SAG-USG COUNTER-TERRORISM PARTNERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000408 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR M U/S PKENNEDY, DOE FOR DAS WBRYAN, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2014 TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET IR IZ MARR MCAP MOPS OVP PGOV PK, PREL, PTER, SA, YM SUBJECT: SAG-USG COUNTER-TERRORISM PARTNERSHIP REF: A. A:07 RIYADH 1778 ¶B. B: RIYADH 272 ¶C. C: RIYADH 268 ¶D. D: RIYADH 326 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The SAG’s MOI-hosted Security Conference in Riyadh and the meeting between CENTCOM DCOM LtGen John Allen with Asst. Minister for National Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Naif (MbN) highlight the SAG’s commitment to counter-terrorist activity in the Kingdom by partnering with the USG in protecting its critical infrastructure, especially its energy production sites. MbN reconfirmed the SAG’s commitment to pay all critical infrastructure protection costs of the Office of Program Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI),including USG employee salaries. He concurred any changes necessary in the Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA) be made to allow such payments, but remarked hopefully the lawyers would not be problematic. Regarding the Saudi deradicalization program, he considered it a success in generating Saudi public anger at radical extremists and was unconcerned by those who escaped the program to rejoin Al Qaeda (AQ),noting they actually serve the SAG’s purpose because they delegitimize extremism by rebuffing the chance for rehabilitation and a new life, further alienating violent radicals from the populace. MbN did express concern that some ARAMCO employees posed a threat of internal sabotage to oil facilities due to extremist sympathies. END SUMMARY. OPM-MOI NOW OPERATIONAL -------------- ¶2. (SBU) OPM-MOI, a DOS-led interagency security assistance organization including DOE and DOD, established by the formal TCA signed by the Secretary and Minister of Interior HRH Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in May 2008 to partner with the Saudi MOI in protecting the Kingdom’s critical infrastructure with full SAG funding (Reftel A),is now operational in Saudi Arabia. In the March 9 meeting between LtGen Allen and MbN, LtGen Allen introduced the senior U.S. military officer assigned to assist the MOI in training its Facilities Security Force (FSF). Likewise, we informed MbN of the arrival of the senior DOS officer in Riyadh on March 10 to serve as OPM-MOI’s Program Manager and overall leader. These officers, along with the senior DOE Liaison and associated CENTCOM and Embassy Riyadh personnel, now serve as the core of OPM-MOI who will begin assisting the Saudis in enhancing the protection of their critical infrastructure, with initial focus on Saudi oil facilities. ¶3. (C) LtGen Allen reaffirmed to MbN the USG’s full commitment to the protection of Saudi critical infrastructure, emphasizing that CENTCOM Commander GEN David Petraeus guarantees CENTCOM’s full support to this program. Both concurred on the importance to the global economy of preventing terrorists from attacking Saudi oil facilities. MbN asserted the goal is to prevent attacks from ever being carried out, recommending OPM-MOI include intelligence links in its operational plans. LtGen Allen commended MOI’s success in dealing with internal terrorist threats in the Kingdom, and its successful rehabilitation program with Saudi Guantanamo returnees and extremists captured in Saudi Arabia. RIYADH 00000408 002 OF 003 ¶4. (SBU) MbN was informed that the initial OPM-MOI work contracts, consisting of the DOE Project Specific Agreement (PSA) to conduct vulnerability assessments of oil sites and the DOD Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to implement urgent needs training of FSF troops, have been submitted to MOI staff for approval and signature. MbN was grateful for USG efforts and assured us full funding would soon follow the signing of these documents, and reconfirmed the SAG’s commitment to pay all OPM-MOI costs. He also agreed to fund all USG employee costs, concurring with any necessary TCA changes to allow such payments, commenting that "hopefully the lawyers will not cause us any problems." ¶5. (SBU) MbN had previously acknowledged to the Ambassador the MOI’s lack of technical capacity in effectively working with OPM-MOI. To rectify this problem, OPM-MOI has begun coordination with the Saudis for SAG-funded English language and management training in the U.S. for mid-level MOI officers who will be our future interlocutors. In the interim, OPM-MOI is drafting a plan for MOI to contract and fund bilingual Americans experienced in USG contracting and Foreign Military Sales to work in MOI assisting in PSA, LOA, and related OPM-MOI projects. DEFUSING THE INTERNAL SAUDI THREAT -------------- ¶6. (SBU) MOI sponsored the second annual Riyadh Security Conference from March 2-5, which included such notables as FBI Director Robert Mueller and former Attorney General Edwin Meese. Other participants were U.S., British and Saudi security officials, academics, and the U.S. and U.K Ambassadors to the Kingdom. The theme of this well-received conference was how to deradicalize extremists. This topic was noteworthy as several Saudi Guantanamo returnees had recently disappeared, with two resurfacing in Yemen as AQ members (Reftels B, C and D). ¶7. (C) In private discussions with us, MbN observed it was unfortunate these individuals had escaped and some had rejoined AQ, but stated the Saudi deradicalization rehabilitation program was nonetheless a success and was unconcerned by these individuals. He explained while these Guantanamo returnees rejoining AQ in Yemen was embarrassing to the SAG, the program itself was achieving the true goal of turning the Saudi populace against extremist radicals. These individuals were being denounced by the Saudi public, and even by their immediate families. The SAG was offering these individuals employment and marriage opportunities to allow new, peaceful and productive lives. MbN shared that if the Saudi people saw that the SAG had offered these extremists a helping hand which they slapped away, instead of a clenched fist used against them, then their families, tribes and the Saudi nation as a whole would view the SAG as "the benefactor" and these unrepentant extremists as "deviants." According to MbN, in Arab culture this is an extremely powerful and advantageous position for the SAG as it cuts off the necessary public support extremists need to operate. THREATS - YEMEN, IRAN AND FROM WITHIN -------------- ¶8. (C) In response to his views on the current threat, MbN listed three: -- Yemen was "a dangerous, failed state" similar to Afghanistan by allowing AQ to regroup and become its RIYADH 00000408 003 OF 003 operational base. He mentioned the SAG was using its funds to gain Yemeni tribal cooperation through public works programs, especially as a way to curb the lawlessness along the Saudi-Yemeni border. MbN offered that while Yemeni President Saleh was not the best leader, after 30 years in power, his removal, either through natural causes or rebellion, would leave a vacuum that would further weaken Yemen. He opined that overtures to the Taliban in Afghanistan were useful, as it would make Al Qaeda leaders there nervous and unsure if they would be betrayed, but this would also make them more likely to seek "safe haven" in Yemen. LtGen Allen informed that U.S. Special Forces and U.S. Navy trainers were stepping cooperation with Yemeni forces to counter border and maritime threats. -- Iran, according to MbN, was a greater threat from its destabilizing actions than from its nuclear program. He added Iran currently has many weaknesses due to its deteriorating economy. USG overtures for talks with Iran would exploit those weaknesses and further undermine the mullahs. -- Regarding the internal Saudi threat, MbN stated AQ was beaten down in the Kingdom, but he was concerned of "insiders in ARAMCO" and that ARAMCO employees with full access to its facilities were extremists or extremist/Hezbollah sympathizers, using their authorized access and/or technical knowledge to commit sabotage. Again, he then emphasized the importance of OPM-MOI to provide rapid training of the FSF and detailed assessments of the vulnerabilities of Saudi oil facilities. ¶9. (C) COMMENT. The SAG has worked to counter terrorism within the Kingdom, achieving significant success. Both through its kinetic operations against AQ, to its soft power deradicalization rehabilitation program where it has turned the Saudi public against AQ and violent extremism. Bilateral cooperation on the protection of Saudi critical infrastructure, as previously reported, is of immense importance to ensure adequate energy supplies are available to the global economy. OPM-MOI offers a tremendous venue to strengthen the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship which then allows a broadening of Saudi support on a host of issues. END COMMENT. FRAKER