Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ROME969
2009-08-21 15:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
ITALIAN REACTION TO EXPANDED CGPCS PARTICIPATION
VZCZCXRO8372 PP RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #0969/01 2331535 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 211535Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2562 INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0473 RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0188 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0802 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3357 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 1913 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1386 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1950 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1799 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0451 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0930 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0570 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0278 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0145 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0497 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1616 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1961 RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0411 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4607 RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0002 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 1596 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0866 RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 0561 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0424 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1933 RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0311 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2594 RUEHPL/AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS PRIORITY 0039 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0518 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0195 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0582 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0115 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0373 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1421 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2051 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3760 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0192 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3968 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4856 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3034 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1027 RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS EWWT KCRM NATO PBTS PGOV PHSA PREL
PTER, IT
SUBJECT: ITALIAN REACTION TO EXPANDED CGPCS PARTICIPATION
PROPOSAL
REF: A. STATE 66632
B. STATE 4610
C. ROME 1567
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Liam Wasley for Reas
ons 1.4 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS EWWT KCRM NATO PBTS PGOV PHSA PREL
PTER, IT
SUBJECT: ITALIAN REACTION TO EXPANDED CGPCS PARTICIPATION
PROPOSAL
REF: A. STATE 66632
B. STATE 4610
C. ROME 1567
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Liam Wasley for Reas
ons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) On August 19, Acting Political Minister Counselor and
Poloffs informed Italian MFA Director for Political-Military
Affairs Massimo Marotti of the U.S. interest in expanding
participation in Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS) fora chaired by the U.S.(Ref A). Marotti
told us he believed that the CGPCS had proved extremely
useful, because it provided an umbrella to coordinate
activity occurring simultaneously in multiple fora. He
thought that the Working Groups had made the most significant
contributions since they brought together those with the
resources and will to tackle the problems. While Marotti
acknowledged that contributions to the CGPCS need not be
limited to providing military forces, he considered the lack
of a clear process for accession problematic. He also was
skeptical that simply expanding participation would increase
CGCPS effectiveness. Marotti noted that China had previously
expressed interest in joining the CGPCS, but the lack of a
mechanism for joining had so far precluded action on China's
request. Marotti also asked how the CGPCS decision-making
process would be affected by new members, who were not part
of the working group focusing on counter-piracy operational
and intelligence support and coordination (Ref B).
2. (C) Marotti also noted that it would be helpful and more
politically palatable if there were more transparent criteria
for membership and for exclusion. For example, he posited
that excluding all countries under current UNSC sanctions
would be a better and more defensible standard, but
acknowledged that Somali participation was critical to
success.
ROME 00000969 002 OF 002
Comment
--------------
3. (C) Marotti's less than enthusiastic response to the idea
of opening up CGPCS membership to any country that expresses
interest, regardless of its capacity to effectively
contribute, may be due to a belief that expanded
participation without clear selection criteria would dilute
the influence of countries like Italy which have made
significant contributions. It is also worth noting that
membership in an "exclusive" body was instrumental in
mobilizing resources and political will in Italy when the
CGPCS was launched. (Note: Italy has one frigate each
deployed to NATO's SNMG-2 (Standing NATO Maritime Group-2)
and to the EU's ATALANTA mission. End note.) Italy has also
amended its judicial procedures to permit the arrest and
prosecution of persons suspected of piracy seized on the high
seas (Ref C). End comment.
DIBBLE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS EWWT KCRM NATO PBTS PGOV PHSA PREL
PTER, IT
SUBJECT: ITALIAN REACTION TO EXPANDED CGPCS PARTICIPATION
PROPOSAL
REF: A. STATE 66632
B. STATE 4610
C. ROME 1567
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Liam Wasley for Reas
ons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) On August 19, Acting Political Minister Counselor and
Poloffs informed Italian MFA Director for Political-Military
Affairs Massimo Marotti of the U.S. interest in expanding
participation in Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS) fora chaired by the U.S.(Ref A). Marotti
told us he believed that the CGPCS had proved extremely
useful, because it provided an umbrella to coordinate
activity occurring simultaneously in multiple fora. He
thought that the Working Groups had made the most significant
contributions since they brought together those with the
resources and will to tackle the problems. While Marotti
acknowledged that contributions to the CGPCS need not be
limited to providing military forces, he considered the lack
of a clear process for accession problematic. He also was
skeptical that simply expanding participation would increase
CGCPS effectiveness. Marotti noted that China had previously
expressed interest in joining the CGPCS, but the lack of a
mechanism for joining had so far precluded action on China's
request. Marotti also asked how the CGPCS decision-making
process would be affected by new members, who were not part
of the working group focusing on counter-piracy operational
and intelligence support and coordination (Ref B).
2. (C) Marotti also noted that it would be helpful and more
politically palatable if there were more transparent criteria
for membership and for exclusion. For example, he posited
that excluding all countries under current UNSC sanctions
would be a better and more defensible standard, but
acknowledged that Somali participation was critical to
success.
ROME 00000969 002 OF 002
Comment
--------------
3. (C) Marotti's less than enthusiastic response to the idea
of opening up CGPCS membership to any country that expresses
interest, regardless of its capacity to effectively
contribute, may be due to a belief that expanded
participation without clear selection criteria would dilute
the influence of countries like Italy which have made
significant contributions. It is also worth noting that
membership in an "exclusive" body was instrumental in
mobilizing resources and political will in Italy when the
CGPCS was launched. (Note: Italy has one frigate each
deployed to NATO's SNMG-2 (Standing NATO Maritime Group-2)
and to the EU's ATALANTA mission. End note.) Italy has also
amended its judicial procedures to permit the arrest and
prosecution of persons suspected of piracy seized on the high
seas (Ref C). End comment.
DIBBLE