SAUDIS TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: PEACE PROCESS NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000134 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2019 TAGS: PREL SAIS IS KPAL SUBJECT: SAUDIS TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: PEACE PROCESS NOW Classified By: Ambassador Ford Fraker, reasons 1.4 b, d. Key Points: --(U) FM Saud Al-Faisal strongly urged that the new US administration engage early and meaningfully to restart the Middle East peace process. --(C) The Saudis fear that strong popular Arab reaction to events in Gaza may destabilize region unless the US acts. --(C) Saud said leaders gathered in Kuwait might call for deployment of an international force to Gaza. --(U) FM Saud asked to arrange a congratulatory phone call to Secretary-designate Clinton as soon as convenient. (C) COMMENT: Saud,s gently worded warnings about the dangers posed by delays in resuming the peace process were bluntly and succinctly echoed by King Abdallah in the opening session of the Arab Economic Summit in Kuwait on January 19: Israel should realize that the choice between peace and war will not be available indefinitely, and that the Arab Peace Initiative, currently on the table, will not remain on the table forever. To underscore his determination, he then held reconciliation talks with Bashar Al-Asad. Events in Gaza have apparently resulted in renewed Arab unity, at least in popular outrage. The Saudis fear instability and increased Iranian influence could result, and believe that there is a limited window of opportunity for action. They say they are ready to participate as partners if the US is ready to lead. End comment. ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 7. ¶2. (C) SAUDIS PLEASED WITH AMBASSADORIAL EXTENSION: In a January 18 meeting, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal warmly welcomed the news that Ambassador Fraker,s tenure had been extended to facilitate the transition between US administrations. "This is an excellent sign for the new administration," Saud declared, adding that it would ensure a smooth handover and continued good bilateral cooperation. ¶3. (C) NEXT STEPS ON GAZA: The January 19-20 Arab Economic Summit in Kuwait would focus on the Gaza situation, Saud explained, though the ministers would also be considering some 42 decisions related to regional economic development. With a fragile cease-fire in place, there was a growing consensus that the best case scenario would involve the deployment of an international force in Gaza, along the border with Egypt and possibly in a buffer zone along the northern border with Israel. Some worried that such forces would end up in conflict with Hamas, but the Saudis believed this was not likely. Saud did not provide details about the make up or sponsorship of such an international force, but said it was likely that the final summit communiqu would urge its creation. ¶4. (C) URGENT US ACTION NEEDED: Saud said that he hoped Ambassador Fraker could convince the new US administration to urgently engage in the Middle East peace process by taking "meaningful steps" towards establishing a Palestinian state. Such action would strengthen those on the Arab side who favor peace and help undermine Hamas and build Palestinian unity. "Hamas is not an option," but the people of Gaza will only support the side able to secure benefits. "Abu Mazen is the only one who can do this, but he needs help." ¶5. (C) THE SAUDI MESSAGE: Prince Saud strongly urged that President Obama and Secretary-designate Clinton start early on the peace process and convince Israel that the US government has a firm position on establishing a Palestinian state. The Arab peace initiative was based on the concept that "the US would bring Israel, and the Arabs would bring the Palestinians." Now, the Saudi and other Arab governments looked to the US to act, and for both sides to move in tandem. In Saud,s view, this was most important. If Israel believed that the Arabs remained disillusioned with the US (and presumably disinclined to act as partners in a peace process),it would continue to act unilaterally, and count on unqualified US support for its actions. This was very shortsighted, because Israel should have seen the limits of what its military action could achieve. A chink had appeared in Israel's armor, Saud warned. In the absence of a peace process, there will be growing turmoil and instability in the region, and pressure to exploit Israel's weaknesses. (Comment: Saud appeared to be alluding to Iranian attempts to expand its influence, and the belief among the rejectionist Palestinian factions encouraged by Syria and RIYADH 00000134 002 OF 002 Iran, that since Hizballah and now Hamas had both survived military confrontations with Israel, armed confrontation was a viable option. End comment.) ¶6. (C) BILATERAL PRIORITIES: In response to the Ambassador's question, Saud mentioned two key priorities for the new administration: continuing efforts to strengthen Saudi Arabia's military, which should help stabilize the region by providing some balance to the Iranian threat, and increasing "human to human contact." ¶7. (U) PHONE CALL REQUEST. In that connection, the Foreign Minister requested the Ambassador's assistance in arranging for a phone call with the Secretary-Designate; it was his hope to extend his congratulations on her assumption of her new duties personally. The Ambassador assured him that he would convey the request as soon as possible. ¶8. (U) Please advise. FRAKER