FIGHTING CONTINUES ALONG YEMENI BORDER WHILE A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 001524 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS SA YM SUBJECT: FIGHTING CONTINUES ALONG YEMENI BORDER WHILE A "BUFFER ZONE" IS ESTABLISHED REF: A. RIYADH 1490 ¶B. RIYADH 1495 RIYADH 00001524 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) SUMMARY: -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Military operations along the Saudi-Yemeni border continue, with the Saudi military expressing its intention to create a 10km "buffer zone" along the border with Yemen. Media reports of a Saudi Naval blockade are inaccurate, although its coastal patrols have been stepped up. The SAG continues to insist that it will not send ground troops into Yemen, but will strictly enforce the border and detain any "infiltrators" that try to cross. As the local media focuses on Saudi Arabia,s right to self-defense and the "deviance" of the Houthis, Iranian media have started to suggest that the U.S. is somehow behind the Saudis, decision to intervene. While many are urging calm, ripple effects have begun to appear in domestic politics throughout the region. End Summary. A BUFFER ZONE ALONG THE BORDER -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) On November 10, local newspapers quoted Prince Khalid bin Sultan, Deputy Minister for Defense and Aviation, saying that the Houthis had been driven from Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi offensive would continue unless the rebels "retreated tens of kilometers inside the border." The SAG has since declared the affected area along the Yemeni border a "military zone" and issued mandatory evacuation orders. (NOTE: According to sensitive military reporting, the MOI had been planning to create a buffer zone of 10-km from the Yemeni border prior to the Houthi incursion. However, they had been unsure of what to do with the villagers in the area, some of whom did not wish to leave. Recent events have given the MOI carte blanche to implement this pre-existing plan. End Note.) Newspapers reported that Saudi forces had arrested Houthi leader Abdullah Al-Houthi and killed Houthi commander Antar; however, a MOI spokesman denied the report. CLEARING OUT BUNKERS AND CAVES -------------- ¶3. (U) In addition to these operations, paratroopers and Special Forces have been searching villages and caves in the area. On November 15, a military spokesman announced that "heavy and light weapons, maps, listening and decoding devices, a laptop and various other kinds of weapons" had been discovered during their recent search of border villages. According to an unnamed military source quoted in Saudi Gazette, the Houthis had dug a series of camouflaged bunkers and caves in Saudi territory that Saudi forces were methodically searching and destroying. "The forces clear an area, secure it and then move on to the next area," the source said, adding that the time consuming and dangerous work of clearing potentially booby-trapped caves and bunkers has slowed the Saudi military's progress. He said that the Houthi attacks had slowed because they were running low on ammunition and supplies. SHELTER ESTABLISHED FOR DISPLACED SAUDIS -------------- ¶4. (U) While the military operations continue, evacuated villagers have been moved into government shelters in Jazan. Major General Adil Zamzami, the civil defense director in charge of the shelter camps in Jizan, announced that 6,000 villagers were moved into shelters. On November 14, UNICEF reported that 240 villages had been evacuated and 50 schools had been closed to protect citizens from the fighting. Prince Mohammad bin Naser, Governor of Jizan, said that all families affected by the move will receive compensation every week until they can be returned to their homes. Additional information regarding the humanitarian fallout of the SAG,s military operations will be reported septel. RIYADH 00001524 002.2 OF 004 SECURING THE COASTLINE -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Sea-based operations have been stepped up, although reports of a "blockade" are inaccurate. On November 12, local media reported that the Saudi Navy had increased patrols along the Yemeni coastline to prevent weapons and supplies from reaching the rebels. A front page, full color article in the November 15 Saudi Gazette claimed that five "infiltrator ships" were seized by the Saudi Navy while attempting to smuggle weapons into the Kingdom. However, the article also noted that no actual weapons were found on any of the ships. (NOTE: DAO has observed preparations for deploying additional elements of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) in Jizan. Sources indicate an increase of two to three extra patrol ships along coastal waters providing an increase in normal operations. DAO notes that the RSNF will likely play a support role to the routine, but increased interdiction and law enforcement operations of the coast guard and border patrol. End Note.) CASUALTIES CONTINUE TO MOUNT -------------- ¶6. (U) According to local media reports from November 14, two additional Saudi soldiers were killed by Houthi forces, bringing the total number of Saudi deaths to nine: five soldiers and four civilians. Casualty figures for Houthi rebels and Yemeni civilians continue to be difficult to confirm, with Saudi media claiming that hundreds of Houthis have been killed and 2,300 captured. Houthi sources allege heavy civilian casualties have been caused by Saudi and Yemeni government forces. HOUTHIS "UNCIVILIZED" -------------- ¶7. (U) Local media continues to justify the SAG action by highlighting its defensive nature and the "uncivilized" tactics of the Houthis. On November 10, Saudi Gazette reported that dozens of children wearing suicide bombs were discovered by the military. (NOTE: This report is unconfirmed, and nothing more has since appeared in the press. End note.) Several sources alleged that many "infiltrators" dressed as women to avoid detection while attempting to escape into the mountains. Other reports have surfaced that claim the Houthis have armed animals with explosives and left IEDs in villages in the area. A front page report in the Saudi Gazette said that forces "arrested a magician who had come to plant voodoo war magic on the battlefield to help fellow infiltrators." (COMMENT: Whether or not these reports are accurate, they reflect an interest in portraying the Houthis as a deviant group, willing to resort to any tactic to achieve its goals. END COMMENT.) SAUDI RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT SUPPORTIVE, CONCERNED -------------- -------------- ¶8. (U) Following King Abdullah,s statement regarding the Kingdom,s right to defend itself (ref B),the Kingdom,s most prominent religious leaders have predictably also spoken out in support of Saudi forces. On November 11, Chairman of the Council of Senior Scholars, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh, praised the Saudi forces fighting along the border, calling them "mujahedeen who are defending the faith" and "doing good and engaging in jihad for God." A leading Shiite cleric, Sheikh Hassan al-Safar, also spoke out the same day, denouncing the "aggression" of the infiltrators and confirming that he stood by "his home country," Saudi Arabia. "We ask the media and the writers in the Islamic world to rise above the sectarian discourse as this would harm the public interest of the nation, especially during such sensitive circumstances," he implored. IRAN WARNS AGAINST INTERVENTION -------------- ¶9. (U) On November 11, Iranian FM Mottaki issued an official statement cautioning against foreign intervention in Yemen. RIYADH 00001524 003.2 OF 004 While not naming names, Mottaki,s statement was interpreted as a direct indictment of the SAG,s military operations. A source in the Yemeni Foreign Ministry countered Mottaki,s statement, saying the Yemeni government rejected involvement in its internal affairs "by any party." Saudi papers report that Mottaki is planning to visit Saudi Arabia to meet with FM Saud and "reassure the authorities that Tehran has no intention of disrupting the Hajj." Mottaki's plans to visit are not yet confirmed. CONTINUING COMMUNICATION -------------- ¶10. (C) In an apparent bid to highlight Saudi-Yemeni coordination, SPA and other Saudi media prominently covered the November 14 visit by Yemeni Deputy PM for Defense and Security Affairs Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, who was said to carry a letter from President Saleh to King Abdullah. FM Saud and Assistant Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayif were also present at the meeting, together with the Yemeni Ambassador. Contents were not made public, but presumably dealt with Yemeni arms requests previously conveyed by Alimi. U.S. A NEW SCAPEGOAT? -------------- ¶11. (U) In an ironic twist, some Iranian-backed media outlets are beginning to characterize the Saudi decision to intervene as the result of U.S. pressure. In a November 14 interview with Beirut,s Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Manar TV, Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abd al-Salam characterized the conflict as "a U.S.-Yemeni security plan," and a "foreign aggression on Yemen." He denied claims that the Houthis had entered into Saudi territory, alleging instead that the Yemeni regime,s "failure to implement the U.S. plan to silence and subjugate (the Houthis)" had compelled the Yemeni government to "drag" the Saudis in and fight on their behalf. Al-Salam called the conflict a "war by proxy," and urged the Saudis to realize it was "not in their interest" and engage in dialogue with the Houthis. ¶12. (U) Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani made similar accusations of U.S. involvement in a speech to the Iranian parliament on November 15. According to an official Iranian News Agency report, Larijani criticized Saudi Arabia,s "tragic moves," describing them as "oppressive" measures made "with U.S. support." RIPPLE EFFECTS? -------------- ¶13. (U) Ripple effects from the Saudi-Yemeni border conflict have begun to appear in domestic politics elsewhere in the region. According to pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a controversy erupted in the Bahraini parliament after the 17 members of (Shiite) opposition party al-Wifaq allegedly voted against issuing a formal statement of support for Saudi Arabia. Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Sheikh Adel al-Muawdah accused al-Wifaq MPS of taking "a sectarian position which shows (their) true loyalty," and questioned how they could be "indifferent" to attacks directly supported by Iran." For their part, Al-Wifaq party leaders have maintained that they actually abstained from voting so as not to get involved in an internal Yemeni problem and should not be interpreted as a vote against "our elder sister Saudi Arabia." COMMENT: -------------- ¶14. (C) Nearly two weeks into its largest mobilization in twenty years, it would appear the Saudi military does not intend to become involved in fighting inside Yemen, but is rather focusing on creating an effective security buffer zone along the border. Prior Saudi efforts to secure the border have foundered over the government's indecision regarding how to handle the region's inhabitants, most of whom are Zaydi and living in villages straddling the border. The Houthi incursion appears to have handed the government the excuse it needed for a large-scale relocation of the region's entire population. The difficulty Saudi forces are having in RIYADH 00001524 004.2 OF 004 flushing out all of the militants suggests that the Houthis had, in fact, burrowed in to the border region to stay out of reach of the Yemeni army. With Al-Qaida able to infiltrate as easily as the Houthis, the situation presented a clear threat that no government could accept. ¶15. (S) The Saudi action to push the rebels back into Yemen will almost certainly help the ROYG, as will additional Saudi financial and material support. However, Saudi actions to date suggest the leadership is determined to avoid further entanglement in the conflict inside Yemen, and that while it will provide limited assistance to the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the primary task at hand will be creating a physical barrier to ensure the country's security. The internal-security focus was evident in the line-up of Saudi participants in the King's meeting with Yemeni Deputy PM Alimi. There were no representatives from MODA, though Assistant Interior Minister Muhammed bin Nayif was front and center, in his apparent new role as royal-in-charge of the Yemen file, taking over from his ailing uncle, Crown Prince Sultan. Once the border is secure, it may be possible to engage with Prince Mohammed and other members of the senior leadership to consider how most effectively to support the Yemeni government's efforts to settle the Houthi insurgency and re-establish central government authority. Despite the incessant Saudi rhetoric blaming Iran for the Houthi unrest, a number of senior Saudis have said in private that they believe the ROYG forces are undisciplined and poorly managed, and that Saleh's own policies had alienated the northern tribes. Saudi senior leaders are cognizant of the limits of military action, and will likely be interested in a range of policy options to preserve the region's stability once they do not feel immediately imperiled by Yemeni infiltrators. End Comment. SMITH