SCENESETTER FOR 17-19 NOVEMBER 2009 U.S.-SAUDI

S E C R E T RIYADH 001519 E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2019 TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS SA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR 17-19 NOVEMBER 2009 U.S.-SAUDI STRATEGIC JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: The upcoming U.S.-Saudi Strategic Joint Planning Committee (SJPC) talks will likely have a heightened sense of urgency given the ongoing Saudi operations on the Yemeni border. In addition to discussions of the items of business on the agenda, the meeting will also provide important opportunities to discuss current Saudi military concerns and requirements, as well as approaches to strengthen broad U.S.-Saudi military relations. On the pending sale of new F-15s, there have been numerous consultations since Secretary Gates' October 7 letter to King Abdullah with a proposed configuration. Prince Khalid bin Sultan has said that he does not yet have the King's approval to move forward, and that he does not want this issue to be a focus of discussions at the SJPC. End Summary. The Official Agenda -------------- ¶2. (C) The October 5-7 Military Joint Planning Committee meeting in Riyadh produced an agenda for the SJPC with the following major topics: Regional Security Issues, Comprehensive Defense Analysis, Air and Missile Defense, Eastern Fleet Modernization Program, Depleted Uranium, Weapons Releasability, Return of Dependents, and Visas. These issues will be briefed and discussed in either the SJPC Executive or Plenary Session. Support for RSAF Operational Requirements -------------- ¶3. (C) In response to the November 3 incursion of Yemeni Houthi rebels into Saudi territory, the Saudi military mobilized its Air, Land and Border Guard forces. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) took the lead in attacking the infiltrators who had dug into the mountainous terrain on the Saudi side of the border. On November 6, The RSAF requested that U.S. provide, on an urgent basis, weapons and equipment to enable its F-15s to strike with greater precision. Prince Khalid is looking for quick action on these requests; how the U.S. responds will likely affect the tone of the SJPC talks. F-15s - What More Does Prince Khalid Want? -------------- ¶4. (S) Secretary Gate's October 7, 2009 letter to King Abdullah provided assurances that the U.S. is prepared to equip Saudi Arabia with an aircraft configured with many of the systems requested by the RSAF, but not all. In a meeting with Ambassador Smith after seeing the letter, Prince Khalid reiterated that Saudi Arabia was looking for an aircraft with at least the same capabilities and systems as the Singapore and South Korean F-15s, and said that the aircraft described in Secretary Gates' letter did not meet that threshold. He also made clear that he would not be able to discuss the proposed procurement until he received approval to do so from King Abdullah. USMTM Chief Van Sickle separately heard that the approval from King Abdullah could take "months." ¶5. (S) We believe that there is strong support for a new F-15 purchase among key RSAF leadership. Also, we believe that Prince Khalid, being fully aware that Saudi Arabia's defenses are less than they should be in light of the growing Iranian threat, understands that new F-15s would significantly bolster Saudi Arabia's Iran-focused defensive capabilities. Further, with the recent employment of the F-15s to end the Yemeni incursion, the RSAF F-15s have acquired a more prominent symbolic status as the means by with Saudi Arabia projects power to defend its borders. This may further clarify for the King and others in the Saudi political leadership that new F-15s should have a place in the country's future. ¶6. (S) So what does Prince Khalid want? Our communications and negotiation about the aircraft in recent weeks may have been complicated in part because his father, Defense Minister Sultan, is on the margin rather than in the middle. Prince Khalid cannot speak or act with the authority of his father. He must be cautious; his caution has manifested itself in appeals to senior U.S. visitors to lobby the Saudi political leadership to increase MODA budgets and support MODA procurements. Our way forward should take into account the Saudi belief that the U.S. has withheld systems from their current F-15s after giving assurances that they would receive them. We should also take into account that we need to equip Prince Khalid with strong arguments, and high level political support, that he can take to his leadership to justify the procurement. Reinvigorating the Military to Military Relationship -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S) This SJPC marks a resumption of consultations that last took place in March 2008. It takes place at a time when we can say that many of the difficulties that hurt our political and military relations after 9/11 are receding. The SJPC thus represents an important opportunity to take another step toward reenergizing the traditionally strong U.S.-Saudi military partnership. We can accomplish much if we are able to convincingly convey assurances that their concerns are being heard, and that the partnership is not being taken for granted. SMITH