ITALY: FRATTINI PLANS MID-EAST MISSION, GOI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000042

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL EU IS EG SY IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: FRATTINI PLANS MID-EAST MISSION, GOI
SKEPTICAL ON EU-SYRIA LEVERAGE

REF: A. A) ROME 32

B. B) SECSTATE 1985

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Classified By: Political MinCouns Barbara A. Leaf. Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

Summary
--------------

1.(C) Italian MFA Director General for the Middle East
Ragaglini painted a bleak picture of the current situation in
Gaza and outlined the objectives of Foreign Minister
Frattini's planned trip to the region to us January 13.
Frattini will depart Rome this weekend to visit Beirut,
Damascus, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Ramallah, accompanied by a
planeload of humanitarian supplies. For Lebanon and Syria,
his objective is to reinforce the need for Beirut/Hezballah
to exercise restraint and not exacerbate or take advantage of
the Gaza crisis. In Cairo, Jerusalem, and Ramallah, Frattini
will be looking for ways Italy and the EU can support
Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire, and bolster the
Palestinian Authority. On Gaza, the MFA believes that
implementing effective control on the Philadelphi corridor,
separating Gaza from Egypt, is essential to curtailing Hamas'
ability to wage violence but finding an acceptable solution
will be very tough. On the specific issue of Syria's pending
Association Agreement with the EU, Ragaglini equivocated,
suggesting approval of the agreement could be still many
months off but asserting at the same time that it provides
little or no leverage right now in modifying Syria's
behavior. In the Italian view, Syrian leaders are solely
focused on the transition in Washington and that the signs
from the new administration are far more critical than any
pressure EU leaders can bring to bear. End Summary.

Frattini to the region, including Damascus
--------------

2.(SBU) Political Minister Counselor met with MFA Director
General for the Middle East Cesare Ragaglini and Levant/Egypt
Office Director Carlo Formosa on January 13 for a preview of
Foreign Minister Frattini's just-announced multi-nation trip
to the Middle East. Ragaglini said that Frattini planned to
visit Beirut and Damascus first, then fly on to Cairo, and
finish up in Ramallah and Jerusalem Ramallah. The GOI is
also assembling humanitarian supplies for shipment to Gaza
and are trying to ensure that Frattini and the Italian relief
plane arrive at the same time. But resulting logistics
delays with the relief flight have pushed the Minister's
departure back from Thursday to the weekend.


3. (C) Ragaglini, who was in Israel when the Israeli
operations began, painted a bleak picture of the situation.
He noted that Israel was clearly intent on inflicting the
greatest amount of damage against Hamas in a compressed time
frame to stop the rocket launches, and -- while taking
measures to limit civilian casualties -- fighting in a
densely populated urban environment was exacting an
increasingly heavy civilian toll. While fighting around Gaza
City was a serious concern, Ragaglini was particularly
focused on the difficulty in constructing a solution to the
Philadelphi Corridor. He said the GOI believed that an
international presence was required to close the border to
arms being shipped into Gaza but Ragaglini noted that Egypt
opposed any foreign troops on its territory. He commented
that the GOE also faced an internal political challenge from
the Bedouin in adjoining areas whose livelihoods would be
heavily damaged by any serious effort at cracking down on
cross border smuggling.


4. (C) Ragaglini noted that preventing the placement of a
multilateral force on the Philadelphi corridor was also a
critical goal for Hamas. Effective control of the border
zone would limit Hamas' access to weaponry and render its
strategy of armed harassment of Israel difficult to sustain.
Ragaglini claimed that Hamas was amenable to the idea of a
force of exclusively Turkish troops along the border, and
that Turkey seemed interested, but that HAMAS would not agree
to EU member state participation a la UNIFIL. One of the few
tools that Italy believes may be helpful is reactivating and
expanding the suspended EU mission at the Rafah border
crossing. Ragaglini noted that there was already an existing

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agreement among the EU, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority
for the mission. Reactivating the mission -- which was
suspended in 2007 when Hamas took over Gaza -- with the
active participation of the Palestinian Authorities would
provide an international presence in the border area and not
legitimize Hamas, which he agreed with us was a situation to
be avoided at all costs.

Message to Lebanese: Stay Out of the Fray
--------------


5. (C) Frattini's objective in visiting Lebanon, according
to Ragaglini, is to encourage all parties "to hold it
together" and not get drawn into the conflict in Gaza. He
noted that he saw no indication that Iran or Syria had an
interest in stimulating Hezballah involvement, and that thus
far Hezballah seemed to content to stay on the sidelines.

Syria: No EU Leverage, Eyes on Washington
--------------


6. (C) Ragaglini noted that Damascus had certain
"psychological difficulties" in coming to terms with Lebanese
sovereignty but he believed that a unified international
community would incrementally make Syria adjust to the new
reality. Pol M/C used the Syria discussion to make Ref B
points on our desire to see the EU hold off on any further
moves toward signing the pending Association Agreement with
Damascus. In response, both Ragaglini and Formosa downplayed
the significance of the agreement, noting that it was only
initialed, could take months if not a year of technical work,
and argued that in any case it could be suspended by any
member state at any point for any reason. Despite pointed
questioning, Ragaglini would not be pinned down as to the GOI
position, but said he did not believe that halting the
process now would represent meaningful pressure on Syria. He
and Formosa added that Syrian officials had been clear
repeatedly that "they could live without the agreement."


7. (C) Ragaglini went on to minimize the influence Rome (or
any other EU state, for that matter) had with Damascus at
this point, given that the SARG was keenly and exclusively
focused on what the new U.S. administration would do. This
message had been rendered loudly and clearly to the GOI
during all their recent interactions with Syrian officials.
Responding to Pol M/C's comment that Syria had done nothing
-- had not dispatched an ambassador to Beirut, had blocked
IAEA access to its suspect nuclear site, had balked at
beginning border demarcation with Lebanon, continued to
provide aid and comfort to Hamas leadership -- to signal it
was ready to deal in a new spirit (with Washington or anyone
else),Ragaglini commented that "they are not the Swiss," the
calculus is different. They will expect to strike deals and
make compromises when they sit down at the same table with
the U.S. but will offer nothing up in advance, not even as a
signal. That said, Ragaglini assured us that Frattini would
deliver "the right message" in Damascus on the un-kept
commitments, and would urge the SARG to exercise influence on
HAMAS leadership to come to a workable cease-fire deal with
the Egyptians


8. (C) Comment: The Italians are palpably straining to find
a useful role in bringing the Gaza conflict to an end.
Israeli Ambassador to Rome Gideon Meir told the Ambassador in
a farewell call this week that he had advised FM Livni to
come to Rome at the first opportunity, to both acknowledge
the strong rhetorical stance the GOI has taken in defense of
Israeli actions, as well as to manage the lurching desire of
the GOI "to do something." On the other hand, while the MFA
would not say so, it is clear the GOI does not want to play
hardball with Damascus on the Association Agreement, and
believes it is well within the mainstream of the EU in taking
this position.
SPOGLI