SAUDI TERROR TRIALS A "WIN" AGAINST TERRORISM AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000921

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI TERROR TRIALS A "WIN" AGAINST TERRORISM AND
EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY

REF: A. RIYADH 1568

B. RIYADH 1867

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Ambassador Richard Erdman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) On June 8, Saudi Arabia,s special criminal court
convicted 330 terror suspects in 179 cases on charges of
involvement with Al-Qaeda and "posing a threat to national
security." Sentences imposed by the court ranged from house
arrest and travel bans to financial penalties and prison
terms, and could include as many as 20 death sentences.
Details of individual cases are not publicly available. The
SAG conducted the trials behind closed doors under Shari,a
law, and questions remain regarding the fairness and
transparency of the proceedings, and the adequacy of legal
representation for the defendants. According to Saudi
interlocutors, the slow and deliberate pace of prosecution
was by design and now that the SAG has been assured a "win,"
in the first round, future trials could see an increase in
media involvement and improved legal representation for
defendants. END SUMMARY.

TERROR TRIAL VERDICTS
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2. (C) On June 8, a specialized criminal court issued
verdicts in Saudi Arabia,s first known terror trials for
accused Al-Qaeda militants, and although no details have been
released about individual cases, media reports state that 330
terror suspects were found guilty in 179 cases. Charges
against the defendants included: affiliation with Al-Qaeda,s
terrorist network, participation in its activities, contact
with foreign parties attempting to undermine Saudi Arabia,s
national security, supporting and financing terrorism, and
defying King Abdullah,s order against joining Islamic
insurgencies in countries like Iraq and Somalia. Punishments
announced by the court ranged from house arrest and travel
bans to financial penalties, prison time and death. Media
reports said some defendants were acquitted. Although
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) officials publicly announced only
one death sentence verdict, Dr. Nasser Shaharini (PROTECT),a
public prosecutor with the Board of Investigation and Public
Prosecution at the Ministry of Interior (MOI) told Emboff
approximately 20 defendants were under "consideration" for
receiving the death penalty. Ministry officials claim that
all those found guilty will be able to appeal their verdicts
and will have access to legal representation.


A MATTER OF RESOURCES
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3. (C) Government officials claim the slow pace of the
trials was intentional, but institutional constraints also
caused delays. The Saudi government initially announced
plans to try 991 terror suspects in October, 2008 (Ref A).
Subsequent reports indicated an additional 1200 terror
suspects would be tried. These numbers were unclear, as
explained by Deputy Interior Minister Mohamed bin Nayef (Ref
B),but the reports correctly noted that many suspects await
trial. The government originally assigned only ten judges to
the trials, a small number given the long queue of suspects.
However, Maj. Gen. Mansour al-Turki, spokesperson for the
MOI, recently disclosed plans to increase the number of
judges to twelve. Saudi Arabia has fewer than 800 judges,
too few to handle its clogged courts under normal
circumstances, and pulling more judges from the general
courts for the terror trials is likely to exacerbated the
regular court backlog. The Ministry also had to construct
new court facilities to handle trials of this size and
sensitivity. Minister of Justice Mohamed al-Issa
acknowledged these issues in comments published by Al-Watan
newspaper March 23. Al-Issa defended the independence and
neutrality of the court, and blamed the lengthy trials and
delays on "a lack of human resources."


JUDICIAL SELECTION?
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4. (S/NF) An Embassy contact explained the selection process
for the terror trial judges. First, the Ministry of Justice

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identified potential judges and sent a list to the Supreme
Judicial Council (SJC),which evaluated and endorsed or
rejected the judges. The SJC then sent the list to the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) which selected the most favorable
candidates from the perspective of prosecution, with final
approval resting with the King. Once running this
bureaucratic gauntlet, judges were notified of their
selection and accepted or declined the assignment.


NOT A TRIAL AS WE UNDERSTAND IT
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5. (S/NF) Although the trials took place in specially
created courts, they appear to have followed Saudi Arabia's
normal court process, under which, a judge reviews a case's
document file and considers evidence in his office as opposed
to presiding over courtroom sessions. The defendant appears
only to present his defense. As a result, much of the trial
is actually a judge's independent review of an evidentiary
file. Embassy sources indicated the MOI sought credible
prosecutions under Shari'a law of the most violent,
unrepentant defendants, to build public confidence in the
trials as well as alleviate MOI's own distrust of the
judiciary (Ref A).


A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION?
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6. (C) Saudi law provides defendants a right to "seek the
assistance of a lawyer or representative...during the
investigation and trial stages." However, the law does not
provide for court-appointed counsel for defendants who cannot
afford or otherwise find a lawyer, and it is unclear whether
all the terror defendants were actually represented during
their trials. In fact, the accused in the Saudi legal system
often have difficulty finding representation because
attorneys fear being associated with the misdeeds of their
client.


7. (C) One Embassy legal contact said defendants have a
difficult time finding legal counsel in Saudi Arabia because
of the social stigma that comes with defending them. The
Saudi Gazette reported March 25 that a legal organization,
the Lawyer's Committee, had refused to represent terror
suspects. The article stated that the organization declined
1 million riyals (US $267,000) to represent one suspect. "I
will never defend a terror suspect," said one attorney
interviewed for the story. "Terror suspects are carefully
and meticulously investigated and it is hard for a lawyer to
find a way out for the terrorists," he added. "Terror
suspects do not actually need lawyers because they are justly
tried in the Kingdom."


8. (SBU) Senior government officials have been quick to
announce the right of the accused to legal representation on
appeal, but it is not yet clear whether this means the
government will ensure all appealing defendants are
represented.

ARE THE TRIALS FAIR AND DOES IT MATTER?
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9. (SBU) Government officials such as Dr. Bandar bin
Mohammed al-Eiban, Chief of the Saudi Human Rights
Commission, lauded the Saudi justice system in adhering to
international agreements and treaties. However, as recently
as April 10 a petition was sent to the King by a group of
activists demanding that basic human rights be granted to the
991 terror suspects. Some Saudi human rights activists have
criticized the lack of transparency in the trials and accused
the government of engineering the results, but these
complaints have had no resonance with the Saudi public.


COMMENT
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10. (S/NF) The fanfare with which the government announced
the verdicts, combined with Dr. Nasser's comment that the SAG
plans to "make a big deal" of the terror trial verdicts,
indicate the SAG views the convictions as a huge win in its
struggle against terrorism and extremist ideology. The
government's goal, throughout the lengthy and deliberate pace
of prosecution, was to ensure the proceedings and verdicts

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were airtight from a Shari'a perspective, to avoid any
deviation that could allow extremists to criticize the
verdicts, and to demonstrate that that the actions for which
the defendants were convicted were indeed "deviant." The
trials did not measure up to U.S. standards of due process,
but Shari'a compliance was far more important to the Saudis
than satisfying Western expectations. The MOJ and MOI
initially debated whether the trials should be open to the
public, but up until the verdicts were announced, no media
had been involved and all proceedings occurred behind closed
doors (Ref A). Now that it has established a successful
process, however, the government appears to be seeking media
coverage of the terror trials and is willing to affirm
publicly that it will respect the rights of defendants.
ERDMAN