SAUDI ARABIA VS. UAE: KUWAIT THE REFEREE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001474

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA KU AE
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA VS. UAE: KUWAIT THE REFEREE?

REF: A. RIYADH 1156

B. RIYADH 1339

C. ABU DHABI 981

Classified By: CDA Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Saudi officials have continually downplayed reports
of Saudi-UAE friction (ref C) during the last several months,
characterizing it as a "light problem" (ref B) that will be
"fixed in the near future" (ref A). While post's GCC
contacts remain generally tight-lipped, the Kuwaitis have
told us that rising tensions are "a major issue" and claim to
be playing an active role in mediating the dispute. END
SUMMARY.


SAUDI-UAE TENSIONS A "MAJOR ISSUE"
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2. (C) In a conversation with Poloff on November 3, Kuwaiti
First Secretary Adel Al-Ghenaiman (protect) said that Kuwait
viewed deteriorating Saudi-UAE relations as a "major issue"
and added that the Kuwaiti government was actively involved
in mediating the dispute. Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed
Al-Jaber Al-Sabah had focused on this topic during his
October 6 meeting with Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan in
Abu Dhabi, he continued, and had encouraged the UAE to take a
more moderate stance. Following that meeting, Al-Nahyan had
delivered a response to Al-Sabah and asked that it be
delivered to King Abdullah. The Kuwaiti Ambassador to Riyadh
was expected to deliver this response to King Abdullah on the
evening of November 3. While Ghenaiman did not know the
exact contents of the note, he believed the two sides were
moving closer together and thought an "understanding" could
be reached prior to the GCC's planned December summit in
Kuwait.


GCC UNITY TRUMPS THE BLAME GAME
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3. (C) From Ghenaiman's perspective, the Saudis and the
Emiratis shared the blame. However, GCC unity had to take
priority over bilateral disputes and a moderation of the UAE
position was the most practical solution. The Saudis, he
observed, were being "greedy" to insist upon the terms of the
1974 agreement. The Saudis called the smaller GCC states
their "brothers," he continued, but clearly considered
themselves first among equals. This was a continuous source
of tension, which different GCC countries dealt with in
different ways. Nevertheless, the UAE had gone "too far" by
challenging the validity of the 1974 treaty in an overt and
confrontational way. There may be issues with the treaty,
Ghenaiman conceded, but it was supposed to be a treaty
between states and not individuals. The Emiratis refusal to
honor it following a change in leadership was unsettling, and
cast their general trustworthiness in doubt.


NAYIF'S 2005 VISIT: WHERE IT ALL BEGAN?
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4. (C) Ghenaiman identified Prince Nayif's 2005 visit to Abu
Dhabi as the real beginning of the current problem. Prince
Nayif had traveled to Abu Dhabi with the intention of
discussing and resolving the border dispute, Ghenaiman said,
but the Emiratis had treated the visit as a courtesy call and
refused to get down to business. A frustrated Nayif
supposedly then raised the issue directly, but the Emiratis
would still not engage. Nayif remained the SAG's lead on the
issue, and the Kuwaiti Ambassador had met with him twice in
recent months to advocate for an amicable resolution.
However, Nayif was currently out of the country.


COMMENT
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5. (C) Given the tight-lipped nature of most of our
diplomatic contacts from GCC countries, Ghenaiman's candor is
refreshing. However, his analysis of Saudi and Emirati
behavior may reflect his own opinions rather than the party
line. His description of how Nayif viewed the 2005 visit to
Abu Dhabi, based on recent conversations between Nayif and
the Kuwaiti Ambassador, is inconsistent with Emirati reports
suggesting Nayif was the one who was unwilling to budge.
However, it suggests misunderstanding and personal distrust
are at the heart of the matter. Kuwait's attempts at
mediation are an acknowledgement of the growing seriousness
of the problem. END COMMENT.

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ZIADEH