NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: PART 2 OF 2:

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 001442 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2019 TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG IAEA KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA, NPT SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: PART 2 OF 2: REVIEW CONFERENCE INPUT FOR SAUDI ARABIA REF: A. STATE 083600 ¶B. RIYADH 1061 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Saudi Arabian government is generally supportive of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control issues, although its cooperation is calibrated against regional concerns, such as Israeli policies, Iranian threats, and the imperative of maintaining Arab unity. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) What is the host government's general attitude towards CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts? What factors influence its attitudes and positions? -- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is generally supportive of CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts. The lack of Israeli participation in NPT influences KSA's attitudes and positions. ¶3. (U) What position on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts is the host government likely to take in upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review Conference in 2010? -- The Saudi Arabian government (SAG) is likely to be supportive of others' efforts but not likely to be proactive in offering to host a conference or take leadership roles. ¶4. (U) With which countries does the host country work most closely on these issues? -- The SAG works most closely with Arab League members, GCC states and the U.S. on NPT issues. ¶5. (C) Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, related ministries (such as defense and energy),and their diplomatic missions to arms control fora? -- The key nonproliferation advisor is Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal. Prince Turki, the number 3 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),is also an influential official though decisions on these issues rest with the Foreign Minister. ¶6. (U) What role do you play in arms control and nonproliferation organizations? Do you take a leadership role on any issues? -- The U.S. Embassy's main role has been to keep Saudi counterparts apprised of nonproliferation initiatives, programs, and events. ¶7. (C) How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation policymaking process work, and what is the interplay among government officials and agencies? -- Key nonproliferation issues would be presented to King Abdullah during weekly Council of Ministers meetings. The MFA develops policy based on the King's directions. The King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) serves as the implementing organization within the Saudi government. ¶8. (C) Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and on which issues? -- The King, the MFA, and KACST carry the most weight on nonproliferation issues. ¶9. (C) What are the key factors that drive adoption or rejection of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms control or nonproliferation issues? -- The key factors that drive adoption or rejection of policies are limited Saudi capacity (i.e. to execute obligations of PSA) and limited number of effective senior managers in government. Another factor is Saudi concern about how its diplomatic agreements are perceived in the Arab world and by regional governments. ¶10. (C) How many people in host country's missions (New York, Geneva, and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms control and nonproliferation issues? Who are they? -- Our understanding is that no more than one officer in each mission has nonproliferation as a part of his portfolio. ¶11. (C) Are mission personnel and resources augmented during key relevant meetings? -- During meetings considered of high importance, Saudi representatives from MFA will represent the SAG. For events regarded to be of less importance, a Saudi official from the nearest embassy or consulate would represent. ¶12. (U) What are the roles and influence of the host country's nuclear power industry (if any),academia, and non-governmental organizations in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making? -- The nuclear power industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations have a very limited role and little influence in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making. ¶13. (U) What are the key alliances with other governments on arms control and nonproliferation issues. For example, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)? -- The key alliance for the SAG on arms control and nonproliferation issues is with the GCC. Arab League consensus is also important to the SAG on these issues. ¶14. (C) To what extent does the host government appear to influence, follow, or diverge from the NAM or G-77 line? -- KSA views its NPT policies and obligations primarily as justified by Saudi national interest, and secondarily as part of the Arab League and GCC collective, with constraints imposed by regional political conditions, i.e. Israel's non participation in NPT and Iran's maverick nuclear development policy. ¶15. (C) How much flexibility do the missions to the UN, CD, and IAEA appear to have, and to what extent do they appear to receive guidance from capital? To what extent do they need further guidance from capital to engage on RevCon objectives? -- It can be assumed that the Saudi missions to the UN, CD, and IAEA will not take significant decisions or initiatives without clear guidance and approvals from MFA Riyadh. SMITH