SAUDI KING SHAKES UP RELGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT, SPURS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000356

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING SHAKES UP RELGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT, SPURS

REFORM

REF: A. RIYADH 302

B. RIYADH 319

C. RIYADH 345

Classified By: Political Counselor Lisa M. Carle
reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Saudi King's 14 February ministerial
and other high-level appointments, with major changes in
education and the judiciary, reflect his long-term strategy
to reduce the influence of reactionary clerics and reform the
institutions impeding the Kingdom's modernization through
gradual changes aimed at co-opting, rather than confronting,
his opponents. This message presents an overview of the
changes; septels examining each sector to follow. End
summary.


2. (U) NEW APPOINTMENTS: In the first major cabinet shakeup
since he ascended the throne in 2005, on February 14 Saudi
King Abdallah announced the appointment of new ministers of
health, information, education and justice. He also
appointed several new royal advisors, and new heads of the
major Saudi judicial bodies, at least 50 new senior judges, a
restructured and expanded council of senior Ulama (religious
scholars),and appointments for the 5th term of the Majlis
Al-Shoura, with 82 new faces, including the first royal,
among the 150 members.


3. (C) REFORM STRATEGY: The King's new ministerial and
other high-level official appointments can be seen as part of
his strategy for gradual but systematic reform to address the
structural causes underlying the country's political and
economic problems. Key to this strategy are steps to reduce
the influence of the narrow-minded Wahhabi clerics who have
fueled extremism and obstructed change.


4. (C) STRUCTURAL CHANGES: The King's latest action seemed
to have three goals:

--implementing his 2007 judicial reform decree, which orders
an expansion of the jurisdiction of the Kingdom's Shari'a
Courts as well a new system for appeals and review of
judicial decisions;

--putting a member of the royal family (his son-in-law),with
the power to implement changes, in charge of the Education
Ministry, heretofore the domain of the religious
establishment; and

--restructuring the Ulama (clerical institutions) to reduce
the influence of ideological extremists and reactionaries and
expand the sources of Sharia jurisprudence useful in
achieving goals 1 & 2.


5. (U) EDUCATION,FIRST WOMAN: The King appointed his
son-in-law, Prince Faisal bin Abdallah bin Muhammad Al Saud
(the husband of daughter Adila) as Minister of Education. He
also appointed another well-known reformer, Faisal
Al-Mu'ammar, who had been in charge of the National Dialogue
Center, as one deputy, and appointed an expert in girls'
education Norah Al-Faiz, as the first female deputy minister
(ref A).


6. (C) JUSTICE & COURTS: The most sweeping changes were in
the complicated set of institutions that make up Saudi
Arabia's fragmented, contradictory and confusing judicial
system. With these changes, the King finally jump-started
implementation of the judicial reform decree he had issued in
October 2007 by appointing new leaders to every single
judicial body and launching two new high courts. (Septel will
provide detailed analysis of these changes.)


7. (C) RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS: Perhaps of greater near-term
significance, however, was the King's order to reorganize the
Council of Senior Ulama. The King ordered that the council
be "re-established" under a new secretary general with an
expanded membership of 21 members, and representation of all
four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, instead of only the
strict Hanbali school followed by most Saudis and decreed
since the founding of the Saudi state as the primary source
of jurisprudence for Saudi religious rulings. This is a
major shift for the Kingdom, and a key step towards actual
judicial reform, since it will introduce more moderate Sunni
legal voices and a broader range of opinions into Saudi
juridical debates.


RIYADH 00000356 002 OF 002



8. (U) KINDER, GENTLER RELIGIOUS POLICE: King Abdallah also
fired the controversial head of the Commission for the
Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, aka the
Mutawwaiin, and appointed a more conciliatory cleric, Shaikh
Abdalaziz Al-Humayn, to replace him. Al-Humayn promptly held
a news conference to announce his intention to bring the
Mutawwaiin "closer to the people's hearts."


9. (C) INFORMATION: The new Information Minister, Abdalaziz
Khoja,had been serving as Saudi Ambassador the Lebanon (ref
c). Contacts contend that the former Minister of
Information, known as a reformer, was replaced because of
corruption. He was said to have awarded lucrative
advertising contracts on Saudi television to his son.


10. (U) OTHER CHANGES: The King appointed Saudi Arabia's
most renowned surgeon and former head of the National Guard
Hospital, Dr. Abdallah al-Rabia, as Minister of Health. The
head of the Central Bank, the Saudi Monetary Agency, was
allowed to retire and replaced by his deputy, Mohammed
al-Jasser, in a move not expected to result in major changes
in Saudi monetary policy (ref b). The Deputy of the Joint
Chiefs of Defense retired, and was replaced by the head of
Saudi Land Forces, who in turn was replaced by his deputy.
The head of the Saudi Human Rights Commission was also
allowed to resign, and replaced by the head of the Majlis
Al-Shoura Saudi-US Friendship Committee, Bandar Al-Aiban.


11. (C) MORE TO COME? The King did not formally renew the
other members of the cabinet, and additional changes, most
notably of the unpopular Minister of Labor, Dr. Ghazi
al-Gosaibi, are rumored to be in the works. We don't expect
changes in the key portfolios of foreign affairs, interior,
oil, or finance, however. NOTE: Senior Saudi officials,
including royals, are appointed for 4-year terms, and the
last round of ministerial appointments was four years ago,
about six months before Abdallah became King. He could have
made these changes earlier, but chose to wait until most of
the officials' terms were up. Also, at the time the
government was focused on its domestic battle with Al-Qaida,
and it is likely the King judged that the time was not
propitious for sweeping changes in the religious
establishment.


12. (C) POSITIVE REACTION, FOR NOW: Public reaction to the
changes has been largely positive. The new officials are
younger and more in tune with the King's agenda for reform
and interfaith dialogue than their predecessors. Jamal
Khashoggi, editor of Al-Watan newspaper, told an AP reporter
that the new appointees "bring not only new blood but also
new ideas. They are more moderate and many are also close to
the reform agenda of the King, having worked closely with
him. The people now in charge are not being ordered to
implement reform," Khashoggi concluded. "They believe in
reform." Opinion among Embassy contacts reflects this view,
though many "liberals" expressed disappointment that the
changes were not sweeping enough. Women welcomed the
appointment of Dr. Fayiz but said a woman should have been
appointed to the cabinet, and other contacts were skeptical
that the King is truly interested in reform. Opinion among
religious hardliners is harder to gauge. The King's
incremental approach favors co-opting rather than confronting
his opponents, and it would appear that the King succeeded in
"persuading" the ulama to acquiesce to his plan. One of his
major selling points has likely been that his reforms entail
expanding Shari'a, a goal shared by the Ulama. (Septels will
examine these changes in depth.)
FRAKER