Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RIYADH460
2009-03-25 10:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:
SAUDI MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ON TERRORIST
how-toVZCZCXRO9273 PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR DE RUEHRH #0460/01 0841054 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 251054Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0418 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000460
NOFORN
SIPDIS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FOR JANICE GARDNER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: ETTC KTFN SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ON TERRORIST
FINANCING ISSUES
Classified By: DCM DAVID RUNDELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
Summary
--------------
(S/NF) On February 24, 2009, Treasury Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard
Mendelsohn and GRPO officers met with Saudi Mabahith Major
General Khalid al-Humaydan (Abu Ali). The meeting centered
on the common goals and challenges in combating terrorist
financing and underscored the importance of continued
cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on this issue.
U.S.- Saudi CTF Cooperation
--------------
(S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the Saudi
Government has taken to combat terrorist financing and urged
further progress, while of course giving priority to imminent
security threats in the Kingdom. He stated that al-Qaida's
weakened financial position was not unrelated to the
Mabahith's increased focus on addressing the funding of
terrorism. He identified that a key challenge for the U.S. is
uncovering the upstream sources of funding for terrorist
organizations and asked for closer cooperation between the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia on this issue. Abu Ali agreed that
money is the blood of organizations such as al-Qaida, and
lamented that the Mabahith is not able to find the sources
easily, and pledged further cooperation and attention.
(S/NF) Commenting on specific TF cases, Abu Ali raised Salih
al-Rashudi, a wealthy Saudi who has been detained since June
2007 for providing financial support to al-Qaida. Abu Ali
noted the difference between a donor such as al-Rashudi and a
financial facilitator such as recently-detained Hashim
Muhammad al-Hashimi, a.k.a. al-Tut. Unlike al-Rashudi,
al-Tut was not wealthy and instead focused on bundling funds
for al-Qaida. He described al-Tut as a middle man who likely
collected funds for al-Qaida via intermediaries, not having
direct access to donors themselves. Abu Ali raised Mabahith
detainee Fahad Ibrahim Abdullah al-Khurayf, a.k.a. Salim
Ghanim, also considered a financial facilitator, rather than
a donor, as he was not wealthy. He shared that at times
Saudi Arabia "lucked out," such as a recent case where a
Saudi was detained following the discovery of significant
funds in his tires at the Saudi-Yemen border.
(S/NF) Abu Ali described a natural progression in the
Mabahith: with security gains achieved in the last couple
years, Mabahith turned to financial facilitators; with
successes against facilitators, the Mabahith is increasingly
focused on the ultimate sources of terrorist funds.
(S/NF) Abu Ali stressed the importance of working
cooperatively so as not to "poke our eyes with our own
hands." He hopes to uncover more information that could be
used as evidence in court to prosecute financial facilitators
and donors, in order to take enforcement to the next level.
Lashkar-e-Taiba
--------------
(S/NF) On the subject of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET),Abu Ali
described the organization as the Sunni equivalent of
Hizballah, in terms of its capabilities and the danger it
presents. The organization's training camps in Pakistan are
so rigorous that several Saudis who enrolled failed to
graduate. Abu Ali stated that LET was the only non-Saudi
organization to use Swift Sword's training camp in the middle
of Saudi Arabia. Abu Ali described detained LET fundraiser
Mahmud Bahaziq as a serious threat. Once part of the
al-Qaida organization in Saudi Arabia, Bahaziq was associated
with a plot to contaminate Riyadh's water supply. Abu Ali
asked that the USG look into an unnamed partner of Bahaziq
who works at a medical school in Pakistan that is likely an
LET front organization.
(S/NF) Abu Ali said that from a threat perspective, the
Mabahith does not differentiate between organizations such as
LET, Jemaah al-Islamiyya, and al Qaida - although they have
different titles, they share the same goal.
The Sururiya Organization
RIYADH 00000460 002 OF 003
--------------
(S/NF) Mendelsohn raised Southeast Asian elements involved in
terrorist support, including the Dar al-Hijra Foundation and
Abdallah al-Sughayr, offering the Sururiya organization as
common thread. In response, Abu Ali provided a detailed
history of the Sururiya organization and its linkages to
Saudi Arabia.
(S/NF) According to Abu Ali, Syrian-born Muhammad Surur bin
Nayif Zain al-Abidin (Surur) - currently located in the
United Kingdom - started the movement in the 1970's as a
young teacher in Saudi Arabia by spreading his interpretation
of Islam among students in religious institutions throughout
the country. Abu Ali identified the Muslim Brotherhood as
the "backbone" of Surur's ideology. His students at the time
included future Saudi extremist clerics Safar al-Hawali and
Salman alQwdah.
(S/NF) The Saudis expelled Surur, who took up residence in
Kuwait. IQuwait, Surur contQed to communicate with his
Saudi students and followers. Saudi authorities complained to
the Kuwaitis about Surur's activities, with limited success.
Underscoring the importance of Surur, Mabahith believes he
was involved in the 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca
(nfi). Abu Ali suggested that Surur also played a role in the
1982 massacre in Hama, Syria, stating "it's been said, but
not proven." (Note: In 1982 Syrian forces attacked the Muslim
Brotherhood stronghold of Hama, killing several thousand
civilians and decimating the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. End
Note.) Prior to the attack, Surur convinced Muslim
Brotherhood members in the country to "give up" and return to
Hama, at which point Syrian forces attacked (nfi).
(S/NF) After leaving Kuwait in the 1980s, Surur moved to the
United Kingdom, where he established the Centre for Islamic
Studies and began spreading his ideology globally. Surur's
followers established the Committee for the Defense of
Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in the United Kingdom. Abu Ali
described then CDLR leader Sa'ad al-Faqih as a member of
Sururiya; his colleague Muhammad al-Masari was a Takfiri, not
Sururi. Abu Ali described Surur as a "Godfather-like" figure
who, for many years, vetted individuals who had traveled to
the United Kingdom to meet with al-Faqih or al-Masari. Surur
published the Scandinavia-based radical magazine al-Qiblah,
as well as the seemingly more moderate London-based
As-Sunnah. The latter was used by Surur to criticize Saudi
Arabia.
(S/NF) Commenting on Sururi follower Salman al-Awdah, Abu Ali
stated that although al-Awdah criticized al-Qaida in the
recent past and therefore put distance between him and his
followers, al-Awdah has recently begun reconnecting with "his
people" (nfi). Abu Ali stated that al-Qaida and the Sururiya
movement share the same goal. Mendelsohn added that while
they're working toward the same goal, Sururiya is more
pragmatic than al-Qaida, which makes it dangerous in a
different way. Assured by this recognition, Abu Ali responded
"it seems you understand the threat we are facing," and
emphasized "they don't like us and they don't like you
either."
(S/NF) Building out the connection between radical Islamic
ideologies shared by al-Qaida, Sururiya and the Muslim
Brotherhood, Abu Ali continued, "Hamas, by the way, is
another front for the Muslim Brotherhood. So is the Islamic
Action Front in Jordan. They change labels, but it's the same
medicine." Mendelsohn recognized that Mabahith has taken
measures to confront Hamas fundraisers in the Kingdom, but
that significantly more could be done as Hamas continued to
raise money in Saudi Arabia.
Charities
--------------
(S/NF) Responding to concerns about Saudi-based
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) financing terrorist
networks, Abu Ali requested that the USG share information on
particular individuals about whom the US was concerned. He
said that while it is difficult for him to address NGOs at
the organizational level, the Mabahith is well equipped and
motivated to confront individuals attached to NGOs where
information suggests terrorist support activity.
RIYADH 00000460 003 OF 003
(S/NF) Mendelsohn agreed, caveating that although the USG
will continue to look strategically at entities such as the
International Islamic Relief Organization, the World Assembly
of Muslim Youth, and Hamas as organizations of concern,
Treasury could tactically focus its information-sharing
efforts with Mabahith on the individuals within those
organizations. Additionally, Abu Ali asked that the USG
share information on the movement of charitable funds from
Saudi Arabia abroad, given the Kingdom's ban on such
financial movements.
FRAKER
NOFORN
SIPDIS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FOR JANICE GARDNER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: ETTC KTFN SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ON TERRORIST
FINANCING ISSUES
Classified By: DCM DAVID RUNDELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
Summary
--------------
(S/NF) On February 24, 2009, Treasury Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard
Mendelsohn and GRPO officers met with Saudi Mabahith Major
General Khalid al-Humaydan (Abu Ali). The meeting centered
on the common goals and challenges in combating terrorist
financing and underscored the importance of continued
cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on this issue.
U.S.- Saudi CTF Cooperation
--------------
(S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the Saudi
Government has taken to combat terrorist financing and urged
further progress, while of course giving priority to imminent
security threats in the Kingdom. He stated that al-Qaida's
weakened financial position was not unrelated to the
Mabahith's increased focus on addressing the funding of
terrorism. He identified that a key challenge for the U.S. is
uncovering the upstream sources of funding for terrorist
organizations and asked for closer cooperation between the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia on this issue. Abu Ali agreed that
money is the blood of organizations such as al-Qaida, and
lamented that the Mabahith is not able to find the sources
easily, and pledged further cooperation and attention.
(S/NF) Commenting on specific TF cases, Abu Ali raised Salih
al-Rashudi, a wealthy Saudi who has been detained since June
2007 for providing financial support to al-Qaida. Abu Ali
noted the difference between a donor such as al-Rashudi and a
financial facilitator such as recently-detained Hashim
Muhammad al-Hashimi, a.k.a. al-Tut. Unlike al-Rashudi,
al-Tut was not wealthy and instead focused on bundling funds
for al-Qaida. He described al-Tut as a middle man who likely
collected funds for al-Qaida via intermediaries, not having
direct access to donors themselves. Abu Ali raised Mabahith
detainee Fahad Ibrahim Abdullah al-Khurayf, a.k.a. Salim
Ghanim, also considered a financial facilitator, rather than
a donor, as he was not wealthy. He shared that at times
Saudi Arabia "lucked out," such as a recent case where a
Saudi was detained following the discovery of significant
funds in his tires at the Saudi-Yemen border.
(S/NF) Abu Ali described a natural progression in the
Mabahith: with security gains achieved in the last couple
years, Mabahith turned to financial facilitators; with
successes against facilitators, the Mabahith is increasingly
focused on the ultimate sources of terrorist funds.
(S/NF) Abu Ali stressed the importance of working
cooperatively so as not to "poke our eyes with our own
hands." He hopes to uncover more information that could be
used as evidence in court to prosecute financial facilitators
and donors, in order to take enforcement to the next level.
Lashkar-e-Taiba
--------------
(S/NF) On the subject of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET),Abu Ali
described the organization as the Sunni equivalent of
Hizballah, in terms of its capabilities and the danger it
presents. The organization's training camps in Pakistan are
so rigorous that several Saudis who enrolled failed to
graduate. Abu Ali stated that LET was the only non-Saudi
organization to use Swift Sword's training camp in the middle
of Saudi Arabia. Abu Ali described detained LET fundraiser
Mahmud Bahaziq as a serious threat. Once part of the
al-Qaida organization in Saudi Arabia, Bahaziq was associated
with a plot to contaminate Riyadh's water supply. Abu Ali
asked that the USG look into an unnamed partner of Bahaziq
who works at a medical school in Pakistan that is likely an
LET front organization.
(S/NF) Abu Ali said that from a threat perspective, the
Mabahith does not differentiate between organizations such as
LET, Jemaah al-Islamiyya, and al Qaida - although they have
different titles, they share the same goal.
The Sururiya Organization
RIYADH 00000460 002 OF 003
--------------
(S/NF) Mendelsohn raised Southeast Asian elements involved in
terrorist support, including the Dar al-Hijra Foundation and
Abdallah al-Sughayr, offering the Sururiya organization as
common thread. In response, Abu Ali provided a detailed
history of the Sururiya organization and its linkages to
Saudi Arabia.
(S/NF) According to Abu Ali, Syrian-born Muhammad Surur bin
Nayif Zain al-Abidin (Surur) - currently located in the
United Kingdom - started the movement in the 1970's as a
young teacher in Saudi Arabia by spreading his interpretation
of Islam among students in religious institutions throughout
the country. Abu Ali identified the Muslim Brotherhood as
the "backbone" of Surur's ideology. His students at the time
included future Saudi extremist clerics Safar al-Hawali and
Salman alQwdah.
(S/NF) The Saudis expelled Surur, who took up residence in
Kuwait. IQuwait, Surur contQed to communicate with his
Saudi students and followers. Saudi authorities complained to
the Kuwaitis about Surur's activities, with limited success.
Underscoring the importance of Surur, Mabahith believes he
was involved in the 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca
(nfi). Abu Ali suggested that Surur also played a role in the
1982 massacre in Hama, Syria, stating "it's been said, but
not proven." (Note: In 1982 Syrian forces attacked the Muslim
Brotherhood stronghold of Hama, killing several thousand
civilians and decimating the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. End
Note.) Prior to the attack, Surur convinced Muslim
Brotherhood members in the country to "give up" and return to
Hama, at which point Syrian forces attacked (nfi).
(S/NF) After leaving Kuwait in the 1980s, Surur moved to the
United Kingdom, where he established the Centre for Islamic
Studies and began spreading his ideology globally. Surur's
followers established the Committee for the Defense of
Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in the United Kingdom. Abu Ali
described then CDLR leader Sa'ad al-Faqih as a member of
Sururiya; his colleague Muhammad al-Masari was a Takfiri, not
Sururi. Abu Ali described Surur as a "Godfather-like" figure
who, for many years, vetted individuals who had traveled to
the United Kingdom to meet with al-Faqih or al-Masari. Surur
published the Scandinavia-based radical magazine al-Qiblah,
as well as the seemingly more moderate London-based
As-Sunnah. The latter was used by Surur to criticize Saudi
Arabia.
(S/NF) Commenting on Sururi follower Salman al-Awdah, Abu Ali
stated that although al-Awdah criticized al-Qaida in the
recent past and therefore put distance between him and his
followers, al-Awdah has recently begun reconnecting with "his
people" (nfi). Abu Ali stated that al-Qaida and the Sururiya
movement share the same goal. Mendelsohn added that while
they're working toward the same goal, Sururiya is more
pragmatic than al-Qaida, which makes it dangerous in a
different way. Assured by this recognition, Abu Ali responded
"it seems you understand the threat we are facing," and
emphasized "they don't like us and they don't like you
either."
(S/NF) Building out the connection between radical Islamic
ideologies shared by al-Qaida, Sururiya and the Muslim
Brotherhood, Abu Ali continued, "Hamas, by the way, is
another front for the Muslim Brotherhood. So is the Islamic
Action Front in Jordan. They change labels, but it's the same
medicine." Mendelsohn recognized that Mabahith has taken
measures to confront Hamas fundraisers in the Kingdom, but
that significantly more could be done as Hamas continued to
raise money in Saudi Arabia.
Charities
--------------
(S/NF) Responding to concerns about Saudi-based
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) financing terrorist
networks, Abu Ali requested that the USG share information on
particular individuals about whom the US was concerned. He
said that while it is difficult for him to address NGOs at
the organizational level, the Mabahith is well equipped and
motivated to confront individuals attached to NGOs where
information suggests terrorist support activity.
RIYADH 00000460 003 OF 003
(S/NF) Mendelsohn agreed, caveating that although the USG
will continue to look strategically at entities such as the
International Islamic Relief Organization, the World Assembly
of Muslim Youth, and Hamas as organizations of concern,
Treasury could tactically focus its information-sharing
efforts with Mabahith on the individuals within those
organizations. Additionally, Abu Ali asked that the USG
share information on the movement of charitable funds from
Saudi Arabia abroad, given the Kingdom's ban on such
financial movements.
FRAKER