Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ROME1131
2009-10-05 11:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
ITALY SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE BURMA POLICY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001131
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (SCHEIBE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT BM
SUBJECT: ITALY SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE BURMA POLICY
REVIEW
REF: SECSTATE 100518
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor J. Liam Wasley for r
easons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001131
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (SCHEIBE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT BM
SUBJECT: ITALY SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE BURMA POLICY
REVIEW
REF: SECSTATE 100518
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor J. Liam Wasley for r
easons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: POLOFF delivered reftel points on October 1
to Fabio Schina, MFA Acting Office Director for Asia, Oceania
and Antarctica. Schina conveyed Italy's support for the U.S.
approach to Burma outlined by Massimo Iannucci, MFA Director
General for Asia, Oceania and Antarctica. The GOI's position
is similar and considers the points provided in the reftel
non-paper to be a positive development. END SUMMARY
2. (C) The priorities of the GOI on Burma include freedom for
the more than 2,000 political prisoners (which would be a
prerequisite to a fair 2010 election),open dialog between
the military junta and the democratic opposition and ethnic
communities, and equitable laws that ensure democracy.
3. (C) Schina stated the GOI agrees with Secretary Clinton
that engagement vs. sanctions is a false choice. Sanctions
should be lifted only after real steps are taken by Burma to
address the previously mentioned priorities. Releasing Aung
San Suu Kyi would be a sign of good will and Burma's
intention to undertake serious reform. Schina continued that
effective sanctions should only affect the military junta and
its immediate interests, not the general population. He
expressed concern that sanctions on the financial sector
could impede delivery of aid.
4. (C) Schina pointed out that because Italy has limited
economic ties to Burma, political engagement is vital. The
GOI wants to foster broad European and international
consensus and bring Southeast Asian countries into the
process. According to Schina, EU Special Envoy to Burma,
Piero Fassino, believes it is important to build an
international consensus, including ASEAN members. Schina
opined that if the U.S., Europe, and Southeast Asia delivered
a single point of view on Burma, China would likely follow
since it would not want to face isolation or lose credibility
in the region. He finished by suggesting China's influence
is overestimated. By way of example, he noted friction
between Burma and China over the border clashes between the
two countries in August this year, and China's apparent lack
of ability to assert its will.
DIBBLE
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (SCHEIBE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT BM
SUBJECT: ITALY SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE BURMA POLICY
REVIEW
REF: SECSTATE 100518
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor J. Liam Wasley for r
easons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: POLOFF delivered reftel points on October 1
to Fabio Schina, MFA Acting Office Director for Asia, Oceania
and Antarctica. Schina conveyed Italy's support for the U.S.
approach to Burma outlined by Massimo Iannucci, MFA Director
General for Asia, Oceania and Antarctica. The GOI's position
is similar and considers the points provided in the reftel
non-paper to be a positive development. END SUMMARY
2. (C) The priorities of the GOI on Burma include freedom for
the more than 2,000 political prisoners (which would be a
prerequisite to a fair 2010 election),open dialog between
the military junta and the democratic opposition and ethnic
communities, and equitable laws that ensure democracy.
3. (C) Schina stated the GOI agrees with Secretary Clinton
that engagement vs. sanctions is a false choice. Sanctions
should be lifted only after real steps are taken by Burma to
address the previously mentioned priorities. Releasing Aung
San Suu Kyi would be a sign of good will and Burma's
intention to undertake serious reform. Schina continued that
effective sanctions should only affect the military junta and
its immediate interests, not the general population. He
expressed concern that sanctions on the financial sector
could impede delivery of aid.
4. (C) Schina pointed out that because Italy has limited
economic ties to Burma, political engagement is vital. The
GOI wants to foster broad European and international
consensus and bring Southeast Asian countries into the
process. According to Schina, EU Special Envoy to Burma,
Piero Fassino, believes it is important to build an
international consensus, including ASEAN members. Schina
opined that if the U.S., Europe, and Southeast Asia delivered
a single point of view on Burma, China would likely follow
since it would not want to face isolation or lose credibility
in the region. He finished by suggesting China's influence
is overestimated. By way of example, he noted friction
between Burma and China over the border clashes between the
two countries in August this year, and China's apparent lack
of ability to assert its will.
DIBBLE