UNIFIL: ITALY LOOKING FOR A SIGNAL FROM US

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001119 NOFORN SIPDIS NEA/ELA FOR MATT IRWIN IO/UNP FOR MICHAEL GARUCKIS OSD FOR MAGGIE SADOWSKA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS KPKO IT LE IS SUBJECT: UNIFIL: ITALY LOOKING FOR A SIGNAL FROM US REF: A. BEIRUT 1051 ¶B. LEAF-IRWIN EMAILS 9/24-25/09 ¶C. ROME DAILY REPORT 9/9/09 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Elizabeth Dibble for Reasons 1.4 (B) a nd (D) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. We have a window -- albeit one that is beginning to close -- to reverse an evolving decision by the GOI to cut its posture in UNIFIL by nearly half as it cedes the command to Spain. The decision comes as the GOI looks for ways to trim its budget while maintaining funding for its Afghanistan mission (its number one overseas military priority) in its upcoming decree renewing overseas military missions, which it must present to Parliament by the end of October. Post believes that Italy can find the political will and financial means to maintain both the UNIFIL and ISAF missions at full strength and should be strongly urged to do so. The UNIFIL decision, which is driven largely by the aversion in the center-right political elite towards the mission (stood up in 2006 by the center-left Prodi government),could be forestalled in part by picking up on the (very convenient) recent request by Lebanon that the GOI seek a one-year rollover of General Graziano's mandate. Senior MFA and MOD career officials, dismayed at the readiness of some in the cabinet to gut the UNIFIL mission, have reached out to Embassy Rome and to the Department to seek our help in reversing the decision. These officials tell us that a one-year roll-over would be unrealistic, but that the GOI would likely be responsive to requests from the UN, the U.S. and Israel to stay on for a six-month rollover, to provide Lebanese PM-designate Hariri some continuity as he seeks to form and sustain a stable government. As importantly, according to these officials, this would buy time for a concerted push to get Italian political-level buy-in for maintaining Italian troop levels at or near their current posture. Any approach on our part -- which should be balanced by the need to keep the Italians focused on Afghanistan -- should be aimed directly at FM Frattini, MOD La Russa and NSA Archi in order to overcome effectively both the ever-persistent GOI desire to cut defense expenditures as well as the Berlusconi government's ambivalence toward the mission as an ineffective, "soft" mission inherited from the Prodi government. End Summary. No Point in Being the Biggest Troop Contributor if You Don't Have the Command - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C/NF) The Italian military, which currently fields the largest contingent in UNIFIL (2,300),has been under increasing pressure from Italy's powerful Finance Minister to reduce defense expenditures by cutting back on expensive overseas deployments. While the KFOR mission was first in line for a substantial cut (some 900 troops),the military also looked this past year to trim some of the fat from the UNIFIL contingent, currently 2,300. (Note: GOI officials regularly reassure us that the Afghan mission is safe from serious budget cuts, but more USG hand-holding may be required to avoid slippage there in the wake of the recent death of six Italian soldiers on September 17 (septel)). However, both MFA and MOD officials were united in a desire to retain troop levels in Lebanon near that figure, and, until sometime this past summer, had even hoped to persuade FM Frattini and MOD La Russa to support a request to the UN to extend the Italian command mandate. ¶3. (C/NF) We began to hear vocal grumbling from senior MOD and MFA officials, however, in early August about the prospect of ceding the command to Spain, as it became clear that Frattini in particular had pivoted to a position opposing an extension. Frattini, we heard, was of the view ROME 00001119 002 OF 003 that "Italy should end (its command) on a high note." Given that UNSYG Ban Ki-moon had solicited bids from only Italy, Spain and France, and Paris had already grabbed the Chief of staff position, GOI contacts told us that it seemed both inevitable and infuriating that Spain would inherit the command, while bringing only half as many troops to the table. ¶4. (C/NF) MFA and MOD officials told us they were unsuccessful in efforts to get their ministers, Frattini and La Russa, to strongarm their Spanish counterparts at a September 10 Italo-Spanish summit to get a substantial increase in Spanish troop contributions against Rome's agreement not to run against Madrid for the command. To the pained disbelief of these officials, the Spanish pocketed an agreement by Italy not to compete for the command, and offered only a "we'll see what we can do" response to apparently tepid suggestions by Frattini and La Russa that Spain do more. ¶5. (C/NF) As of early August, however, no one in MFA or MOD was suggesting to us anything more than a foreseeable cut of 200-300 Italian troops with the switch in command. Somewhere in early September, however, senior MFA officials were stunned to be told by FM Frattini that the GOI should plan for a reduction of some 1,000 troops. MFA DG for Political/UN Affairs Luca Giansanti (please strictly protect) related to us last week his blunt assessment that Frattini had consulted no one, including MOD La Russa, in coming up with the figure and said it had "nothing to do Italian foreign policy interests" and everything to do with domestic politics - the continuing disdain in center-right political circles for a military mission deemed a project of the previous (center-left) Prodi government. Groundhog Day All Over Again - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C/NF) When the center-left government of Romano Prodi stepped up in 2006 with an offer to provide the largest troop contingent and take on - in February 2007 - the command of a strengthened UNIFIL II, it was widely credited with having filled the gap others were unwilling to fill, preventing a return to war in Lebanon, and helping to restore credibility to UN Peace Operations. Italian General Graziano, who has come to be more closely identified with UNIFIL than any other figure, stayed on for three years - a feat requiring two waivers, which UNDPKO willingly granted. ¶7. (C/NF) The center-right Berlusconi government came to power in May 2008 with little enthusiasm for this "Prodi project." During the 2008 election campaign, many on Berlusconi's ticket - including current Chamber of Deputies President Fini and MOD La Russa, the leading figures in the right-wing Alleanza Nazionale - had called openly for a reassessment of the mission on the grounds that UN Rules of Engagement gave Italian troops no authority either to protect themselves or to disarm Hizballah. Following the elections, however, thanks to appeals from the UNSYG, the U.S., Lebanon and Israel, most of Berlusconi's cabinet - including La Russa - came around to the realization that UNIFIL was too important to tinker with. Giansanti told us that he and other MFA officials (including Berlusoni's diplomatic advisors) had worked hard to turn around the thinking on UNIFIL in the new Berlusconi cabinet. It has nonetheless been a constant that of the three major missions in which Italy is involved - KFOR, UNIFIL and ISAF - UNIFIL has continued to elicit the least enthusiasm from the Berlusconi government. ¶8. (C/NF) Giansanti told us that, fortuitously, the Lebanese government had called in Italy's ambassador 10 days ago to ROME 00001119 003 OF 003 ask the GOI to seek a roll-over of Graziano's mandate for a year. He said that he understood that PM Siniora would make this case directly to UNSYG Ban on the margins of UNGA; based on that, he and Secretary General Giampiero Massolo had decided to launch a trial balloon with the U.S. to suggest Italy's notional willingness to accede to the Lebanese request. While Giansanti said that a full one-year rollover would be unrealistic, he reiterated what Italian diplomats in Washington and New York have said recently - that the GOI would be amenable to a six-month rollover. He cautioned that the GOI would need to hear the request from the UN, and he hinted that it would be especially useful to get such a request from Washington and the Israeli government. ¶9. (C/NF) Giansanti stressed that while the figure is not yet fixed in stone, Washington will need to make its views known ASAP to Rome. He noted that, were the U.S., Israel and the UN (in addition to Lebanon) to press Italy to keep Graziano in place for a final six months, it would provide space for further high-level discussions with the GOI to make the case for staying at or near the current troop posture. Giansanti offered that the Italian military leadership was more or less on the same page, but that the politics of the issue were driving the GOI to what he and others in the MFA saw as a disastrous down-sizing of Italy's UNIFIL contingent - simply because the center-right Berlusconi government feels no ownership of the mission. He surmised that FM Frattini (who himself is often the target of sniping in center-right circles) simply does not want to fall on his sword to defend Italy's large contribution to the UNIFIL mission, especially when his own priority is the Afghanistan piece. ¶10. (C/NF) Comment: There are a number of ways to reinstate a sense of ownership of the UNIFIL mission on the part of the GOI. One direct way is to appeal to the ever-keen desire of PM Berlusconi to prove that Italy is still a player on significant international issues. Berlusconi (who appears not to have engaged to any degree in the evolving GOI approach on UNIFIL) was very pleased to be included in President Obama's meeting with the top ten UN Peacekeeping Contributors on September 23. In statements afterwards to the press he singled out Italy's UN PKO contribution (99 per cent of which comes from UNIFIL) as one of the reasons that Italy still "counts" in international affairs. A concerted pitch on the part of the UN, U.S., Lebanon and Israel would likely be sufficient to convince the GOI that the prestige of the command is worth the added expense. An approach here will have to engage Berlusconi, in order to give Frattini the requisite political top-cover (and he and La Russa added ammunition to defend both the Afghan and Lebanese commitments in the upcoming budget battle). It will also be important for Defense Minister La Russa to hear a strong pitch on both ISAF and UNIFIL from Secretary Gates when they meet in Washington on October 13. DIBBLE