IRAN'S ELECTION - KHATAMI DEPARTS, MOUSAVI ENTERS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000122 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IR SUBJECT: IRAN'S ELECTION - KHATAMI DEPARTS, MOUSAVI ENTERS TO CHALLENGE AHMADINEJAD DUBAI 00000122 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office - Dubai, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Former president Khatami's decision to withdraw from Iran's upcoming presidential race in favor of former Prime Minister Mousavi will help consolidate the moderate vote, strengthening the challenge to Ahmadinejad. Mousavi, following a twenty-year absence from Iran's political scene, is hoping to capitalize on his sterling revolutionary credentials and reputation as an honest, effective manager. Khatami's endorsement should increase his visibility, particularly among voters too young to remember Mousavi's tenure as prime minister during the 1980s. Mousavi, though embraced by the reformist camp, appears to be emphasizing competence, personal integrity, and a promise to adhere to the country's laws and constitution rather than running in order to further a particular ideological agenda. Though his election would likely portend greater social freedom and a less confrontational presentation of Iran to the outside world, he has stated that he remains firmly committed to defending Iran's "sovereignty" and lauds the country's "irreversible accomplishments" in nuclear technology as a prime example of the Islamic Revolution's righteousness. Iranian elections are notoriously difficult to predict, and key elements - including the final list of candidates and the effect of Mousavi's historically contentious relationship with Supreme Leader Khamenei - remain unclear. However, it is reasonable to surmise that a Mousavi candidacy actively supported by Khatami will present a formidable challenge to Ahmadinejad, whose grip on power seemingly rests on Khamenei's support. End summary. ¶2. (C/NF) Former president Mohammad Khatami announced his withdrawal from the race for Iran's tenth presidential election with a March 17 statement on his campaign website Yaari News in which he also pledged to support former prime minister Mir Hussein Mousavi, who publicly announced his own candidacy March ¶10. By exiting the race, Khatami is making good on earlier pledges to reduce the number of viable reformist candidates so as to avoid splitting the moderate vote. While the reasoning behind his decision is currently subject to robust speculation across Iran's political spectrum, the move undoubtedly reflects Khatami's personal ambivalence about running for office again and his determination to see incumbent President Ahmadinejad defeated. ¶3. (C/NF) Whatever the rationale, Khatami's withdrawal and subsequent endorsement will be a significant boon to Mousavi's candidacy, especially if Khatami is able to deliver substantial numbers of young voters to Mousavi. The 67-year old former prime minister (1981-89) returned to public politics after a twenty-year absence March 10 by officially announcing his candidacy for Iran's tenth presidential election with a promise to return Iran to the "pure Islamic values" envisioned by former Supreme Leader Khomeini. While little is known about Mousavi's current views on specific policy issues, he is generally favorably regarded, especially by older Iranians who remember him as an honest, capable manager during the Iran-Iraq War. As a result of his long absence from the public political scene however, he lacks the name recognition of Khatami or incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, particularly among Iran's youth. (Note: The minimum voting age in Iran is 15. Voters between 15 and 30 years of age comprise about half of the country's eligible voters.) ¶4. (C/NF) Admirers of Mousavi claim that his withdrawal from political life in 1989 further burnished his image among many Iranians, who view him as "untainted" and "uncorrupted" in comparison with many contemporary political figures who are seen as having personally profited from their government positions. He is also admired by older Iranians who remember his willingness to stand up to now Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini, who served as president during much of Mousavi's tenure as prime minister. Numerous IRPO contacts have been quick to draw this distinction between Khatami and Mousavi, contrasting the former president's perceived weakness vis-`-vis Khamenei and other hardline elements of the regime with the collective memory of Mousavi's willingness as prime minister to challenge and/or circumvent then-president Khamenei. DUBAI 00000122 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C/NF) In recent public comments, including a speech at the University of Tehran earlier this month and the announcement of his candidacy, Mousavi played up these attributes, signaling that his campaign will focus on his dated but proven record of managerial competence and personal integrity. In a thinly veiled critique of Ahmadinejad, Mousavi assailed government officials prone to using "illegal means" and circumventing the country's laws and constitution to achieve their goals, no matter how well intentioned. Not only are such actions a violation of public trust, he asserted while announcing his run for office, but also a "denial of common sense." With such comments, Mousavi is attempting to capitalize on the increasingly loud chorus of critics of Ahmadinejad's management of the economy and alleged misappropriation of a billion dollars' worth of oil revenue, even from former allies in the Majles. ¶6. (C/NF) Mousavi is also trying to undermine Ahmadinejad's appeal through "guilt by association" with repeated attacks on his previous and current interior ministers -- the former was forced from office for faking a doctoral degree from Oxford and the latter, former Revolutionary Guard Commander Sadeq Mahsouli, is known as the "billionaire general." In an effort to highlight his own revolutionary credentials, in multiple recent public statements Mousavi has referenced his friendships with highly respected IRGC commanders killed during the Iran-Iraq War and contrasted their sacrifices with Mahsouli and others who have "abused their positions of public trust" to enrich themselves and their families at the expense of the Iranian people. To further bolster his argument that he best represents the true values of the Islamic Revolution, he frequently draws attention to his humble lifestyle. Supporters have been quick to highlight biographical details that illustrate Mousavi's "man of the people" appeal: he has lived in Naziabad, a poor district in South Tehran that was heavily bombarded by the Iraqis during the war, since the 1980s; after his tenure as prime minister he returned to private life as a painter and architect; none of his three children has tried to capitalize on their family name, etc. ¶7. (C/NF) Despite Mousavi's generally positive reputation, middle income and wealthy Iranians are quick to recall his war-time nickname "Mister Coupon" for the rationing system imposed during shortages in the 1980s. Although Iranians opinion leaders generally speculate that his policy views have "evolved" since the revolutionary period, his recent statement include frequent references to the need to form a proper "Islamic economy," merging populist and socialist-like economics with national underpinnings in another direct challenge to Ahmadinejad for lower-income voters. During a February press conference, Mousavi pointed to a "Buy America" clause in the U.S.'s economic stimulus package as an example of how governments should act in the national interest "even if the rules violate WTO safeguards." ¶8. (C/NF) Reformers have embraced Mousavi as one of their own, despite the fact that he was apparently not involved in the intellectual origins of the movement in the mid-90s. A recent editorial in the reformist daily Etemad cited Mousavi's "belief in the supremacy of law" as the most important trait binding him to the reform movement. Multiple IRPO contacts have cautioned against assuming that Khatami and Mousavi are ideologically interchangeable, however. One well-established IRPO contact observed that while a Mousavi presidency would likely witness the return to an era of greater freedom of expression domestically and a less confrontational external approach, he is a staunch nationalist who remains committed to the goals of the Islamic Revolution as interpreted by Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, during the announcement of his candidacy Mousavi pointed to Iran's "irreversible achievements" in developing nuclear technology in the face of Western opposition as a prime example of Iran's ability to "succeed on its own." DUBAI 00000122 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C/NF) Perhaps the most important unanswered question about Mousavi is the current state of his relationship with Supreme Leader Khamenei. While the leader does not select the winner per se, he can exercise significant influence over the final outcome, particularly in a relatively close election. Conventional wisdom holds that Khamenei still harbors resentment of Mousavi from their unusually public political rivalry in the 1980s and would likely be unwilling to allow someone with the fortitude to challenge him attain the presidency. Yet, despite his withdrawal from political life twenty years ago, Mousavi has been repeatedly appointed to the Expediency Council since 1989, an indication that while perhaps not an ally of Khamenei, he is still a member of the regime establishment and has not crossed any red-lines with the Supreme Leader. ¶10. (C/NF) Comment: Iranian elections are notoriously difficult to predict and internal maneuvering up to and through the Guardians Council vetting process in late May will no doubt alter the political landscape in advance of the June 12 election. Khatami's withdrawal and endorsement of Mir Hussein Mousavi, however, provides a significant boost to the reform-oriented, moderate camp. The reformers in 2005 were unable to unite behind a single candidate; if they can do so behind Mousavi, their electoral prospects would certainly increase. Khatami, if he campaigns for Mousavi, can help increase the former Prime Minister's name recognition among Iranian youth. Mousavi too has impeccable revolutionary credentials and his past ties to Khomeini will make it difficult for the Guardian Council to reject his qualifications-a scenario IRPO contacts deem unlikely. And Mousavi is clearly making a concerted effort to "out-Ahmadinejad" Ahmadinejad by blending economic populism, a return to "pure" Islamic values, fierce nationalism with his own record of competent management-an area where Ahmadinejad is vulnerable. ¶11. (C/NF) Comment (contd.): Still, Mousavi's candidacy faces several key challenges, not least of which is his poor relationship with Khamenei. The Supreme Leader's continued support for Ahmadinejad, and reported opposition to Khatami's candidacy, suggests he wants a more pliable president in office. And the reformist ranks still have two prominent candidates as Mehdi Karroubi has vowed to remain in the race, at least through the vetting process, which ends just two weeks before the election. Karroubi came in third in the 2005 election and is also likely to campaign as an economic populist, raising the possibility that Karroubi and Mousavi will draw votes from one another. ASGARD