SAUDI-IRAQI RELATIONS: "GREAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001408 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV SA IZ SUBJECT: SAUDI-IRAQI RELATIONS: "GREAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS BUT GREAT OPPORTUNITIES" REF: RIYADH 1051 RIYADH 00001408 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During an October 12 introductory call with Ambassador Smith, Iraqi Ambassador Ghanim Al-Jumaily characterized the Saudi-Iraqi relationship as full of "great misunderstandings and great opportunities;" criticized the Iraqi government for failing to articulate its vision; called for greater Saudi-Iraqi security cooperation as the first step to improved relations; and expressed gratitude for U.S. support and cooperation. He said that "explaining Saudi views to Iraqis was a struggle," but that he believed both countries ultimately shared similar ideas about the ideal future for Iraq. In his view, Iraqis had not shown a strong willingness to engage the Saudis. He suggested that if Iraq were to directly address the three main areas of Saudi concern-- internal stability, Iranian influence, and Iraq's Arab identity-- Saudi Arabia and other Arab neighbors would be quick to respond. END SUMMARY. WE WANT YOU TO SUCCEED -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador welcomed Jumaily warmly, and stressed that "we want you to succeed." Jumaily thanked him for U.S. support and said he looked forward to a close working relationship with the U.S. Embassy. Ambassador asked for Jumaily's views as to the best way to convince the Saudis to take constructive action, such as open an Embassy in Baghdad. Jumaily said that in order to effect change, we first needed to understand what the Saudis really wanted; how they looked at Iraq; and recognize the "disconnect" between the Iraqi perception of Saudi views, and actual Saudi views--as he had come to understand them-- during his time in the Kingdom. SAUDIS HAVE THREE MAIN CONCERNS -------------- ¶3. (C) The Saudis were concerned with three main factors, observed Jumaily. First, they worried about their own internal security. Iraqi instability had the potential to spillover into Iraq, and the presence of Al-Qaeda elements was an existential threat to the Kingdom. Next, of equal and sometimes greater importance, they were concerned with Iranian influence. Iranian and Shia influence were not the same thing, Jumaily stressed, and an Arab-oriented Shia was preferable to an Iranian-influenced Sunni from the Saudi point of view. This was an aspect of the Saudi view that Iraqis and others often failed to understand. Lastly, they worried about the identity of the new Iraq-- whether it would be an Arab country, where it would stand on important regional issues, and how it planned to use its substantial and undeniable POLITICAL weight in the region. EXPLAINING SAUDI VIEWS A STRUGGLE -------------- ¶4. (C) On the whole, the Saudi-Iraqi relationship was full of "great misunderstandings and great opportunities," and Jumaily described his "difficult struggle" to explain the Saudi perspective to his government. "There is so much alignment between what the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Iraq all want," he observed. "We all want Iraq to use its weight positively in regional politics, to support the peace process, to promote non-violence, and to maintain good neighborly relations." IDEAL RELATIONSHIP: THE U.S.-U.K. MODEL -------------- ¶5. (C) Jumaily described the ideal Saudi-Iraqi relationship as a strategic rather than tactical one. The countries were too important to one another to allow the strength of the relationship to depend on leaders and personalities. He said the Saudis had failed to distinguish between the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government. "Iraq has embraced democracy," he observed, but the Iraqi leadership seemed to waver in its commitment. Rather than focus on improving the relationships between the two heads of state, the Saudis and Iraqis should begin working level discussions on security, economics, and regional issues. Improvements in the security relationship RIYADH 00001408 002.2 OF 003 would lead to improvements in the economic relationship. These, in turn, would lead to improvements in the POLITICAL relationship, which could eventually culminate in a meeting of the two heads of state. IRAQ MUST EXPLAIN ITSELF TO ITS NEIGHBORS -------------- ¶6. (C) Iraq itself was partly to blame for its poor relationship with Saudi Arabia and other neighbors, Jumaily noted, in that its leaders had failed to articulate their vision for the new Iraq. Its neighbors were watching and waiting, fearful of the direction it might choose. Recent statements regarding Kuwait had done nothing to calm these fears. "Iraq has to come out and explain itself to the region, make a statement that this is where Iraq wants to be." By publicly and directly addressing the Saudis' three main areas of concern, Jumaily continued, Iraq would earn the trust of not only the Saudis, but the rest of its Arab neighbors. IMPROVED SAUDI-SYRIAN RELATIONS GOOD FOR IRAQ -------------- ¶7. (C) Jumaily cited Syria as the one possible exception to this rule. Why, asked Ambassador, was Syria the exception? Jumaily explained that Syria had shifted towards Iran, and no longer recognized its position in the Arab world, but that this could change. He said that the symbolism of King's Abdullah's October 7-8 visit to Damascus was significant and would have a positive effect on Iraq and the region, regardless of whether it delivered any immediate POLITICAL results. The major issues in the region were all linked, he explained, and the real struggle was between those who held sectarian and those who held moderate views. SECURITY VS. ECONOMY: CHICKEN VS. EGG -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador observed that Jumaily's observations presented a dilemma. While focusing on improving the economic relationship seemed a good place to start, this could be viewed as a challenge to the POLITICAL structure. Jumaily responded that we should begin by improving security cooperation, which would lead to economic cooperation while at the same time strengthening the POLITICAL structure. He perceived strong support among high-level Saudi officials, including FM Saud Al-Faisal, for greater security cooperation, but saw Prince Naif as a "stumbling block." He cited General Intelligence Directorate head Prince Muqrin as the most "forward-leaning" among Saudi officials, noting he had previously expressed willingness to work with former Iraqi intelligence Chief Mohammed Abdullah Al-Shawani. However, the Saudis' unwillingness to engage with other members of Iraq's security establishment remained an issue. SAUDIS "RELUCTANT TO STIR THE POT" -------------- ¶9. (C) Responding to a query about Iraq's upcoming elections, Jumaily said the Saudis were faced with a "Catch-22." "Their policy is non-interference," he said, "they have told me King Abdullah does not want to appoint the next Iraqi president, but he wants to make sure no one else gets to do so." The Saudis were watching and waiting to see if Iraq would move in a nationalist, rather than sectarian direction, he said, but they didn't want to intervene. Jumaily cautioned that others were willing to intervene on behalf of sectarian interests, and that it would be difficult for Iraq to resist these forces. "The Saudis recognize the importance of these elections," he concluded, but "don't want to put their hands in the pot." NO WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE -------------- ¶10. (C) Jumaily said his main challenge was to convince both sides that there was room for cooperation, and lamented that he was not succeeding, especially on the Iraqi side. "I do not see a strong willingness to engage the Saudis," he observed, "perhaps they believe this will come at a price." Asked if perhaps the Iraqi government might feel the need to demonstrate its independence, Jumaily responded that talk about Iraq tended to focus on symbolism rather than RIYADH 00001408 003.2 OF 003 substance, and that the moderate Arab governments in the region recognized that, like it or not, Iraq was and would remain influenced by U.S. policy. They had some concerns regarding the nature of any continued U.S. presence in Iraq, but their real concern remained Iran. "It's mind-boggling," he continued, "when someone in the Iraqi parliament stands up and expresses support for the Houthis in Yemen." MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME -------------- ¶11. (C) Putting Iraq on the right track would do wonders to improve the region's perceptions of the U.S. and its role, Jumaily noted, and "Iraq is a tipping point." He said Iraq needed to make up for lost time and "present a vision, wherever it comes from," so as to avoid a POLITICAL conversation that focused on personalities. "I don't think the Saudis, Jordanians, or Egyptians care who is in power," he suggested, "what they care about is Iraq's position on key issues." It was natural for politicians to focus on symbols rather than substance, but by allowing them to do so we had let Iraqi officials "off the hook." NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶12. (C) Ambassador reiterated that there was strong, continued U.S. support for Iraq and asked for some specific steps the U.S. might take to help improve the Saudi-Iraqi relationship. "A lot must be done in Washington and in Baghdad," Jumaily responded, and reiterated the need for Iraqi leaders to articulate their vision and directly address the three main issues of Saudi concern. He also cited again the need to bring the Saudis and Iraqis together to discuss security, and suggested the Iraqi leadership might be moved to action if this was presented to them as key to their own self-preservation. With respect to whether there were elements within PM Maliki's proposed non-sectarian coalition that could be helpful in swaying the PM and his aides to cooperate, Jumaily was skeptical. Maliki's inner-circle was against building such a coalition, he said, and unless this issue was addressed Maliki's coalition would remain about symbolism rather than substance. However, trust was very important in the Bedouin culture that Saudis and Iraqis shared, and it would take a long time for Maliki to win King Abdullah's back. SMITH