SAUDIS REACT TO BORDER INCURSION WITH AIRSTRIKES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001478 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019 TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL SA YM IR SUBJECT: SAUDIS REACT TO BORDER INCURSION WITH AIRSTRIKES REF: A. RIYADH 1470 ¶B. SANAA 2029 ¶C. RIYADH 1396 RIYADH 00001478 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith, for reasons 1.4 (a),(b) & (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) The Royal Saudi Air Force has reacted to the November 3 attack on a border post by presumed Yemeni Houthi rebels with ongoing airstrikes to eject the rebels from Saudi territory and deter further incursions. The incident, in which at least one Saudi border guard died and at least 11 were injured, follows other cross-border skirmishes and incursions by Al Qaida elements. It has provoked SAG alarm and determination to demonstrate (to Al-Qaida, the Houthis, Iran, and perhaps most importantly, the ROYG) the Saudi ability and intent to vigorously defend its border. Military operations along the border are ongoing. Embassy expects that they will be confined to the border region, as the SAG's overriding concern is border security. Despite a desire to support the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, all available evidence indicates that the Saudis do not/not want to be drawn into operations inside Yemen. End summary. AIRSTRIKES ONGOING -------------- ¶2. (S) Following an attack by presumed Houthi rebels on a Saudi border post in Jebel Dukhan on November 3, the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) bombed positions of Yemeni rebels dug into positions on Mount Dukhan on the Saudi-Yemeni border. RSAF Deputy Commander MG Ayyash reported that F-15 aircraft were being used, that the air strikes were continuing (as of approximately 1500 on November 5),and were being conducted only on the Saudi side of the border. WHAT JUST HAPPENED? -------------- ¶3. (S) The November 3 incursion was not the first time that fighting between ROYG forces and Houthi rebels has spilled across the border, though it is the first time Saudi forces were directly engaged. While events are still unclear, a number of factors help explain why it occurred: --Mount Dukhan straddles the Saudi-Yemeni border. Its peak has been claimed by Saudi Arabia since April 2001 when Yemen and Saudi Arabia reached a border demarcation agreement. The Houthis dispute this. The Saudis have maintained a border guard base near the top of Mount Dukhan for years. -- The Houthis claim that in recent weeks the Saudis withdrew from the Mount Dukhan border post so that Yemeni Government (ROYG) forces could use it to mount operations against the Houthis. The Embassy has not been able to confirm this; most of this information comes from media interviews by Houthis who have given accounts of Yemeni troops shooting down at them from positions on top Mount Dukhan. --As we see it now, the most plausible explanations for why the Houthi group moved into Saudi territory are that 1) they were seeking to attack Yemeni forces that they believed were positioned near the top of Mount Dukhan or 2) they were being pursued by ROYG forces and were compelled to cross into Saudi territory. There is little reason to believe that the Houthis were seeking to draw Saudi forces into a fight. SAUDI MILITARY REACTION TO DEFEND BORDER -------------- ¶4. (S) The Saudi reaction to the incursion was unusually swift. In addition to airstrikes, nearly a dozen villages in the border area have been evacuated, and additional forces moved into the area. Saudi government statements on Nov. 4 emphasized the government's determination to defend its borders from all threats and to punish those responsible for the incursion. On Nov. 5, many Saudi Arabic newspapers headlined the story and some articles added other indications RIYADH 00001478 002.2 OF 002 about the Saudi thinking, such as "Iranian Agents Threaten Our Southern Border." While official statements do not mention Iran, this is a principal theme in the Arabic-language media, and the Saudi leadership has made clear its conviction that Iran supports the Houthi rebels. ¶5. (S/NF) The military response and public statements underscore that the SAG's primary concern is border security, which is their main defense against Al-Qaida attacks from Yemen. The Saudis are deeply concerned that President Saleh is unable and perhaps unwilling to mount an effective campaign against Al-Qaida while battling the Houthis. While they regard Saleh as corrupt, unreliable and largely ineffective, they see no alternative to supporting him, and assess that their own security depends on his ability to settle the Houthi rebellion. As we recently heard from Foreign Minister Al-Faisal, the Saudis have concluded that a negotiated settlement is no longer possible. They have appealed to their GCC partners and the U.S. to bolster the ROYG's ability to put down the Houthis. Meanwhile the SAG has been walking a fine line of quietly facilitating Yemeni military operations while trying not to get drawn directly into the fighting. (See REF C for details). WHAT NEXT? -------------- ¶6. (S) The prominent and sensational press coverage of the incident suggests a SAG campaign to build local and regional support for military actions against the Houthis to secure the border. As of midday on Nov. 5, skirmishes are ongoing, suggesting that the Yemenis intruders have not been removed from Mount Dukhan. The Saudis are likely to continue military operations along the border until they are convinced that there will be no further such incidents. The SAG is determined to demonstrate its resolve, not only to the Houthis and their perceived Iranian mentors and to Al-Qaida elements in Yemen, but to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, to make clear the Saudi view that he must act decisively to regain control of Yemen. SMITH