SAUDI KING APPOINTS STAND-IN, NOT SUCCESSOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000482 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER SA SUBJECT: SAUDI KING APPOINTS STAND-IN, NOT SUCCESSOR REF: A. 08 RIYADH 1757 ¶B. 08 RIYADH 1748 Classified By: Ambassador Ford Fraker, Reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) ¶1. (U) Key points: --(U) Saudi King Abdallah issued a royal decree appointing his half-brother, Interior Minister Nayif bin Abdalaziz, as second deputy prime minister. The position had been vacant since Abdallah became King in 2005. -- (C) Though the previous two crown princes held Nayif's new position prior to being formally tapped as heirs to the throne, the appointment does not necessarily mean Nayif is "Crown Prince in Waiting," because there is now a new mechanism )- the Allegiance Commission -- to select the King's successor. -- (C) The King was likely driven by expediency. Crown Prince Sultan is for all intents and purposes incapacitated, and the King needed to travel abroad. Someone had to be left in charge. -- (C) Nayif, by virtue of his seniority among the sons of Abdalaziz and his position as Minister of Interior, was by tradition the leading candidate for the job. --(S) Assistant Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayif told the Ambassador that his father's appointment should not be seen in the light of succession, but as "an administrative necessity." -- (U) The King concomitantly appointed his 35-year old son, Mishaal bin Abdallah, to be Governor of the troubled Yemeni border province of Najran, one of the major potential transit points for foreign fighters in/out of the country. End key points. ¶2. (C) WHY NOW? The King had to travel first to attend the Arab League Summit in Doha and then to London to attend the G-20 summit on April 2. The Saudi Basic Law stipulates that when the King travels abroad, he shall deputize the Crown Prince (Deputy Prime Minister) to manage the affairs of the state. However, the incumbent Deputy Prime Minister )- Crown Prince Sultan -- is incapacitated. Therefore the King needed to appoint a second deputy prime minister who could serve as "acting Prime Minister" in the King's absence. ¶3. (U) BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ALLEGIANCE COMMISSION? As in the case of all ministerial-level appointments, filling the position is the King's prerogative. The second deputy prime minister position was established in 1975, when then-King Khalid appointed then-Prince Abdallah. In 1982, Prince Sultan was named second deputy prime minister by King Fahd. However, when Abdallah became king in 2005, he did not fill the vacancy. Neither the Basic Law nor the Law on the Allegiance Commission mention this position. The Law on the Council of Ministers merely states that the King, as Prime Minister, has the power to appoint all deputies and ministers. ¶4. (C) WHY NAYIF? Nayif, by virtue of his relative seniority among the still-living sons of Abdalaziz, and his position as Minister of Interior, is by tradition the leading, and in that sense least controversial, candidate for the job. His appointment was widely expected when Abdallah became King nearly four years ago. The King's failure to act was widely seen as confirmation that relations between the two were not good. Despite rumored tensions between the two, they have collaborated effectively to combat the domestic insurgency mounted by Al-Qaeda and strengthen Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism partnership with the U.S. The Saudi government's strong commitment to fighting terrorism make the interior minister an obvious choice to serve as caretaker while the Crown Prince recovers and the King travels abroad. ¶5. (C) WHAT ABOUT THE U.S.? Like then-Crown Prince Abdallah before him, Nayif is often said to be a strong Arab nationalist suspicious of ties with the U.S. However, the USG currently has an excellent and expanding institutional relationship with the Ministry of Interior. While this is usually attributed to Assistant Minister Mohammed bin Nayif (Nayif's son),this could not be happening without the Minister's full support. Despite his rumored poor health, Nayif still controls the MOI. ¶6. (C) Septel will report further details on Nayif's background and views. ¶7. (C) MIXED REACTION: The country is buzzing with the news, RIYADH 00000482 002 OF 002 with many assuming that the appointment signals that the Crown Prince is close to death, and others concluding that, in the words of one contact, "100 percent there was a deal." A sampling of opinions on Saudi blogs revealed unhappiness among so-called reformers (the liberal Al-Toomar site said the appointment "bypassed the Allegiance Commission"), equanimity from others, and support from some conservative blogs. Nayif is generally seen as unpopular, though in the absence of opinion polls on this issue, that sentiment is difficult to verify. ¶8. (C) TALAL SOUNDS OFF? Prince Talal bin Abdalaziz, a royal family outsider long known for his expressing his maverick views publicly, issued a statement calling on the King to "confirm" that this appointment is an "administrative action" and not intended to pre-empt the role of the Allegiance Council in the eventual selection of Crown Prince Sultan's successor. The King has not commented in response. ¶9. (C) MUHAMMAD BIN NAYIF'S COMMENT: In a conversation with the Ambassador late the night of March 29, Prince Mohammad bin Nayif told the Ambassador that his father's appointment should not be seen in the light of succession, but as "an administrative necessity." ¶10. (C) ANOTHER APPOINTMENT: The King issued a second decree the same day (March 27) appointing one of his younger sons, Mishaal bin Abdallah, as Governor of the troubled Yemeni border province of Najran, one of the major potential transit points for foreign fighters in/out of the country. The position had been vacant for several months after the incumbent had been relieved of his duties, essentially for failing to manage unrest among the Ismaili Shia population there (ref b). The position is a sensitive one, and the appointment has raised eyebrows given Mishaal's youth (he is about 35) and inexperience (he has been working in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) -------------- COMMENT: A SHORT TERM FIX? -------------- ¶11. (S) We are not/not inclined to view this appointment as part of a larger quid pro quo to appease conservatives opposed to the King's reforms. While Nayif is widely seen as a conservative, this is not surprising for a minister whose main preoccupation is maintaining law and order. Most observers viewed then-Crown Prince Abdallah as much more conservative and reactionary than he has proven to be as King. While Nayif has always been somewhat of an enigma, his actions do not support the theory that he is a reactionary or actively working against the King. Indeed, if the views of his son, Mohammed bin Nayif are any guide, he is more likely a pragmatist who eschews ideology, and who has supported the King's efforts to combat both terrorism and radical ideologies. Whatever differences of opinion Nayif may have with the King, at the end of the day the "will to power" of the senior Al Saud and lessons from previous Al Saud dynasties drive them to work together to preserve the monarchy. The senior leadership recognizes that to survive, they must continue the process of institution-building and modernization. End comment. FRAKER