CHARGE,S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH MFA DEPUTY MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000843 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE IR IS SA SUBJECT: CHARGE,S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH MFA DEPUTY MINISTER JINDAN Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard W. Erdman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 24 meeting with the Charge, MFA Deputy Minister for Bilateral Affairs Jindan confirmed that improving Saudi-Syrian relations were being driven by Syria's improved behavior toward Lebanon and Hamas and by Saudi Arabia's strategic interest in pulling Syria away from Iran and drawing it into a more constructive role in the region. On Middle East peace and Palestinian reconciliation, Jindan said the President's Cairo speech was resonating with the "pragmatic" wing of Hamas; indicated that Palestinian reconciliation efforts were continuing but there was more to be done; criticized Prime Minister Netanyahu's recent speech while acknowledging several times that it contained positive elements; parried Charge's push for confidence-building steps and increased financial support for the Palestinian Authority; and urged increased U.S. efforts to "influence" Israel to take more constructive positions. On Pakistan, Jindan said his government was quietly working for reconciliation between the Pakistani government and the opposition and, in response to CDA's strong push for additional emergency humanitarian assistance for displaced persons, said he would raise our request at higher levels. (END SUMMARY) IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH SYRIA -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Deputy Minister for Bilateral Relations, Khaled Al-Jindan, during Charge's June 24 introductory call, described improving Saudi-Syrian relations and Egyptian-Saudi efforts to work with Syria to promote Palestinian unity. Echoing the June 23 comments of his MFA colleague Prince Torki to the Charge, Jindan ascribed the SAG's new policy tack as a product of Syria's more constructive behavior vis a vis Lebanon and Hamas, Saudi desires to draw Syria away from Iran, and the need to enlist Syrian help in forging Palestinian unity. Jindan noted that Damascus-based Hamas leader Mishal's recent public statements about accepting an Israeli state within 1967 borders was one manifestation of evolving Hamas attitudes. PRESIDENT'S CAIRO SPEECH RESONATING WITH HAMAS' MORE PRAGMATIC WING -------------- ¶3. (C) Jindan praised the President's Cairo speech and said the President's nuance references to Hamas -- as an organization with deep roots in Palestinian society and a responsibility to base its policies on realism, not illusions -- had been widely and positively noted in the region. The previous Administration, he added, had oversimplified things, treating Hamas as homogeneous when in fact it contained within it two distinct current of thought. One current saw things as black and white, wanted to re-create the Caliphate, and was fundamentally radical. Their ambition was not confined to Palestine but sought a rebirth of the entire Muslim world. The second current, Jindan suggested, was more pragmatic, more responsive to Syria, and more willing to cut a deal on Palestinian unity. Achieving such unity was essential to resuming negotiations, and Israel could do a lot to make this possible. By contrast, if it took a hard line, Israel would simply force the Palestinians to take a hard line as well. NEED FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY -------------- ¶4. (C) Charge underscored that this was a two-way street and that both sides, if they were serious about peace, needed to send positive signals to the other. Everyone -- the parties, regional players, the U.S., and others -- needed to take steps to build confidence and create a positive environment for negotiations. As the President had told the King in their June 3 meeting, the U.S. could not do this alone. We needed help. We didn't expect full normalization before a RIYADH 00000843 002 OF 003 peace settlement but, surely some modest steps in that direction should be possible and should be considered. With regard to Palestinian unity, Charge said he fully agreed with (FM) Prince Saud's comment to him the other day that such unity was a matter of bringing the radicals (i.e., Hamas) to the moderates (the PA),and not vice versa. In this regard, providing additional budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority was essential, if the moderates were to prevail. ¶5. (C) Jindan responded that the SAG had never stopped providing financial assistance to the Palestinians, while noting their ongoing concerns about corruption. Charge countered that misuse of budgetary assistance was no longer a problem, in our view, and the United States was never easily persuaded on this sort of thing. In this case, however, we were convinced that the mechanisms and reforms PM Fayyad has put in place have effectively ensured transparency and prevented misuse of such assistance. (Comment: We believe Saudi reluctance to commit to new aid is not a function of corruption concerns, but of their desire to keep pressure on the PA to make the necessary compromises with Hamas while still ensuring that any Palestinian unity government be committed to Quartet principles.) FOCUS ON POSITIVES IN NETANYAHU SPEECH, WHICH HAVE CREATED SOME COMMON GROUND -------------- ¶6. (C) Jindan said the purpose of this week's Arab League Summit in Cairo was to provide a joint response to the President's Cairo speech. Charge hoped whatever statement came out of the session would make a positive contribution to Middle East peace efforts and build on the positive aspects of Israeli PM Netanyahu's speech. Netanyahu, Charge commented, was addressing multiple audience and it was no surprise, given the political configuration of his cabinet, that he had staked out positions unacceptable to the Arab/Palestinian side. That said, it was important to distinguish between negotiating preconditions and negotiating objectives. It was also important to look beyond the obvious and unfortunate negatives in his speech to recognize that the speech in fact contained some positive aspects and, for the first time with a Likud-led government, created common ground we can now begin to build on. Among these positive elements were: 1) the acceptance of the two-state principle; 2) the call for Israel to recognize Palestinian rights; 3) recognition that an economic peace could not be a substitute for a diplomatic peace; and 4) readiness to begin negotiations without preconditions. ¶7. (C) Jindan agreed there were "positive elements" in the speech and repeated the phrase several times, suggesting he had absorbed Charge's argument. But, he commented, the negative aspects of the speech had made it difficult to see the positive elements. In addition, the demand to recognize Israel as a "Jewish state" was problematic because it excluded Israeli Arabs and prejudged the refugee return issue. Charge noted he had seen Netanyahu's remarks rendered two ways in English -- Israel as a "Jewish state" and Israel as "a state of the Jews," which was a more inclusive concept. Jindan said the positive aspects of the speech needed to be defined, clarified, and successful explained, and urged the U.S. to do everything in its power to exercise positive influence on Israel and advance Middle East peace. A CLEAR, STEADY, AND POSITIVE MESSAGE CONCERNING A TWO-STATE SOLUTION IS ESSENTIAL -------------- ¶8. (C) Charge responded that it was important to understand the nature of our interactions with Israel. Israel was a democracy, we had an unshakable commitment to its security, and we could not just order it around. Rather, we had to make clear how we saw U.S. interests -- in this case, Middle East peace achieve through a two-state solution and opposition to actions from either side that undermined the possibility of such a solution and that were ultimately against the parties' own need for a peaceful settlement. In this context,for example, we felt Israel was making a strategic blunder and acting against its own interests to the extent that it was undermining the possibility of a two-state solution by pursuing settlement activity. The role RIYADH 00000843 003 OF 003 of a real friend was to speak honestly and openly, and that was what we were trying to do with both sides. In the case of Israel, it was a matter of being steady, clear, and firm and of conditioning the Israeli leadership, political elite, and public as to our expectations, interests, needs, and concerns. If we held firm and kept a clear message, Israeli attitudes would evolve because they knew that working against the interest of their most important strategic partner was ultimately not sustainable. While Israel as well needed to do its share to build a more positive environment for negotiations, Arab confidence-building steps were essential to influencing public opinion in Israel, which ultimately determined the nature and policies of Israel's government. SHARED INTEREST IN PROVIDING URGENTLY NEEDED HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN -------------- ¶9. (C) Asked to comment on Saudi relations with Pakistan, Jindan said that Saudi Arabia had close and long-time ties with Pakistan and that Pakistan was an important ally of both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Consulting with one another was essential, because the situation was dangerous, al Qaeda was seeking to exploit differences between the government and opposition, and "if things go wrong over there, it will have a negative impact on all of us." For this reason, the SAG was quietly working to encourage reconciliation between President Zadari and opposition leader Nawz Sharif, to whom the SAG had given the "green light" to leave the Kingdom and return to Pakistan, once the situation had stabilized. ¶10. (C) Charge said the situation remained extremely fragile. Taliban advances into the Swat Valley and other areas had triggered an enormous humanitarian crisis, increasing prospects for further instability and creating over two million displaced persons who would likely be vulnerable to extremist messages. We appreciated Saudi Arabia's pledge of $700 million at the Tokyo Conference and its recent airlifts (5-6 planeloads) of emergency relief supplies. Nonetheless, the U.S. had provided two-thirds of emergency relief assistance to date in response to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, and we strongly hoped our partners could take another look and do their share. ¶11. (C) Charge stressed this was a very high priority for the U.S., especially given our shared interest in preventing further destabilization and radicalization. Failure to address the humanitarian crisis would almost certainly leave the displaced population more vulnerable to extremist messages. While registering some skepticism as to whether assistance to Pakistan always ended up with the intended recipients, Jindan promised to report our request to higher levels and noted that Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Madani would be attending the upcoming meetings in Trieste, where Pakistan and its needs would be discussed. ERDMAN