SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL'S FEBRUARY

S E C R E T RIYADH 000158 NOFORN SIPDIS FOR SENATOR MITCHELL FROM THE CHARGE D,AFFAIRES ALSO PASS TO NSC FOR SHAPIRO AND PASCUAL; NEA FOR FO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS SA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL'S FEBRUARY 1-2 VISIT REF: CAIRO 119 Classified By: CDA David Rundell Reasons 1.4 (B) & (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: -- King Abdullah's approach to the Peace Process is shaped by political, personal and religious factors. -- He regards the Arab Israeli dispute as a strategic threat to his Kingdom for two reasons. First, it undermines the Al Saud's strong security ties with the United States by making them domestically unpopular. Second, it opens divisions in the Arab World which an expansionist Iran can exploit. -- These factors give King Abdullah a strong interest in resolving the Arab Israeli dispute. Like his predecessor King Fahd, King Abdullah has put forward a peace plan and exerted considerable personal effort to win broad Arab support for it. -- Both King Abdullah and Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal have emotional stakes in this issue. The King was married to Aida Fusok whose family fled Palestine in 1948. The King's son and close advisor Abdullaziz is thus half Palestinian. Saud Al Faisal was seven years old when he accompanied his father to New York and watched his father fail to prevent the UN partition of Palestine. -- Al Saud legitimacy is partially based on their role as defenders of the faith. It is not a coincidence that the Dome of the Rock and Al Aqsa Mosque are depicted on the Saudi 50 riyal note. For the Al Saud, the status of Jerusalem is a religious as much as a political issue. -- The King is deeply religious and very serious about his Interfaith Dialogue Initiative. He views it as a pillar of his legacy. It took courage for him to visit the Pope. At some point in the future it may be possible to combine his peace plan with his interfaith dialogue, possibly with a meeting in the most multi-faith city of all. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) INTRODUCTION: Senator Mitchell, Embassy Riyadh warmly welcomes your visit to Saudi Arabia. You and your delegation will find yourselves warmly received by your Saudi interlocutors, King Abdullah and Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal, as well. Saudi Arabia has long advocated greater U.S. engagement in the Middle East peace process and the Saudis see your visit as a sign of the new Administration's commitment to make the peace process a central component of US policy towards the region. Indeed, the Saudis may well see your appointment as a response to the November 29, 2008 letter to President-elect Obama, authored by Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal on behalf of the Arab League, strongly urging that his Administration resume negotiations on a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement on the basis of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The Saudi press has headlined news of your appointment. You will find in the King and Prince Saud willing, though cautious and sober, partners for peace. END INTRODUCTION. -------------- KING'S AGENDA: TIME IS RUNNING OUT -------------- ¶3. (C) King Abdullah stated the Saudi position bluntly in the opening session of the Arab Economic Summit in Kuwait on January 19: Israel should realize that the choice between peace and war will not be available indefinitely, and that the Saudi-authored Arab Peace Initiative, currently on the table, will not remain on the table forever. Saudi and Arab public opinion have reacted strongly to the Israeli offensive on Gaza, creating intense pressure on regional governments to act. The Saudis fear instability and increased Iranian influence could result, and believe that there is a limited window of opportunity for action. US intervention is urgently needed, the Saudis say, and they are ready to participate as partners if the US is ready to lead on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative. ¶4. (C) THE ARAB PROPOSAL: The proposal as adopted by the Arab League in 2002, offers Israel full normalization with Arab countries, including peace treaties and the establishment of diplomatic relations, provided Israel meets three conditions: (1) it fully withdraws to the lines of June 4, 1967, including from the Golan Heights, (2) it achieves a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue in line with UN General Assembly resolution 194, and (3) it accepts the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with east Jerusalem as its capital. The initiative was also adopted by the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 2006, and the Arab League renewed its commitment to the initiative at summits in 2007 and 2008. ¶5. (S/NF) A VIABLE PROPOSAL? King Abdullah will look to you to elaborate on the President's positive comments regarding the Arab Peace Initiative as a basis for moving forward. He expended considerable political capital to win its adoption. As you know, events in Gaza have eroded broad Arab support for the initiative (the Syrians declared it was "off the table") and the King needs support to defend against the rejectionists. That said, the Saudis have cooperated with the Quartet and other similar initiatives (the King received Tony Blair last week). They will tell you that their sine qua non is a "comprehensive" rather than a "step-by-step (read, Oslo-based) approach." Like the Egyptians (reftel), they will warn against the possibility that renewed US engagement would devolve into endless "process." Beyond these worries, however, the Saudis remain committed to peace with Israel as a strategic option. -------------- CONTEXT: FEARING IRAN -------------- ¶6. (C) Saudi foreign policy calculations are driven by an overriding fear of expanding Iranian influence. While US-Saudi bilateral relations have improved dramatically since their post-9/11 nadir, differences have remained over US policies towards the region. In the words of Saud Al-Faisal, "military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan has tilted the (regional) balance of power towards Iran." The Saudis have three principal problems with the US: -- (C) As the author of the Arab Peace Initiative, King Abdullah risked his personal prestige in advocating a comprehensive peace as the "strategic option" for the Arabs in 2002, only to be frustrated by what he saw as US reluctance to engage over the next seven years. --(C) Similarly, in the Saudi view, advice from the King and Foreign Minister against invading Iraq was ignored. Among other things, this affected Saudi willingness to cooperate to support the Al-Maliki government, viewed as too close to Iran for Saudi comfort. --(C) Finally, the US debate over whether and how to engage Iran fueled Saudi fears that a new US administration might strike a "grand bargain" without prior consultations. ¶7. (C) Over the past few years, therefore, the Saudis have expanded their relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India in part to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. ¶8. (C) In rounding out the Saudi context, we would note that the Saudi leaders with whom you will meet are part of a single family, who within their living memory created a new state and named it for themselves. Preserving the unity of their diverse state and their prerogatives as the ruling family are the Al Saud's overriding priorities. They do not want, and can not afford, a religious war of civilizations, oil prices so high that they destroy demand, regional instability that threatens their borders or an Arab-Israeli conflict that undermines regimes closely tied to the United States. -------------- WHAT SAUDIS BRING TO TABLE -------------- ¶9. (C) A PENCHANT FOR MEDIATING: The Gaza crisis threw Arab divisions into sharp relief, with competing summits, ruptures, and publicly exchanged snubs and insults. Yet King Abdullah advocating Arab unity and a return to the Arab Peace initiative, was apparently able to overcome the infighting long enough to be able to claim Saudi-Syrian and Egyptian-Qatari "reconciliation." The Saudis have tried their hand at mediating regional disputes from Lebanon to Palestine to Somalia and Iraq. Success has been mixed, but it would appear that the King is able to use his growing influence to at least bring interlocutors together. ¶10. (C) SOLIDARITY WITH MODERATES: The Saudis have long cooperated with the Egyptians and Jordanians to manage regional affairs, and will continue to occupy the political center vis--vis Israel. The King underscored his support for Egyptian initiatives with the Palestinians in his speech in Kuwait. The Saudis have also expressed a commitment to work with Egypt and the international community to address concerns about Hamas' rearmament across the Egyptian border. ¶11. (C) FINANCIAL MIGHT: Saudi Arabia produces nearly half of the Arab world's GDP and is the only Middle East country in the G-20. In addition, as the largest Arab donor to the Palestinian Authority's budget, the Kingdom retains significant influence over the Fatah leadership. ¶12. (C) INTERFAITH DIALOGUE: Rather than exporting religious intolerance, King Abdullah has visited the Pope and is now openly promoting interfaith dialogue. In addition to his role in forging the Arab League's support for comprehensive peace with Israel, as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah,s influence extends throughout the Islamic world. His blessing -- and his checkbook -- will be key to settling the question of Jerusalem and the status of Palestinian refugees. -------------- SAUDI LIMITATIONS -------------- ¶13. (C) PALESTINIAN FATIGUE? Saudi patience with the Palestinian factions has been largely exhausted since the failure of the power-sharing agreement negotiated under King Abdullah,s sponsorship in Mecca in February 2007. During this latest crisis, the Saudis have been content to support Egyptian mediation efforts, though President Abbas regularly visits the Kingdom for consultations and the Saudis continue to provide substantial financial assistance. Most of it flowed directly to Abbas, but there are indications that Saudis are increasingly frustrated with the impasse (at the Kuwait Summit, the King warned that Palestinian divisions were "more dangerous than Israeli aggression") and may be looking for other Palestinian Authority channels for the $1 billion pledged by King Abdullah in Kuwait. ¶14. (S/NF) CAPACITY LIMITS: While the Saudis are eager for US involvement and will seek to provide leadership within the Arab League, their ability to provide sustained support for multilateral negotiations will be hampered by their extremely centralized system, in which the King himself must weigh in on all decisions of any significance. Beyond that, FM Saud Al-Faisal,s health continues to decline, and the number of trusted diplomats able to speak on behalf of the King is extremely limited. -------------- OTHER REGIONAL EFFORTS -------------- ¶15. (S/NF) The Saudis launched an initiative to mediate among Afghan factions several months ago that has yet to bear fruit. Recently the head of Saudi intelligence traveled to the region for renewed contacts. They say the effort would only go forward if the Taliban accepted a series of conditions: 1) to lay down arms; 2) accept that Afghanistan is for all Afghans; 3) agree that once a deal is struck there would be no backsliding; and 4) that no talks to be held in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have been far less helpful on Pakistan in recent months, reflecting the King's personal distaste for Pakistani PM Zardari. Despite a number of Zardari visits to the Kingdom, the Saudis have held back economic and political support pending, they say, "stabilization" of the Pakistani political situation. -------------- OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES -------------- ¶16. (C/NF) COUNTER-TERRORISM: With our assistance, Saudi Arabia has largely defeated terrorism at home. The Saudis are now one of our most important counter-terrorist intelligence partners. They established tighter controls on charities and the transporting of cash to disrupt terrorist finance. We have signed an Information Sharing Agreement with the Kingdom and started to exchange Airline Passenger Information and Passenger Name Records to help track terrorist suspects and facilitate legitimate travel. While concerns about foreign fighters regrouping in Yemen remain, we can say clearly that Saudi Arabia is now part of the solution, not the problem. ¶17. (S/NF) SUCCESSION: Crown Prince Sultan, who would normally participate in such discussions, is absent, convalescing in Morocco following a serious illness. Given his age (he is 84),his full recovery is in question, and his passing from the scene would require activating the new Allegiance Commission to select a new Crown Prince. The Embassy assesses that this process would proceed smoothly, with one of the King's half brothers chosen as the new Crown Prince. We do not expect this to affect US-Saudi relations, or the Saudi strategic commitment to the peace process. RUNDELL