Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RIYADH1531
2009-11-17 13:39:00
SECRET
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:
SAUDI MINISTER OF STATE MADANI ON YEMEN, IRAN, THE
how-toVZCZCXRO0363 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHRH #1531/01 3211339 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 171339Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1937 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHIC/ORG OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0334 RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0441 RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0056
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001531
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA IR IZ LE YM AF
SUBJECT: SAUDI MINISTER OF STATE MADANI ON YEMEN, IRAN, THE
HAJJ AND MORE
REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1524
B. SECSTATE 115549
RIYADH 00001531 001.3 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001531
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA IR IZ LE YM AF
SUBJECT: SAUDI MINISTER OF STATE MADANI ON YEMEN, IRAN, THE
HAJJ AND MORE
REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1524
B. SECSTATE 115549
RIYADH 00001531 001.3 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------
1. (C) During a meeting with Ambassador Smith on November
16, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Nizar Madani
said the Saudis were "concerned" about politicization of the
Hajj but prepared to "react strongly" if necessary. He
thanked the U.S. for its support for the SAG's continuing
military action on its southern border (ref A),said the
"infiltrators were hit hard," and insisted operations would
stay defensive in nature. He was suspicious of Iranian
support for the Houthis; apprehensive about Iranian nuclear
backsliding; but hopeful Iran was "rational" enough to not
interfere with this year's Hajj. While the meeting was very
cordial, Dr. Madani seemed uncharacteristically rushed. END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
NO POLITICIZATION OF THE HAJJ
--------------
2. (C) Madani noted that the entire SAG, including the MFA,
was "very busy" gearing up for the Hajj. While there was
still concern regarding the possibility of an H1N1 outbreak,
the SAG had taken all possible precautions to limit this
possibility. Politicization of the Hajj was "always a
concern," but the SAG was adamant that the Hajj was a
religious event that should not be used for political gain.
They hoped that no one would try to cause an incident, he
continued, but were prepared to "react strongly" in the event
someone did. "Our leaders mean what they say," he stressed,
noting that politicization of the Hajj adversely affected all
pilgrims.
STRONG U.S. SUPPORT, BUT AL-QAEDA THE REAL ISSUE
-------------- ---
3. (S/NF) Ambassador re-iterated strong U.S. support for
Saudi Arabia's right to defend its borders and take defensive
action within its territory. He noted that the U.S. was
ready to respond quickly to Saudi requests, and additional
munitions requested by the SAG had arrived in country that
morning. Ambassador then stressed that the U.S. still
believed a negotiated ROYG-Houthi settlement was preferable
to a continued campaign against the Houthis, which was a
distraction from the more critical fight against Al-Qaeda.
INFILTRATORS HIT HARD
--------------
4. (C) Madani expressed his thanks, adding that support
within the region and elsewhere for the SAG's defensive
actions was nearly unanimous. Border security was key to any
country's stability, he continued, and the Saudi-Yemeni
border had been historically problematic. Although the
Saudis, together with the GCC, had initially viewed the
Houthi rebellion as an internal problem, the situation
changed once the Houthis crossed the border. He maintained
that the Saudi military would protect the border and "hit
infiltration hard," but did not plan to bring the fight into
Yemen.
5. (C) When asked if he thought President Saleh would be
willing to consider a negotiated settlement with the Houthis
he was non-committal. He observed that the Yemeni government
was facing three serious internal challenges: from the
Houthis in the North, the secessionists in the South, and
"Al-Qaeda all over." At this point, it was unclear how Saleh
evaluated his strength vis-a-vis the Houthis. If he felt he
could defeat them he would continue, Madani suggested,
otherwise he may be willing to consider negotiation. Madani
was "not aware" of how the Yemenis were currently assessing
the situation.
RIYADH 00001531 002.3 OF 002
WHY DID THE HOUTHIS CROSS THE ROAD...
--------------
6. (C) Madani said there were "many theories" as to why the
Houthis crossed into Saudi Arabia, most notably that they had
been pushed by Iran to cause trouble for Saudi Arabia. He
"hoped this was not true," but added Iranian FM Mottaki's
comments raised question marks. "Why are they saying this,"
he asked, "unless they have plans?" In his view, the fact
they made the statement at all was proof of Iranian
involvement.
AFGHAN INAUGURATION DELEGATION TBD
--------------
7. (C) Per ref B, Ambassador conveyed the U.S.'s intent to
send a senior official to President Karzai's inauguration and
urged Saudi Arabia to do the same. Madani said that he had
recommended high-level Saudi attendance at the event, but was
not yet sure who would attend. He seemed genuinely
non-plussed when asked why no Saudi representative attended
the most recent Friends of Democratic Pakistan meeting and
suggested they may not have received the invitation in time.
(COMMENT: Given that the last FoDP meeting coincided with the
Eid Holiday, the UNGA, and the G-20 summit, it is somewhat
plausible that it slipped through the Saudi cracks. However,
it underscores the importance of developing a clear, coherent
mechanism of informing the Saudis well in advance of upcoming
meetings so as to ensure appropriate representation. END
COMMENT.) Regarding naming an SRAP, he requested additional
clarification regarding what duties this position would
entail.
IRAN NOT HELPFUL
--------------
8. (C) Madani said the Saudis still hoped that a diplomatic
settlement with Iran was possible, but were worried as it
seemed Iran was "going back to square one." Ambassador
observed that Iran's current behavior was indeed unhelpful.
At some point we would have to address the issue of
sanctions, and if and when we did, it would be important to
have a single message. Madani would not speculate as to when
the Saudis thought a discussion of sanctions would be
necessary, but said they hoped Iran was "rational enough" not
to try and exploit the Hajj season.
PLEASED WITH PROGRESS IN LEBANON
--------------
9. (C) Things were "moving in the right direction" in
Lebanon, Madani said, and the Saudis were pleased with the
prospects for Hariri's new government. While "surprises can
happen," there was no indication of serious problems and
Syria's behavior had been encouraging.
IRAQ: MALIKI'S COMMENTS "NOT ENCOURAGING"
--------------
10. (C) Madani said that the Saudis were hoping for success
and stability in Iraq and that they would have "no problem"
with election results as long as the process was free and
fair. However, they remained concerned about Iranian
influence. Further, anti-Saudi statements from PM Maliki and
others were not encouraging. "We show good intentions," he
noted, "and we expect these to be returned."
SMITH
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA IR IZ LE YM AF
SUBJECT: SAUDI MINISTER OF STATE MADANI ON YEMEN, IRAN, THE
HAJJ AND MORE
REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1524
B. SECSTATE 115549
RIYADH 00001531 001.3 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------
1. (C) During a meeting with Ambassador Smith on November
16, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Nizar Madani
said the Saudis were "concerned" about politicization of the
Hajj but prepared to "react strongly" if necessary. He
thanked the U.S. for its support for the SAG's continuing
military action on its southern border (ref A),said the
"infiltrators were hit hard," and insisted operations would
stay defensive in nature. He was suspicious of Iranian
support for the Houthis; apprehensive about Iranian nuclear
backsliding; but hopeful Iran was "rational" enough to not
interfere with this year's Hajj. While the meeting was very
cordial, Dr. Madani seemed uncharacteristically rushed. END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
NO POLITICIZATION OF THE HAJJ
--------------
2. (C) Madani noted that the entire SAG, including the MFA,
was "very busy" gearing up for the Hajj. While there was
still concern regarding the possibility of an H1N1 outbreak,
the SAG had taken all possible precautions to limit this
possibility. Politicization of the Hajj was "always a
concern," but the SAG was adamant that the Hajj was a
religious event that should not be used for political gain.
They hoped that no one would try to cause an incident, he
continued, but were prepared to "react strongly" in the event
someone did. "Our leaders mean what they say," he stressed,
noting that politicization of the Hajj adversely affected all
pilgrims.
STRONG U.S. SUPPORT, BUT AL-QAEDA THE REAL ISSUE
-------------- ---
3. (S/NF) Ambassador re-iterated strong U.S. support for
Saudi Arabia's right to defend its borders and take defensive
action within its territory. He noted that the U.S. was
ready to respond quickly to Saudi requests, and additional
munitions requested by the SAG had arrived in country that
morning. Ambassador then stressed that the U.S. still
believed a negotiated ROYG-Houthi settlement was preferable
to a continued campaign against the Houthis, which was a
distraction from the more critical fight against Al-Qaeda.
INFILTRATORS HIT HARD
--------------
4. (C) Madani expressed his thanks, adding that support
within the region and elsewhere for the SAG's defensive
actions was nearly unanimous. Border security was key to any
country's stability, he continued, and the Saudi-Yemeni
border had been historically problematic. Although the
Saudis, together with the GCC, had initially viewed the
Houthi rebellion as an internal problem, the situation
changed once the Houthis crossed the border. He maintained
that the Saudi military would protect the border and "hit
infiltration hard," but did not plan to bring the fight into
Yemen.
5. (C) When asked if he thought President Saleh would be
willing to consider a negotiated settlement with the Houthis
he was non-committal. He observed that the Yemeni government
was facing three serious internal challenges: from the
Houthis in the North, the secessionists in the South, and
"Al-Qaeda all over." At this point, it was unclear how Saleh
evaluated his strength vis-a-vis the Houthis. If he felt he
could defeat them he would continue, Madani suggested,
otherwise he may be willing to consider negotiation. Madani
was "not aware" of how the Yemenis were currently assessing
the situation.
RIYADH 00001531 002.3 OF 002
WHY DID THE HOUTHIS CROSS THE ROAD...
--------------
6. (C) Madani said there were "many theories" as to why the
Houthis crossed into Saudi Arabia, most notably that they had
been pushed by Iran to cause trouble for Saudi Arabia. He
"hoped this was not true," but added Iranian FM Mottaki's
comments raised question marks. "Why are they saying this,"
he asked, "unless they have plans?" In his view, the fact
they made the statement at all was proof of Iranian
involvement.
AFGHAN INAUGURATION DELEGATION TBD
--------------
7. (C) Per ref B, Ambassador conveyed the U.S.'s intent to
send a senior official to President Karzai's inauguration and
urged Saudi Arabia to do the same. Madani said that he had
recommended high-level Saudi attendance at the event, but was
not yet sure who would attend. He seemed genuinely
non-plussed when asked why no Saudi representative attended
the most recent Friends of Democratic Pakistan meeting and
suggested they may not have received the invitation in time.
(COMMENT: Given that the last FoDP meeting coincided with the
Eid Holiday, the UNGA, and the G-20 summit, it is somewhat
plausible that it slipped through the Saudi cracks. However,
it underscores the importance of developing a clear, coherent
mechanism of informing the Saudis well in advance of upcoming
meetings so as to ensure appropriate representation. END
COMMENT.) Regarding naming an SRAP, he requested additional
clarification regarding what duties this position would
entail.
IRAN NOT HELPFUL
--------------
8. (C) Madani said the Saudis still hoped that a diplomatic
settlement with Iran was possible, but were worried as it
seemed Iran was "going back to square one." Ambassador
observed that Iran's current behavior was indeed unhelpful.
At some point we would have to address the issue of
sanctions, and if and when we did, it would be important to
have a single message. Madani would not speculate as to when
the Saudis thought a discussion of sanctions would be
necessary, but said they hoped Iran was "rational enough" not
to try and exploit the Hajj season.
PLEASED WITH PROGRESS IN LEBANON
--------------
9. (C) Things were "moving in the right direction" in
Lebanon, Madani said, and the Saudis were pleased with the
prospects for Hariri's new government. While "surprises can
happen," there was no indication of serious problems and
Syria's behavior had been encouraging.
IRAQ: MALIKI'S COMMENTS "NOT ENCOURAGING"
--------------
10. (C) Madani said that the Saudis were hoping for success
and stability in Iraq and that they would have "no problem"
with election results as long as the process was free and
fair. However, they remained concerned about Iranian
influence. Further, anti-Saudi statements from PM Maliki and
others were not encouraging. "We show good intentions," he
noted, "and we expect these to be returned."
SMITH