G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 001240 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM UNSC KNNP KSUM SUBJECT: G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING ROME 00001240 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Liam Wasley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The last Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG) meeting of Italy's G8 Presidency was held October 28 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Rome. Chaired by Minister Filippo Formica, deputy director of the MFA's Office of Multilateral Political Affairs, the agenda covered regional issues (Iran, DPRK); Nonproliferation and Disarmament (NPT review process, CTBT, FMCT, and sensitive technology transfer); UNSC 1540; the IAEA Additional Protocol, a report on the G8 Global Partnership, and a preview of Canada's 2010 G8 Presidency. Representatives from all G8 countries attended, as well from the EU Secretariat and the EU Commission. The U.S. delegation was led by DAS for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations Eliot Kang. Threat Reduction Program Coordinator Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins also attended the meeting. End summary. NPDG Divided on Iran -------------- ¶2. (C) During the last NPDG meeting of the 2009 Italian G8 presidency on October 28, 2009 in Rome, directors confirmed their basic differences on Iran, with France and Japan warning that the TRR arrangements risked legitimizing Iran,s nuclear enrichment program and joining the U.S. and UK in arguing that an effective dual track approach must present the compelling possibility of strict sanctions for non-compliance. Russia was strongly skeptical of this approach, taking issue with interpretations of the UNSC resolutions and questioning the validity of intelligence assessments on Iran. Russia said Iran was deeply suspicious as well and wanted &material collateral,8 not just guarantees; this was behind Iran,s pressing for schemes involving immediate exchanges and supply of uranium in portions, rather than all at once. Japan Reports on DPRK -------------- ¶3. (C) Japan updated on the visit of the Chinese Premier to North Korea and further noted the need to recognize that the DPRK had not taken any positive steps and actually had conducted ballistic tests; Japan supported strong G-8 sanctions against DPRK and said China,s role in the effort would be important. DAS Kang emphasized that the Six-Party Talks were about denuclearization and observed that the sanctions were having an effect. 2010 NPT RevCon Planning -------------- ¶4. (C) All agreed that Middle East issues could completely disrupt the RevCon, and on the importance of engaging Egypt to take a more realistic approach. France also said the RevCon could not be a success without addressing Iran. Germany noted very high NAM expectations on disarmament and warned that &there was a long way to go in overcoming very negative reactions8 among some NAM to efforts such as UNSCR 1887. Japan reported briefly on the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) report, noting it would contain 20 points for a new international consensus to update the 13 steps agreed in 2000. (Note: the ICNND is co-chaired by Australia and Japan; it is not official but is supported by the two ROME 00001240 002.2 OF 004 governments. End note.) Japan said the report would be issued no later than January 2010 (we asked Japanese representative Toshio Sano about Australian interest in a trilateral meeting with the United States to unveil the report on the margins of the November APEC, but Sano thought this timing was probably not feasible). Canada drew attention to its nonpaper describing ways to strengthen the NPT and said formal demarches requesting G8 views would be forthcoming. CTBT Ratification; Pakistan FMCT Policy -------------- ¶5. (C) Italy said Secretary Clinton,s participation in the September 24, 2009 CTBT Article XIV Conference on facilitating entry into force of the Treaty had contributed greatly to the success of the conference. He also referenced Under Secretary Tauscher,s side meetings at the conference to update supporters on U.S. ratification efforts and exchange ideas on promoting early entry into force. DAS Kang said the United States was carefully laying the groundwork for the ratification effort, citing the National Academy of Sciences study on technological advances, direct involvement of the Vice President,s office as well as Secretary Clinton and U/S Tauscher, and work on the U.S. CTBTO assessment to help operationalize the global verification regime. The other G8 members echoed Italy,s positive remarks: France said U.S. CTBT ratification could help spur non-members to join the NPT, promote support for a Middle East WMD-Free Zone, and encourage Chinese CTBT ratification. At Russia,s suggestion, there was agreement to explore a G8 demarche to the other Annex 2 countries (China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and Pakistan),although approaching DPRK remained problematic. DAS Kang noted that it was also important for the G8 to mobilize third countries to press remaining Annex 2 countries as well. The EU Council said a G8 demarche would show Egypt that the G8 was serious about Israel and could also be effective in leveraging G-20 membership for India. Japan noted gaps in the International Monitoring System (IMS) in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and suggested that having the PTS and CTBTO press Egypt and Saudi on this could facilitate Israeli accession to the CTBT. The EU Council noted a new EU joint action plan to support CTBTO was needed and would factor in the missing IMS stations. ¶6. (C) On FMCT, Italy noted G8 member efforts to address Pakistan,s concerns and press it to join consensus on the 2009 program of work at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). DAS Kang and the UK rep supported G8 action to reach out to Pakistan; the UK noted that many, including London, shared some of Pakistan,s concerns about a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Germany emphasized that the credibility of the CD was at stake if negotiations did not get underway in January 2010; nevertheless, Pakistan had legitimate security concerns that needed to be taken into account. Germany noted its November 17-18 experts, seminar, &Towards FMCT.8 The Directors seemed resigned to Pakistan,s being too distracted at the moment to make a meaningful change in its FMCT policy; Japanese DG Sano opined that China and others (undefined) were continuing to hide behind Pakistan on this issue; Germany agreed and suggested the United States might leverage its security support for Pakistan. Sano said China was key to persuading Pakistan, and because of this the P5 might be more effective than the G8. Sensitive Technology Transfers and NSG -------------- ¶7. (C) On transfers of sensitive technology and the NSG, Germany lamented the lack of progress in the NSG on the criterai approach. Japan cited very intensive NSG ROME 00001240 003.2 OF 004 discussions on the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply and reiterated that while Argentina and Brazil claimed special status, such status should be temporary and no other countries should have such consideration. Russia said the NSG decision had been incorporated in Russian legislation and that paragraph 7 was the best outcome that could have been achieved; in addition, it was not acceptable for Turkey to receive sensitive technology. France cited the vacuum in NSG rules, so that the L,Aquila language on this was key. DAS Kang reported on U.S. outreach to Turkey (Kang) and South Africa (Einhorn). He said Turkey had very ambitious plans for civil nuclear energy. Suppliers need to make clear that Turkey cannot ask for the impossible. Kang noted that nuclear fuel assurances could help. In this regard, Russia,s excellent proposal in Vienna was potentially very helpful. ¶8. (C) Canada said the black box approach was hard to accept; but Canada joined consensus and hoped in the future it would develop its own enrichment technology. However, Canada observed that the timing of attempts to restrict transfers of ENR before the NPT RevCon was perhaps not very good and would send the wrong signal. Russia noted recent talks with South Africa, in which they indicated they could move ahead on the criteria approach after the NPT RevCon. UNSCR 1540 -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On UNSCR 1540, Italy recalled the Comprehensive Review held in New York in September, at which the G-8 statement had been provided. The Review concluded that outreach activities had largely achieved their purpose, and there was increased focus on country reporting on capabilities. Germany hoped to follow up on the October 22-23 G8 meetings with more in-depth discussions and information exchanges, but not decision-making. On universalization of 1540 and its follow-on 1810, Italy said demarches had been made to all the 31 countries that had not submitted a report to the 1540 committee (except North Korea). The demarches had been productive, identifying reasons for lack of implementation and receiving assurances about intentions to comply. However, cited obstacles such as lack of resources or knowledge and political stability indicated that full 1540 implementation remained a distant goal. Italy suggested demarches to try to encourage greater 1540 activism by regional leaders: China, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, as well as regional organizations such as the AU, ASEAN, and CARICOM. Russia reiterated, although in a much lower key, familiar complaints about lack of support from capitals for 1540, need for higher profile 1540 efforts, avoidance of G8 duplication of the work of the 1540 committee, etc. The UK and United States agreed with the need for even greater profile and focus of 1540 efforts. Italy raised the question of whether sub-groups of experts should be established, noting this had not been resolved. Universalization of the Additional Protocol -------------- ¶10. (C) On universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP),Italy noted generally encouraging responses to 22 demarches it had carried out, with assistance from Russia and Germany for two additional demarches to Belarus and Namibia. A table of responses was circulated. The conclusion of the demarches was apparently encouraging. Most delays were caused by bureaucratic difficulties. However, for some there was a clear political choice involved, such as Egypt and Israel. All agreed the Egypt/Israel problem was key, but Canada noted that Argentina's position was ambiguous and Brazil was likely much more resistant to the AP than ROME 00001240 004.2 OF 004 their official policy pronouncements would indicate. DAS Kang used this discussion to press for increased resources for the IAEA as that organization was being asked to do a lot more. Kang noted that expertise could not be built overnight; with a new DG from a G8 country coming on board, there might now be a window of opportunity ) but a narrow one ) to prepare for the future. Italy noted a seminar on IAEA AP that it is sponsoring. Global Partnership -------------- ¶11. (C) On Global Partnership, Italy reported on the October 27 meeting of the G8 Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) it had hosted with the G8 plus Ukraine, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and others. Highlights included updates on Russia and Ukraine projects, including the need for finishing CW destruction facilities, a Russian briefing on sub dismantlement to be completed by 2012, a French presentation, and Italian contributions to dismantlement of an additional submarine. The October 26 scientist engagement (a comprehensive new approach replacing the previous "redirection8 focus) workshop sought to replace the old fragmented approach with increased emphasis on coordination, networking, and commercialization as a way to enhance sustainability. The group also discussed its interest in continuing geographic expansion of the Partnership, and anticipated discussion of an extension to the Partnership in ¶2010. An October 7-8 Mediterranean Contact Group worked to address Russian recommendations for combating WMD knowledge proliferation. Outlook for the Canadian G8 Presidency -------------- ¶12. (C) On the outlook for the Canadian G8 presidency, Canada provided a notional schedule of NPDG meetings (week of January 25 in Ottawa; week of March 15 in Montreal; week of June 7 in Toronto; and week of October 18 in Ottawa). Canada said it was virtually decided by the GOC that the G8 FM meeting would be March 29-30, so the January NPDG would consider a first draft of a ministerial statement. The ministerial might be focused on targeted outreach involving key non-G8 players. Russia asked about a separate nonproliferation/disarmament document at the summit. Canada said probably there would be one, but the GOC had not yet decided. Canada stressed that the ministerial would probably seek to be involved in the preparations for the NPT RevCon. Russia also asked about the structure of an FM statement; Canada said its consultations on the margins of the UNGA revealed interest in nonproliferation as an area of focus for the 2010 summit. ¶13. (SBU) DAS Kang has cleared this cable. THORNE