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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
09ROME1125 2009-10-02 15:28:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY: REACTION TO REPORT OF QOM URANIUM

Tags:   PGOV PREL IR KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA 
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DE RUEHRO #1125 2751528
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021528Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2735
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3824
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0255
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 4035
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0175
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001125 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA
SUBJECT: ITALY: REACTION TO REPORT OF QOM URANIUM

ENRICHMENT FACILITY

REF: STATE 99897

Classified By: DCM Elizabeth L Dibble for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (C) Post delivered reftel points to Minister Filippo
Formica, Deputy Director General for Multilateral Political
Cooperation, accompanied by the French Political Counselor to
Rome, and a political officer from the UK Embassy.
After presenting points, we emphasized the U.S. desire to
work fully in synch with the GOI and to have full GOI public
support for the position outlined. Post also shared points
with Political Director De Bernardin. We will follow up
jointly with French and UK colleagues with the Iran office
director.



2. (C) Formica, a non proliferation expert who has worked
Iran sanctions issues for some years, said he looked forward
to the prospect of undertaking future efforts together with
us. The only option at this point, he said, is the "dual
track" option we are pursuing (post had briefed Formica
earlier in the day on the October 7th experts meeting in
Washington). He said there was no alternative but to
consider sanctions at some point. He said he also looked
forward to the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and to
the Oct 1 P5 1 meeting, and was optimistic that a serious
process was getting started. He noted that it was important
to keep in mind that the choice of moving toward a nuclear
weapon was not irreversible, as we had seen in the case of
Kazakhstan and others.



3. (C) Formica had questions as to our estimation of when
the site near Qom was begun, and whether in our view Iran was
implementing the Additional Protocol at that time.



4. (SBU) Regarding public statements, on September 25, in
response to the report of Iran's covert uranium enrichment
plant near the city of Qom, Prime Minister Berlusconi's
Office issued a statement saying that Italy "associates
itself with the statements by President Obama, UK PM Brown
and French President Sarkozy this morning on Iran's new
illegal nuclear enrichment plant." The statement went on to
say that "Italy is against Iran developing a military nuclear
program and hopes Tehran will shed full light on its nuclear
program, as requested by the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the UN Security Council. The Italian Government
hopes that the upcoming round of negotiations that will begin
on October 1 will shed light also on this point, and that on
that occasion, Iran will begin to show concretely its
willingness to negotiate on the nuclear issue and on other
topical, sensitive international issues."



5. (SBU) While the MFA did not issue a statement at that
time, following Tehran's test missile launch, FM Frattini
publicly commented that "Iran must stop its missile testing,
thereby proving its good faith and willingness to dialogue
and collaborate with the IC on the eve of the Geneva talks.
It is not through missiles or nuclear threats that Tehran
will see its regional and international role recognized and
be able to guarantee its people's prosperity... Iran must
respond to the IC's outstretched hand with the hand of
dialogue, not with missile threats."


End text.
THORNE