry. Semati also observed that while Karroubi is making "bolder" promises than Mousavi in terms of opening Iran's political structure to greater competition, most moderates don't "take him seriously." According to Semati, Karroubi is proposing systemic reforms that he can't possibly deliver within the framework of contemporary Iranian politics. While such reforms have some appeal to voters, given the "national trauma" associated with the failure of the Khatami administration to institute such measures, Semati believes that Karroubi is not "taken seriously" by most politically-active moderates. It was precisely this reasoning that led Khatami to throw his weight behind Mousavi, a "revolutionary who has evolved" as opposed to Karroubi, in Semati's opinion. Mousavi, he noted, will be careful about managing expectations and therefore will be able to deliver more of what he promises. Khatami's Withdrawal "Softened" the Supreme Leader ¶7. (S/NF) Dr. Semati believes that Khatami's decision to withdraw from the election has already delivered an important victory to moderates: a "softening" of Supreme Leader Khamenei's overt support for Ahmadinejad. Semati said that most reformers now believe that Khamenei is "comfortable" with the prospect of a Mousavi presidency, and that although he might personally prefer another Ahmadinejad victory, he is now less likely to "push the system hard" in favor of Ahmadinejad. ¶8. (S/NF) Semati further noted that the leadership is currently "firmly" in control and that there is reluctance, even among the "hard core reformers" for any sort of dramatic change to Iran's system of government. At least, Semati said, Khamenei can keep the Revolutionary Guards and more radical fringe elements of the body politic in check. Khamenei does respond to pressure, particularly when it comes from both within and outside of the system. If Ahmadinejad fails to win re-election, Semati predicted, it will ultimately be due to the fact that he has made himself a virtual "outsider" by antagonizing so many powerful elements within the governing clique. Semati believes Khamenei considers Ahmadinejad's hard-line presentation of Iran's foreign policy successful, but that he is also aware of the president's "disastrous" management of the economy and other domestic policy issues. Comfortable that Mousavi will not cross any red lines, Khamenei is prepared to allow for reasonable competition within the system. This Election Matters ¶9. (S/NF) Dr. Semati observed that while it is difficult to predict how the outcome of this election will impact relations between the U.S. and Iran, the consequences domestically are DUBAI 00000174 003.2 OF 003 quite clear. A second Ahmadinejad government would only hasten Iran's brain drain, including among the "intellectual elite" - the political class who comprise what remains of the Reform Movement. Semati also predicted that a renewed mandate for Ahmadinejad would be the death knell of the remaining qualified technocrats in government. Like other IRPO contacts, he anticipates that participation in this election will exceed that of the 2005 race, but not reach the 80 plus percent during the Khatami. ¶10. (S/NF) Comment: Dr. Semati offers well-informed perspective on the election in general and relations between Khatami and Mousavi in particular. However, his insider's view is limited by the fact that he has no direct ties to Ahmadinejad's inner circle or other conservative elements within the system. In fact, he was told directly by Khatami just one year ago that he is on a "velvet revolution list" maintained by hardliners due to his 2007 fellowship at the Wilson Center and his efforts to get Haleh Esfandiari released. Furthermore, Dr. Semati was perhaps overly dismissive of the prospect of another viable candidate emerging, given the increasingly frequent signals that former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai may throw his hat in the ring as a compromise candidate. Dr. Semati emphasized, however, a point we have heard repeatedly from Iranian interlocutors: electoral politics in Iran is essentially "inside baseball" until the last couple of weeks of the cycle when the list of qualified candidates is released by the Guardians Council. Nevertheless, past elections have shown that both wrangling at the top and building momentum among voters are key facors in determining the final outcome. End comment. ASGARD