IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - MARCH 10,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000115 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM CONS IR AF SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - MARCH 10, 2009 DUBAI 00000115 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office - Dubai, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. [S/NF] Reformist MP Khoeni On Future of Reform Movement: Last week former MP (Sixth Majles) Moussavi Khoeni spoke about his experiences as a parliamentarian and his views on reformist participation in the upcoming presidential elections. Turning now to his views on the future of the reformist movement in Iran, he noted that Supreme Leader Khamenei and Guardian Council head Ayatollah Jannati both referred to the Reformist period (1997-2005) as a "mistake" during meetings with Majles officials and had cautioned that "we won't make this mistake again". Khoeni was in Dubai applying for a student visa for graduate study in the US, and welcomed an opportunity to help the USG better understand the reformist trend, both in Dubai and if/when he comes to the US. As noted previously, Khoeni does not support Khatami, but is aiming for "three or four" years down the road, when he suggests Abdollah Nouri would be the best candidate to lead a resurgent reformist movement. [Nouri, a mid-ranking cleric, was Minister of Interior under Khatami, but was dismissed and ultimately imprisoned for five years for challenging the validity of the velayat-e faqih.] During the next three-four years, Khoeni hopes to help build up a revived reformist movement from the grassroots, apparently from outside Iran. ¶2. [S/NF] The Role of the US in the Future of Reformism in Iran: Moussavi Khoeni offered as assessment of what role the US can play in the future of the reform movement. While he welcomed the participation of international organizations in the reformists' quest to establish human rights and the rule of law in Iran, he cautioned that "strong outside pressure" would not help. "Such pressure may be able to change the regime, but will not be able to effectively administer what comes after it." Rather, the international community should, he continued, "bring pressure on areas the people need help". He cited human rights as a priority, and added that "Democrats need to affirm their commitment to human rights in Iran". He felt that international broadcasting could play an important role, but noted VOA as currently set up was too one-sided and remote from realities inside Iran to be relevant. He cautioned against relying for editorial direction on VOA staff that have been away from Iran for decades and lack understanding of today's realities. He suggested that VOA engage in greater direct dialogue with the Iranian people about issues in a more "professional" manner. They should not present every issue in "digital" terms, he said. [Note: As an IT specialist by training, he explained that he meant to avoid 1/0 or black/white analysis.] He suggested VOA should allow broader debate of viewpoints, like Al Jazeera. This he added, would remove the stigma facing those who appeared on VOA, which rendered even highly credible Iranians who appeared on VOA into "stooges of the US." Finally, Khoeni noted that sanctions should be better targeted to hurt the IRIG, not the Iranian people. ¶3. [S/NF] Comment: Mousavi Khoeni's advocacy for Abdollah Nouri, who is a leading advocate in Iranian politics for abolishing the Velayat-e Faqih, as a reformist standard bearer in the near future suggests that at least some reformists are looking to advance major structural changes to Iran's political system, including targeting the top of the power structure for major reform/elimination. Meanwhile, Khatami, who has also, according to previous IRPO reporting, has reportedly abandoned his support for the institution of the velayat-e faqih, continues to serve as the reformists' best near term prospect of a return to prominence. Given Rafsanjani's well-known plans to replace the velayat with a ruling council, it appears the reformists have a strong consensus on this core issue - the institution of the Supreme Leader (at least as currently constituted) must go. ¶4. [S/NF] Iran Seeks Security Agreement, Greater Transport Links with Afghanistan: During a recent encounter with a senior Afghan government official transiting Dubai, IRPO Officer learned that Iran is seeking a security partnership agreement with Afghanistan, which would include a specific provision that "Afghan territory would not be used to launch any attack on Iran." He added that Iran raised this issue immediately after DUBAI 00000115 002.2 OF 003 Afghanistan concluded a security agreement with the US. (Note: The parallels to the US-Iraq SOFA/SA are striking.) This official also noted that Iran is looking to greatly enhance its transport ties with Afghanistan, and plans to invest 20 billion USD over the next five years to develop its large blue water port facilities at Chah Bahar on the Sea of Oman. [Note: The Chah Bahar Port/Free Zone is the main port facility where goods bound for transport to Afghanistan and Central Asia enter Iran. Such shipments would be greatly facilitated through the 2008 inauguration of the India-Iran Chah Bahar - Zaranj - Delaram highway project linking the Afghan ring road to the Indian Ocean.] Finally, this official the Afghans and Iranians are discussing a road project to link Herat directly to Kabul through the Hazara region. ¶5. [S/NF] Does a Television Monopoly Help of Hurt Ahmadinejad?: An IRPO contact who is heavily involved in the Star TV Farsi project offered some analysis of the Iranian media market and IRIB. He said that the conventional wisdom predicts that IRIB's constant, positive coverage of Ahmadinejad will help his electoral campaign. He noted, however, IRIB's packaging of the president is unsophisticated propaganda. He suggested that many Iranian viewers will see it for what it is, and it may reinforce their negative perception of Ahmadinejad's mismanagement of the economy. Although the Star TV project is exclusively entertainment programming and may not represent the ideological challenge to the IRIG of VOA or BBC Persian, our contact said the IRIG may feel threatened by it for other reasons. He explained that IRIB generates USD 200 to 300 million in advertising and other revenue for the government. Star TV's backers believe that they can attract some of those advertisers away from IRIB, cutting into its revenue. If they succeed, and hurt IRIB financially, then the IRIG may try to retaliate, he said. Comment: Media access will be a defining feature of the presidential campaign, and no candidate is likely to get as much television coverage as Ahmadinejad. We agree with our interlocutor's assessment that extensive coverage that tries to conceal his failing economic policies may backfire. ¶6. [S/NF] Mixed Signals on Hollywood Delegation's Visit: The visit of an Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (AMPAS) delegation has prompted some curious recriminations within the IRIG over who authorized the delegation to visit Iran. Ahmadinejad's art advisor and other officials demanded an apology for Hollywood's insults to Iran and the conservative daily Kayhan asserted that the visit had the same ill intent as USG-sponsored exchange programs. The visit generally received positive press coverage in Iran and culminated in Annette Benning and the others from Hollywood being named honorary members of the Iranian House of Cinema. This week, MPs summoned the ministers of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence and Security on March 8 to answer questions on who invited the group and issued them visas during a period of "cultural onslaught," according to one MP. He criticized officials for not scrutinizing the purpose of the visit closely enough. Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi defended the visit as completely legal. Comment: As our recent experience shows, the IRIG is strictly vetting any visits with some connection to the U.S. Despite the public criticism of Hollywood's treatment of Iran, however, there was sufficient support within the IRIG from behind the scenes for this visit to go forward. This episode reinforces our view that exchanges with the U.S. remain a highly factionalized issue within the IRIG but that under the right conditions, i.e. no obvious USG connection and devoid of any political overtones, they can go forward. ¶7. [C/NF] Majles Rejects Ahmadinejad's Cash Handouts: On March 8th the Majles voted to remove the clause in the government's proposed Economic Reform Plan that would have redistributed subsidies on fuel, water and electricity as cash handouts to low-income Iranians. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, under the plan some 70% of families would have been eligible to receive $80 per month on average in direct DUBAI 00000115 003.2 OF 003 cash payments. Comment: Ahmadinejad has made the Economic Reform Plan and its goal of replacing subsidies with direct payments to needy families key elements of his promise to both reduce the economy's dependence on oil exports and to provide "economic justice" to lower and working-class Iranians. The Majles' rejection of his cash payment plan will force the president to find other ways to appeal to lower-income voters, who make up his base. The decision also casts in doubt the timing of the removal of subsidies, since the government will have to come up with another way to offset the steep rise in prices for consumers. ¶8. [C] Iranians Booking Fewer Visa Appointments in Dubai: The online booking system for visa appointments in Dubai has availability throughout March and into April - a rarity in recent memory. The consulate has been offering 170 visa appointments per day to Iranians and, until the last two weeks, applicants had booked every opening soon after becoming available. The total number of incoming applicants is also down. Last year, 1,411 applicants applied for visas between 11 February and 10 March; this year 1,044 applied during the same time frame (Only a portion of those with an appointment appear at the consulate for an interview; the figures cited refer to those actually appearing). Comment: IRPO Conoff queried a few applicants regarding whether the visa application process has become harder recently; none mentioned anything accounting for the decrease. The drop may be temporary and may relate to the Iranian New Year (March 21),but Norouz in past years has not coincided with such a drop. ¶9. [U] Window on Iran is a classified, weekly product providing Washington policy community and Iran watchers highlights of key developments on Iran. It is produced by the Iran Regional Presence Office - Dubai. Please direct any questions/comments to Kay McGowan (mcgowanka2@state.sgov.gov ) or Charlie Pennypacker (pennypacker@state.sgov.gov ). ASGARD